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Chapter 1
The Spatial Consequences of Non-Balanced
Growth
1.1 Introduction
This essay develops a theoretical model of regional development in the presence of non-
balanced growth (NBG) and uses it to analyze the consequences of NBG at the national
level for the spatial distribution of population and production. The term NBG refers
to systematic changes in the employment and output shares of the major sectors
of the economy over time in the process of economic development (see Kongsamut,
Rebelo, and Xie 2001; Acemoglu and Guerrieri 2008). This essay focuses on the
spatial consequences of deindustrialization —the increase in the service sector’s share
of total employment over time relative to goods producing sectors —which is the most
prominent form of NBG in advanced economies. The analysis considers the three
explanations for NBG most emphasized in the literature: supply-side NBG, where
NBG results from differential rates of productivity growth across sectors; demand-
side NBG, where NBG results from differences in the income elasticities of demand
for sectoral output; and NBG in an open economy, where change in the terms of trade
1
between countries results in NBG.1 As these alternative explanations for NBG are
neither mutually exclusive nor contradictory, all three causal explanations for NBG
may be simultaneously influencing the spatial development of an economy undergoing
NBG.
It is shown in this essay that the presence of NBG on the national level influences
how the spatial distributions of population and production change as a consequence
of economic growth. How the spatial distribution of the economy evolves as a con-
sequence of economic growth (and how the spatial distribution of the economy in-
fluences the process of economic growth) is one of the central questions in economic
geography (Gabaix 1999; Duranton 2007). The theoretical analysis suggests a simple
mechanism for how NBG may influence the spatial distribution of the economy: when
there are differences in the relative importance of regional economic characteristics
between the major sectors of the economy, NBG will cause population to shift to-
wards regions whose economic characteristics give them a comparative advantage in
the sector(s) whose share of total employment is expanding. In this essay, the term
regional economic characteristics refers both to regions’innate geographic character-
istics —or first-nature features —and to regions’endogenous economic characteristics
—or second-nature features.
In addition to influencing the spatial distribution of the economy, NBG is shown
to have implications for how a region’s economic characteristics influence its rate of
population growth. The relationship between a region’s economic characteristics and
its population growth rate is another major question in economic geography (e.g.,
Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 1995). It is shown that when NBG influences
regional population movements, the presence of NBG can undermine two important
1Supply-side non-balanced growth is also referred to as technology-based non-balanced growth.
Demand-side non-balanced growth is also referred to preference-based non-balanced growth.
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predictions of previous models of urban and regional development concerning the
relationship between a region’s economic characteristics and its rate of population
growth. First, NBG can disrupt the self-reinforcing relationship between the spatial
agglomeration of economic activity and regional population growth emphasized in
previous models (e.g., Krugman 1991; Venables 1996; Baldwin and Forslid 2000). In
particular, it is shown that when economic growth is non-balanced, it can lead to a
reduction in the spatial agglomeration of economic activity at both the regional level,
leading to (relative) population decline in agglomerated regions, and the national
level, leading to a more even distribution of population across regions in the economy.
Moreover, this result holds in a theoretical model where agglomeration externalities
benefit both regional productivity and regional productivity growth. Agglomeration
externalities refer to the advantages that firms and workers receive from locating close
to one another spatially that are external to the firm or worker, but internal to the
region in which the firm or worker operates.2
Second, it is shown that the presence of NBG on the national level can attenuate
the positive relationship between regional productivity growth and regional popu-
lation growth emphasized in previous models of urban and regional development.
(The term productivity growth in this essay refers to total factor productivity growth
unless otherwise specified.) In many previous models of urban and regional develop-
ment, such as Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1995) and Palivos and Wang (1996),
above-average productivity growth in a region increases the return to regional factors
of production, including labor, and encourages in-migration. The analysis in this
2Duranton and Puga (2004) survey the theoretical literature on agglomeration externalities.
Rosenthal and Strange (2004) survey this literature’s empirical counterpart. Berliant and Ping
(2004) and Henderson (2006) survey the literature that examines the relationship between agglom-
eration externalities and urban and regional economic and population growth. In addition to the
term agglomeration externalities, the terms agglomeration economies and localized production exter-
nalities are also used.
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essay demonstrates that in certain circumstances, NBG can cause this positive rela-
tionship between regional productivity and population growth to be reversed, with
regions concentrated in relatively stagnant sectors experiencing stronger population
growth. This result is in agreement with recent patterns of regional development
in the United States and other advanced economies, where many of the regions that
have experienced the strongest population growth have been concentrated in relatively
stagnant sectors of the economy (Glaeser and Tobio 2007).
The spatial consequences of deindustrialization have received little formal theo-
retical analysis in the previous literature. Indeed, theoretical studies that have jointly
analyzed location and economic growth, such as Baldwin and Forslid (2000) and Fu-
jita and Thisse (2003), have focused on the relationship between economic growth and
the spatial distribution of the economy, and do not consider the influence of changes
in sectoral employment shares over the process of development. The lack of formal
analysis of the spatial consequences of deindustrialization is in marked contrast to
the literature on urban-rural transformation, where numerous studies have examined
the spatial consequences of industrialization — the movement of workers from the
agricultural sector to non-agricultural sectors (Becker, Mills, and Williamson 1986;
Davis and Henderson 2003). This lack of attention is surprising given that deindus-
trialization has been observed in almost every advanced economy — in the United
States since the mid-1960s and in Western Europe and Japan since the early 1970s
—and that the shift in the sectoral composition of employment towards services in
many of these economies has been profound. Consider the recent transformation of
the U.S. economy: in 1957, the service sector comprised 57% of total employment; by
2000, it comprised 75% (Lee and Wolpin 2006). Further, Rowthorn and Ramaswamy
(1999) find, when looking at changes in the service sector employment relative to
manufacturing, that between 1960 and 1994 the total number of workers engaged
in manufacturing across advanced economies as a whole remained roughly constant,
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while employment in the service sector grew at an average annual rate of 2.2%.
The magnitude of theses changes in the sectoral composition of employment sug-
gests that deindustrialization is likely to have consequences for many aspects of
the economy, including the spatial distribution of population and production. In-
deed, several empirical studies of regional development in advanced economies have
found that deindustrialization is concurrent with the population decline of regions
whose economies are relatively less concentrated in services.3 For example, Glaeser,
Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1995), when considering the growth of cities in the United
States between 1960 and 1990, and Combes (2000), when considering the growth of
French employment regions between 1984 and 1993, find that regions significantly in-
volved in manufacturing grew more slowly in terms of both population and per capita
income than regions less involved in manufacturing.
This essay’s focus on deindustrialization is reflected in the importance given to
endogenous regional economic characteristics in the analysis. Previous models of
urban-rural transformation, such as Davis and Henderson (2003), have exogenously
assumed that certain regions are more suitable for agricultural production (e.g., rural
regions) and certain regions are more suitable for non-agricultural production (e.g.,
urban regions). In the case of deindustrialization, however, it is less defensible to as-
sume that there are exogenous differences in the suitability of regions for production
in services relative to goods production. The assumption of exogenous differences is
less defensible because both the service and goods-producing sectors are largely ur-
3It is only the subset of industries in the manufacturing and service sectors that generate export
revenue for a region whose location decisions will influence the spatial distribution of the economy.
Black and Henderson (2003) find that 65% of employment —some manufacturing (wholesale trade,
construction, etc.) and some service (retail, restaurants, etc.) — is relatively constant across re-
gions in the United States. It is industries that comprise the remaining 35% of employment that
account for regional heterogeneity in industrial composition and whose location decisions influence
the distribution of economic activity across regions.
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ban. Both sectors being largely urban is important because the benefits from urban
production are thought to be related to the spatial concentration of workers and firms
in urban areas —i.e., to agglomeration externalities —which is endogenous. Because
of the importance of agglomeration externalities, endogenous regional economic char-
acteristics must be explicitly taken into account in the model presented in this essay
in order to make the analysis relevant to understanding the spatial consequences of
deindustrialization.
As is mentioned above, the term NBG in this essay refers to systematic changes in
the employment and output shares of the major sectors of the economy in the process
of economic development. The analysis in this essay focuses by and large on NBG as it
applies to changes in sectoral employment shares because it is changes in employment
shares that are relevant for regional population movements. Certain studies have used
the term “structural change”to refer to changes in sectoral employment shares that
occur over long periods of time (e.g., Ngai and Pissarides 2007). This essay uses
the term NBG rather than structural change because, as has been pointed out in
Matsuyama (2007), the term structural change is often used more broadly to refer
to changes in all aspects of the economy brought about by economic growth and the
accompanying increases in per capita income.4
The term deindustrialization in this essay refers to the increase in the service
sector’s share of total employment over time relative to a broadly defined goods-
producing sector, which includes both manufacturing and agriculture.5 This essay
defines deindustrialization in this way because its intent is to explore the spatial con-
4According to Matsuyama (2007), structural change includes changes in the sectoral composition
of output and employment, changes in the distribution of income and wealth, changes in demograph-
ics (population age distribution, etc.), and changes in institutions, such as the financial system, the
organization of industry, and political institutions.
5Note that together, services, manufacturing, and agriculture comprise all of private-sector em-
ployment.
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sequences of NBG where the economic forces driving NBG are those associated with
the rise in the service sector’s share of total employment in advanced economies. The
rise in the service sector’s share of total employment in the later stages of development
is pervasive across advanced economies, and the primary explanations offered for this
rise —slower productivity growth in services (e.g., supply-side NBG) and higher in-
come elasticities of demand for service sector output (e.g., demand-side NBG) —apply
to the increase in the service sector’s share of total employment relative to both man-
ufacturing and agriculture. This use of the term deindustrialization is different from
that of several previous studies, which use deindustrialization to refer to the decline
in the manufacturing sector’s shares of total employment (see Eltis 1996; Rowthorn
and Ramaswamy 1999; Pitelis and Antonakis 2003).6
In the theoretical model, a region is defined by the geographic extent of its labor
market. In particular, it is assumed that the geographic range of workers is limited
so that the physically immobile factors of production (e.g., land) in a region can
only be used by workers located in the region. It is also assumed that agglomeration
externalities are limited to workers and firms in a given region. This latter assumption
agrees with previous empirical research that suggests that agglomeration externalities
have limited geographic reach (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1993; Ellison and
Glaeser 1997; Wallsten 2001).
On a formal level, the theoretical model developed in this essay combines a Romer
(1990)-type model of endogenous growth with horizontally differentiated inputs and
a core-periphery model of economic geography. The model extends previous multi-
sector, multi-region, general-equilibrium models of regional development by allowing
endogenous labor allocation across both sectors and regions within an analytically
6These previous studies attempt to explain the relative decline of the manufacturing sector in
specific countries (e.g., the United Kingdom in Eltis (1996) and Greece in Pitelis and Antonakis
(2003)) or across advanced countries as a whole (e.g., Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1999).
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tractable model of endogenous growth. This extension is essential to analyzing both
NBG (intersectoral labor mobility) and its spatial consequences (interregional labor
mobility). The theoretical framework builds off previous models, such as Baldwin
and Forslid (2000) and Fujita and Thisse (2003), that have successfully incorporated
agglomeration externalities into a tractable, multi-region growth model with factor
mobility.
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. Chapter 1.2 surveys the liter-
ature on NBG and the literature in economic geography on the determinants of urban
and regional growth. Chapter 1.3 discusses the elements that the theoretical model
must contain in order to analyze the implications of NBG for regional development.
Chapter 1.4 develops the baseline theoretical model of regional development in the
presence of supply-side NBG. The baseline model considers supply-side NBG because
it has been suggested that it is the explanation for NBG that most closely matches
the experience of the United States and other advanced economies over the period
of deindustrialization (Ngai and Pissarides 2007; Acemoglu and Guerrieri 2008). In
Chapters 1.5 and 1.6, the static and dynamic equilibria for the baseline model of
supply-side NBG are defined and analyzed. In Chapter 1.7.1, the baseline model is
reconsidered for demand-side NBG; in Chapter 1.7.2, the baseline model is further
extended to consider the spatial consequences of NBG in an open economy. Finally,
in Chapter 1.8, conclusions are given and directions for future research are discussed.
1.2 Literature Review
This section reviews the literature on NBG and the literature in economic geography
on the determinants of urban and regional growth and explains how concepts from
these literatures underlie the main economic forces in the analysis.
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1.2.1 Non-Balanced Growth
This section reviews the literature on NBG. As stated in the introduction, NBG refers
to systematic change in the relative importance of the major sectors in the economy,
in terms of output and employment shares, in the process of economic development.
In particular, NBG refers to what Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001) refer to as the
"Kuznets facts" of economic development: the decline in the relative importance of
the agricultural sector in the early stages of development, and the successive rise in
the relative importance of the manufacturing and service sectors.
The literature on NBG can usefully be divided into two branches. The first branch
consists of descriptive studies that seek to establish stylized facts concerning the
patterns of NBG followed by most countries. Without exception, studies from this
first branch of the literature provide empirical support for the Kuznets facts. For
example, Maddison (1980) presents evidence on NBG from 16 countries from 1870
to 1976.7 Over this period, the average portion of employment in agriculture across
countries fell from 49% to 8%, while the portion of employment in manufacturing
rose from 28% to 36% and the portion of employment in services rose from 24% to
56%. Similarly, Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (1997) present evidence that through
the period from 1970 to 1989 patterns of NBG consistent with the Kuznets facts
have occurred in a cross-section of 123 non-socialist countries, where the agricultural
sectors comprise the largest share of output and employment in poorer countries, and
the service sectors comprise the largest share of output and employment in richer
countries. Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (1997) also find evidence consistent with the
Kuznets facts in time-series data from 22 countries from 1970 to 1989, in which the
relative importance of the agricultural sector declines and that of the service sector
7The 16 countries in Maddison (1980) are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and the United States.
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increases as countries become richer.
The second branch of the literature consists of analytical studies that use formal
theoretical models to analyze how NBG is systematically related to the process of
economic growth.8 This second branch of the literature can be further divided into
studies that emphasize supply-side explanations and studies that emphasize demand-
side explanations for NBG. Studies that emphasize supply-side explanations for NBG
posit that NBG occurs primarily as the result of differential rates of productivity
growth across sectors. To explain deindustrialization, these studies contend that pro-
ductivity growth has proceeded more slowly in services and that the elasticity of
substitution between service-sector output and output from goods-producing sectors
is low (less than 1).9 When the elasticity of substitution is low, the increase in the
relative price of service-sector output that results from slower sectoral productivity
growth more than compensates for the decrease in the relative return to factors of
8There are also studies that emphasize the expansion of North-South trade in recent decades in
their explanations of non-balanced growth and deindustrialization (Sacks and Schatz 1994; Wood
1995). According to these studies, deindustrialization has occurred in part because the number of
low-skilled jobs lost in import-competing industries in advanced countries as a result of the expansion
of North-South trade has exceeded the number of skill-intensive jobs created in the export sector.
Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1999) have found that, in a sample of advanced economies that have
experienced deindustrialization, North-South trade plays a comparatively smaller role in explaining
deindustrialization than do domestic factors such as slower productivity growth in services.
9While there is not information available in the literature on the elasticity of substitution between
the service sector and the broadly-defined goods-producing sector considered in this essay, several
previous studies have found an elasticity of substitution between service and non-service sectors
of less than 1 using different definitions of the two sectors. For example, Acemoglu and Guerrieri
(2008) estimate an elasticity of substitution between output from the more capital-intensive sector
(which corresponds closely to the goods-producing sector) and the less capital-intensive sector (which
corresponds closely to the service sector) of 0.76 with a two standard error confidence interval of
0.73 to 0.79.
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production in the service sector, causing the sector’s share of total employment to
increase as the economy evolves. Differences in productivity growth between sec-
tors drives NBG in the models of Baumol (1967), Ngai and Pissarides (2007), and
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008).
Previous studies have put forward a variety of explanations for why productivity
growth might proceed faster in goods production than in services. Baumol (1967)
attributes differential rates of productivity growth across sectors to differences in the
inherent technological character of different activities in the economy. In support
of this claim, Baumol points out that productivity in many service-sector activities,
such as education or health care, are unlikely to benefit greatly from technological
advances or from scale economies. Alternatively, Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008)
identify capital deepening — increases in the capital-to-labor ratio as the economy
evolves —as a potential source of differential productivity growth across industries,
because capital-intensive industries derive greater benefit from capital deepening in
the economy. The authors argue that sorting industries by capital intensity maps
closely, though imperfectly, to the service and goods-producing sectors, which are
less capital-intensive and more capital-intensive, respectively.
The empirical evidence suggests that, on average, productivity growth has pro-
ceeded more slowly in services. Maddison (1980) reports figures on output growth per
worker (labor productivity growth) for 4 countries for the period 1870 to 1950 and
for 12 countries for the period 1950 to 1976.10 In all cases, Maddison finds that labor
productivity has proceeded most rapidly in agriculture, followed by manufacturing,
followed, in turn, by services. Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff (1985) also present ev-
idence consistent with slower labor productivity growth in the service sector using
10The four countries for the period 1870 to 1950 are Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United
Kingdom. The 12 countries for the period 1950 to 1976 are Austria, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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U.S. data from 1947 to 1976 at the two-digit industry level according to the Standard
Industrial Classifications. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) provide evidence that both
total factor productivity growth and labor productivity growth have proceeded more
slowly in services than in goods production in the United States in the period from
1958 to 1996. In particular, Jorgenson and Stiroh find that the two fastest growing
subsectors of the service sector in terms of total employment —Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate and General Services —both experienced negative annual total factor
productivity growth (-0.176 and -0.190, respectively) and weak annual labor produc-
tivity growth (0.664 and 0.920, respectively) over the period.11 More recently, Triplett
and Bosworth (2003) have shown that the productivity resurgence beginning in the
mid-1990s can be attributed in large measure to productivity growth in the service
sector catching up to, though not surpassing, productivity growth in manufacturing.
Studies that emphasize demand-side explanations for NBG argue that differences
in the income elasticities of demand for sectoral output caused by non-homothetic
consumer preferences are the primary drivers of NBG. According to these studies,
differences in the income elasticities of demand for sectoral output cause sectoral
output and employment shares to change as the economy becomes wealthier on a
per capita basis. Non-homothetic consumer preferences drive NBG in the models
of Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), Caselli and Coleman (2001), and Gollin,
Parente, and Rogerson (2002).
The empirical evidence suggests that services are slightly income elastic (i.e., have
an income elasticity of demand slightly greater than 1), though this evidence is mixed
(see Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1983) and Flavey and Gemmell (1996)). While
there are numerous studies that have documented the rise in the share of total ex-
penditure devoted to services as per capita incomes rise (e.g., Houthakker and Taylor
11The subsectors Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate and General Services are defined according
to the Standard Industrial Classifications.
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1970; Kravis, Heston, and Summers 1983), the evidence that real expenditure on
services increases with per capita expenditure is less strong.12 For example, Kravis,
Heston, and Summers (1983), using time series data from France (1959 to 1978), the
United Kingdom (1957 to 1978), and the United States (1947 to 1978), show that
while the share of services in total expenditure rises sharply as incomes rise when
current-period prices are used, when services are measured in constant prices, the
share of expenditure devoted to services is stable over time for France and the United
Kingdom and only rises slightly for the United States.13 The evidence from empirical
studies that have directly estimated the aggregate income elasticity of demand for
services is similarly mixed. For example, Bergstrand (1991), using a cross-section
of 21 countries in 1975, and Flavey and Gemmell (1991), using a cross-section of
52 countries from 1980, find that the aggregate income elasticity of demand for ser-
vices is slightly greater than 1. Alternatively, using cross-sectional data on consumer
expenditure for 11 service-sector industries for 60 countries in 1980, Flavey and Gem-
mell (1996) find that while certain services are income-elastic, the aggregate income
elasticity of demand for services is not significantly different from 1.
The majority of the literature on NBG focuses on explaining NBG in a closed econ-
12Houthakker and Taylor (1970) break household consumption in the United States into durable
goods, non-durable goods, and services. Using this taxonomy, they show that over the period 1954 to
1970 the share of durable goods was roughly constant, while the share of services has been increasing
at the expense of non-durables. Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1983) present evidence that the share
of total expenditure devoted to services is increasing in per capita income from a cross-section of
34 countries in 1975 using 151 expenditure categories, where the service sector comprises 22% of
household spending in developing economies and 35% to 45% of household spending in advanced
economies.
13Ngai and Pissarides (2007) cite the increase in the relative prices of services that has accompanied
deindustrialization as evidence supporting their claim that slower productivity growth in services is
the primary driver of deindustrialization.
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omy. Limiting the analysis to a closed economy is problematic because the advanced
countries in which deindustrialization has taken place are all, to varying degrees, open
economies, and because international trade will cause the process of NBG to unfold
differently across countries. As has been pointed out by Matsuyama (2007), faster
productivity growth in a given sector will shift a country’s comparative advantage
towards that sector. So, while faster productivity growth in goods production within
a country may lead to deindustrialization globally, it may not cause employment in
goods-producing sectors in that country to decline. This provides an explanation for
why deindustrialization has been uneven across advanced economies. For example,
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), when considering declines in manufacturing employment,
show that many advanced economies, such as Germany and Japan, have experienced
smaller declines in manufacturing employment than the United States, and that cer-
tain advanced Pacific Rim economies, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea,
have seen their manufacturing sectors’share of employment continue to rise through
the early 1990s.
1.2.2 The Determinants of Regional Growth
This section surveys the economic geography literature on the determinants of ur-
ban and regional growth, paying particular attention to concepts that underlie the
explanation for how NBG influences spatial change in the theoretical model.
In the economic geography literature, the extent of economic development and
the pace of economic growth in a given region is determined by its economic char-
acteristics, or its first- and second-nature features (Krugman 1993). In this section,
the literature in economic geography on the determinants of regional growth is di-
vided into studies that emphasize the role of first-nature features and studies that
emphasize the role of second-nature features in regional economic development. A
region’s first-nature features relate to its intrinsic geographic characteristics and are
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independent of previous economic development in the region. First-nature features
are what led economic activity to become established in its current locations. Exam-
ples of first-nature features are a region’s proximity to the ocean and other navigable
bodies of water, a region’s climate, and a region’s proximity to deposits of natural
resources. The term first-natures also denotes features, such as the amount of avail-
able land, that limit the extent of economic development in a region and encourage
the dispersion of economic activity.
A region’s second-nature features are dependent on previous economic develop-
ment in the region. Second-nature features include a region’s physical infrastructure,
such as roadways and housing, which give more developed regions a competitive
advantage over less developed regions, as well as the benefits that firms and work-
ers receive from locating close to one another spatially (agglomeration externalities).
Agglomeration externalities are the second-nature features most emphasized in the
economic geography literature and are what give rise (along with indivisible public
goods and indivisible capital) to increasing returns to scale on the regional level —
the observed positive relationship between a region’s size and the productivity of its
workers and firms. Agglomeration externalities encompass all positive externalities,
both pecuniary (such as the benefits of large labor markets) and technical (such as
knowledge spillovers), that are external to the worker or firm but internal to the region
in which the worker or firm operates. Agglomeration externalities are both static and
dynamic —benefiting both current regional productivity and regional productivity
growth.
Among the sources of agglomeration externalities emphasized in the literature,
three factors are most prominent. First, there are the advantages of regional size that
arise from labor-market pooling. Labor-market pooling emphasizes the benefits that
follow from the better matches, on average, between heterogeneous workers and firms
that occur in regions with large populations and large labor markets. Better matching
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allows workers to be more productive in the jobs they perform, which attracts firms to
large regions, and allows firms located in large regions to pay higher wages, which in
turn attracts workers.14 Second, there are the advantages that firms located in large
regions receive from having access to a larger variety of local suppliers of specialized
intermediate inputs.15 Third, there are the benefits workers and firms receive from
exchanging industry-relevant knowledge with other workers and firms, often termed
knowledge spillovers. The idea is that because the exchange of knowledge is facilitated
by geographic proximity, workers and firms located in large regions have a greater
ability to access and benefit from the knowledge of others.
In addition to agglomeration externalities, which are related to the economic con-
ditions within a region, there are second-nature features that relate to the spatial
structure of the economy as a whole. The most notable inclusion in this category is
market potential. A region is said to have good market potential if, in addition to
having a large domestic market, it is also geographically close to other regions with
large markets. Good access to markets with large numbers of potential customers
is thought to promote regional growth by encouraging export industries. Market
potential has been shown to be an important factor in explaining why manufactur-
ing production in the United States was initially concentrated in the Northeast and
the Midwest (Harris 1954). There are also second-nature features that discourage
14This line of research was first developed by Helsley and Strange (1990). A variant of this
explanation has been proposed by Duranton (1998). In Duranton’s explanation, large labor markets
confer benefits on firms and workers by allowing workers to become more specialized, and therefore
more productive, in the tasks they perform.
15There is strong empirical evidence of the importance to local development of a large diver-
sified base of non-tradable inputs (Saxenian, 1996). Examples of such inputs include legal and
communication services, maintenance and repair services, financial services, and large non-tradable
industrial inputs such as industrial waste disposal. For theoretical research on this phenomenon, see
Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990).
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economic development. For example, the spatial concentration of population often
results in congestion of local public goods, such as roadways, and creates disamenities
such as noise and air pollution.
1.3 Elements of the Model
This section describes the elements that the theoretical model must contain in order
to analyze the implications of NBG for regional development and explains how these
elements are included in the model.
1.3.1 Non-Balanced Growth
In the theoretical model, it is necessary that there is economic growth and that the
growth be non-balanced, i.e., that it results in change in sectoral output and employ-
ment shares. In the theoretical model, economic growth is endogenous and results
from purposeful innovative activity, as in a Romer (1990)-type model of endogenous
growth with horizontally differentiated inputs. In particular, purposeful innovative
activity in these models leads to Hicks-neutral technical change. Hicks-neutral tech-
nical change is a form of total factor productivity growth where technical change does
not influence the marginal rate of substitution between inputs.16 It is necessary that
economic growth in the model be endogenous for agglomeration externalities and the
spatial distribution of production to influence the pace of economic growth.
As is mentioned in the Introduction, this essay considers three different explana-
tions for NBG. The baseline model presented in Chapter 1.4 considers supply-side
16Formally, total factor productivity is the ratio of output to an index of inputs (Chambers 1988).
Growth in total factor productivity is a useful measure of technical change because the ratio of
total factor productivity from two different time periods provides a measure of the change in the
effectiveness of the index of inputs in producing output.
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NBG, where NBG results from differences in productivity growth between sectors. It
is assumed in the baseline model that one sector (i.e., the goods-producing sector)
benefits from technological advance, and hence from Hicks-neutral technical change,
while the other sector (i.e., the service sector) does not. The direction of supply-side
NBG in the baseline model is shown to be determined by the elasticity of substitution
between the two sectors’output in household preferences. When the elasticity of sub-
stitution is less than 1, economic growth causes factor shares in the less progressive
sector to increase; when the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1, the opposite
result holds, and economic growth causes factor shares in the progressive sector to
increase. The intuition for the role of the elasticity of substitution in determining the
direction of supply-side NBG is given in Chapter 1.5.3.
In Chapter 1.7.1, supply-side NBG in the model results from the assumption of
non-homothetic consumer preferences. In particular, consumer preferences in Chap-
ter 1.7.1 are non-homothetic with constant elasticity of substitution equal to one.
(In contrast, consumer preferences in the baseline model of supply-side NBG are
homothetic and additively separable with a non-negative constant elasticity of sub-
stitution.) Non-homothetic consumer preferences imply different income elasticities
of demand for sectoral output and lead to uneven patterns of employment and output
growth between sectors. In Chapter 1.7.2, which considers the spatial consequences
of NBG in an open economy, NBG occurs as a result of changes in the terms of trade
between countries.
1.3.2 Regional Economic Characteristics
In order for NBG to influence the spatial distribution of the economy in the model, it is
necessary that regions’economic characteristics (e.g., population, climate, proximity
to natural resources, and industrial composition) influence production on at least two
dimensions and that their relative importance differs between the two sectors in the
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model. Regional economic characteristics must influence production on at least two
dimensions for the spatial distribution of the economy to reflect the trade-off between
competing economic forces. Furthermore, it is necessary that the relative importance
of these regional economic characteristics differ between sectors for this trade-off to be
altered by NBG and lead to spatial change in the model. The two regional economic
characteristics included in the theoretical model are agglomeration externalities and
an interregionally immobile factor of production.
Agglomeration externalities are included in the model in a manner consistent with
core-periphery models of economic geography (e.g., Krugman 1991). In core-periphery
models, the incentive for agglomeration arises from a combination of increasing re-
turns to scale in production and transportation costs. The technical details for how
agglomeration externalities are included in the theoretical model are given in Chapter
1.5. Agglomeration externalities represent a region’s endogenous economic character-
istics, or second-nature features, in the model and are both static, providing incentive
for the spatial concentration of population and production, and dynamic, influencing
the pace of regional productivity growth.
The interregionally immobile factor of production, which is referred to as the "fixed
factor," is taken to represent all of a region’s first-nature features that influence either
firm production decisions. As such, the immobile factor represents regional economic
characteristics such as the amount of available land, climate, and proximity to deposits
of natural resources. As the immobile factor is scarce, it provides an incentive for the
spatial dispersion of economic activity in the model.
In the theoretical model, it is assumed that agglomeration externalities only influ-
ence production in the goods-producing sector and that the fixed factor is only used
in production in the service sector. These assumptions simplify the analysis while
allowing the relative (and absolute) importance of regional economic characteristics
to differ between the two sectors, which is required for NBG to influence the spatial
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distribution of the economy in the model. These assumptions, however, are arbitrary
in that regions’first (the fixed factor) and second nature (agglomeration externalities)
features influence production in both sectors, and that there is no empirical evidence
in the published literature that suggests that the relative importance of regions’first
and second nature features differs systematically between the two sectors.
1.3.3 Factor Mobility and General Equilibrium
It is necessary to assume in the theoretical model that regions share in national
markets for factors of production, including labor. The assumption of national factor
markets is defensible in a model of regional development because there are fewer legal,
cultural, and technological constraints on the movement of factors across regions
within a country than between countries. Fewer constraints mean that factors of
production, including labor, will migrate quickly between regions within a country in
response to interregional price (wage) differentials. Blanchard and Katz (1992) show
that interstate labor migration is the main channel of adjustment to local economic
shocks for U.S. states.
The assumption of national factor markets has three important implications for
the analysis in this essay. First, a national factor market means that interregional
differences in savings rates should not influence the pace of regional development in
the analysis. Differences in savings rates are thought to be an important determinant
of cross-country differences in economic growth. Second, labor mobility means that
interregional differences in population growth rates are not related to differences in
exogenous labor endowments or regional fertility. Third, national factor markets
mean that the distribution of employment, and hence population, across regions is
determined in general equilibrium. It is necessary that the interregional distribution
of employment be determined in general equilibrium for NBG to influence the spatial
distribution of population in the model.
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1.4 The Model
This section defines the preferences and technology in the baseline model of the spatial
consequences of supply-side non-balanced growth. The term baseline model is used
because the assumptions about the technology in the economy in this chapter are
maintained in the model of the spatial consequences of demand-side non-balanced
growth presented in Chapter 1.7.1 and in the model of the spatial consequences of
non-balanced growth in an open-economy presented in Chapter 1.7.2.
The model presented in this section exploits the analytical similarities between
Romer (1990)-type models of endogenous growth with horizontally differentiated in-
puts and Krugman (1991)-type core-periphery models of economic geography. The
analytical similarities between these models stem from their reliance on the monop-
olistic competition framework introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Previous au-
thors, such as Walz (1996) and Fujita and Thisse (2003), have demonstrated that the
monopolistic competition framework is amenable to the joint study of growth and
location because it allows for (i) endogenous growth, (ii) agglomeration externalities,
and (iii) interregional factor movement to be dealt within a unified theoretical model.
The main theoretical innovation in the theoretical model is that it extends previous
models in the literature to allow endogenous labor allocation across both sectors and
regions within an analytically tractable growth model under perfect foresight. This
extension is essential for analyzing both non-balanced growth (intersectoral labor
mobility) and its spatial consequences (interregional labor mobility). Previous multi-
region growth models have either constrained the interregionally mobile factor of
production (labor) to employment in one sector (Baldwin and Forslid 2000; Fujita
and Thisse 2003) or do not have fully developed dynamics (Walz 1996).
As is standard in Romer (1990)-type models of growth, endogenous economic
growth in the model results from the expansion of the number of horizontally-differentiated
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intermediate inputs available for production. The model is also in keeping with the
standard core-periphery assumption that agglomeration externalities arise from the
combination of increasing returns to scale and transportation costs, which together
provide an incentive for demanders and suppliers of intermediate inputs to locate
in the same region. However, the model departs from the standard core-periphery
framework by assuming that both suppliers and demanders of intermediate inputs
are free to move between regions at zero cost. Assuming that firms are "footloose"
avoids some of the analytical complexity of the core-periphery framework and allows
a factor of production (labor) that is mobile between both sectors and regions to be
included in a model that is analytically tractable.
1.4.1 Preferences
There are two regions in the economy, a and b, three sectors, the manufacturing or
goods-producing sector (M -sector), the innovative sector (I-sector), and the service
sector (S-sector), and H households. Each household member chooses their location
(region a or b) and sector of employment (the M -, I-, or S-sector) to maximize their
wage.
A typical household, household j, is of size lj (t) at time t and grows according to
lj (t) = e
ntlj (0) , (1.1)
where lj (0) > 0 is household j’s size at t = 0 and n ∈ [0, δ), where δ is its rate of time
preference. Each household member supplies inelastically one unit of labor per unit of
time, so that lj (t) also denotes household j’s labor supply at time t.17 It is assumed
17The assumption that each household member supplies inelastically one unit of labor per unit
of time implies that neither involuntary unemployment nor labor/leisure trade-offs are considered
in the model. These issues are ignored because the focus of the analysis is on how change in the
distribution of employment across sectors in the process of economic growth influences the spatial
development of the economy.
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that all population growth takes place within existing households and that both n
and δ are constant over time and identical for all households in the economy.18’19
Household members receive utility from the consumption of M - and S-sector
output. Each member h of household j has a utility function given by










where YhjM(t) and YhjS(t) are household member h’s consumption of M - and S-
sector output at time t, ε ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity of substitution between M - and
S-sector output, and µ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that determines household member h’s
expenditure shares for M - and S-sector output.
Household j’s utility at time t is the summation of the utilities of all household
members at time t. (1.2) implies that household j maximizes utility at time t by
spreading consumption evenly across all of its members.20 As such, household j’s
18That households grow in size at an exponential rate, as is described by (1.1), implies that while
the number of households in the economy is a fixed integer, household size will take non-integer
values. A households size at time t determines its effective labor supply and, from (1.3), its utility
from the consumption of a given amount of M - and S-sector output. Allowing household size to
take non-integer values does not create problems for the analysis because neither the technology in
the model, which described in Chapter 1.4.2, nor household preferences require that household size
be an integer.
19The assumption that n and δ are the same for every household in economy, while unrealistic,
allows the dynamics of economic growth in the economy to be analyzed without having to consider
the distribution of income across households. This is the case because the assumption n and δ are
the same for every household implies that expenditure increases at the same rate for each household
at a given time t regardless of their level of expenditure (see (1.13) below). The fact that expenditure
increases at the same for each household implies that only the level of total societal expenditure, and
not the distribution of total societal expenditure across households, influences the rate of increase
in societal expenditure at time t.
20Appendix A gives a formal proof that household member h’s utility function (1.2) implies that
household j maximizes utility at time t by spreading consumption evenly across all of its members.
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utility at time t can be written as









where YjM(t) and YjM(t) are household j’s total consumption of M - and S-sector
output at time t (hence, YjM(t)/lj (t) and YjM(t)/lj (t) are consumption of M - and
S-sector output per household member at time t). (1.3) implies that ε ∈ (0,∞) is
the elasticity of substitution between M - and S-sector output for household j as a
whole, and that µ ∈ (0, 1) determines household j’s expenditure shares for M - and
S-sector output.
The household j’s indirect utility function at time t corresponding to the direct
utility function in (1.3) is










where Ej(t) is household j’s expenditure at time t, p (t) is the price of S-sector output
at time t, and the price of M -sector output normalized to 1. Notice that Ej(t) > 0




= ∞.21 Household j’s demands for M - and


















Household j holds assets at time t, aj (t), in the form of ownership claims on
I-sector firms (see Chapter 1.4.2) or as loans, with negative loans representing debts.
These two forms of assets are assumed to be perfect substitutes as stores of value and,
as such, bear the same real interest rate, r (t), at time t. These assets allow for the
transfer of funds between households, who want to smooth consumption, and I-sector
firms, who require investment to develop new varieties of intermediate inputs. The
model in this chapter represents a closed economy, so while households can borrow
from and lend to each other, there are zero net loans in the economy for all t.
21(1.4) and (1.5) are dervied in Appendix B.
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The total income received by household j at time t is the sum of labor income,
wj(t)lj (t), where wj(t) is average wage of members of household j at time t, asset
income, r (t) aj (t), where r (t) is the interest rate at time t, and income from ownership
of the fixed factor in regions a and b, wFa (t)fja +w
F
b (t)fjb, where w
F
k (t) is the rent to
the fixed factor in region k, k = a, b, at time t, and fjk ≥ 0 is the amount of the fixed
factor in region k owned by household j (the fixed factor is used in production by
firms in the S-sector and is immobile between regions; see Chapter 1.4.2).22 Given




= wj(t)lj (t) + w
F
a (t)fja + w
F
b (t)fjb + r (t) aj (t)− Ej(t). (1.6)
The objective of household j is to find an expenditure path that maximizes the















subject to (1.6), its initial size, lj (0), asset holdings, aj(0), and ownership of the fixed
factor, fja and fjb.23
The current-value Hamiltonian corresponding to household j’s intertemporal pro-
22The average wage for household j is used because household members are free to choose their
sector and region of employment to maximize their wage, so it may be the case that not all household
members have the same wage at time t.
23A suffi cient condition for the improper intergral in (1.7) to converge is for δ − n > 0 (which
is assumed) and for household j’s attainable utility to be bounded for all t ∈ [0,∞), i.e., for∣∣∣lj (0) ln{Ej(t)lj(t) [µε + (1− µ)ε p(t)1−ε] 1ε−1}∣∣∣ ≤ B ∈ R++ for all t ∈ [0,∞). When these two con-
ditions hold, which is assumed in this chapter, the improper integral in (1.7) will converge and not
exceed Bδ−n (Caputo 2005, p.384). The assumption that household j’s attainable utility is bounded
for all t ∈ [0,∞) is equivalent to assuming that household j’s resources are constrained so that it
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where vj(t) is the co-state variable. Applying Theorem 14.3 from Caputo (2005), if{




is an optimal solution, then it is necessary that there exists a piecewise
smooth function vj(t) such that for all t ∈ [0,∞),24
∂Hc
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b (t)fjb+r (t) a
∗
j (t)−E∗j (t) .
(1.11)
Applying Theorem 14.4 and Lemma 14.1 fromCaputo (2005), given thatHc (aj (t) , Ej (t) , vj(t))
is a concave function of aj (t) and Ej (t) for all t ∈ [0,∞) over the open con-
vex set containing all the admissible values of aj (t) and Ej (t), i.e., over the set
{(aj (t) , Ej (t))| aj (t) ∈ R, Ej (t) > 0}, the necessary conditions in (1.9), (1.10), and
(1.11) are suffi cient to identify the global maximum to household j’s intertemporal




−(δ−n)t = 0 (1.12)
24The function vj(t) is piecewise smooth on the interval t ∈ [0,∞) if its deriative function v̇j(t)
is piecewise continous on the interval t ∈ [0,∞) (Caputo 2005, Definition 1.2). The function v̇j(t)
is piecewise continous on on the interval t ∈ [0,∞) if the inteval t ∈ [0,∞) can be partitioned into
a finite number of points 0 = t0 < t1 < ... < tk < ∞ such that (i) v̇j(t) is continous on each open
subinterval tk−1 < t < tk and (ii) v̇j(t) approaches a finite limit as the end points of each subinteval
are approached from within the subinterval (Caputo 2005, Definition 1.1).
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is satisfied.25
Combining (1.9) and (1.10), the optimal expenditure path for household j is char-
acterized by the Euler equation
Êj(t) ≡ Ėj(t)/Ej(t) = r(t)− (δ − n) , (1.13)
together with the initial conditions, lj (0), aj(0), fja, and fjb, the state equation (1.6),
and the transversality condition (1.12).
Household j’s transversality condition in (1.12) can be re-expressed in a more
intuitive form. Integrating (1.10) with respect to time yields




 exp [(δ − n) t] . (1.14)






, which is positive and finite as Ej(0) is positive and finite. Substituting







 = 0. (1.15)
(1.15) implies that when the transversality condition is satisfied, an optimal ex-
penditure path entails household j’s assets, aj(t), growing asymptotically at a rate
lower than r (t). When the transversality condition holds for every household in the
economy, it rules out chain-letter debt financing, because for a given household to
borrow on a perpetual basis —which would imply that its debt was growing at a rate
higher than r (t) —there would have to be at least one lender in the economy willing
to violate their own transversality condition by holding positive assets that grow at
a rate higher than r (t). This would be suboptimal for the lender, and, hence, would
not occur in equilibrium.
25Theorems 14.3 and 14.4 and Lemma 14.1 in Caputo (2005) are presented for the present-value
Hamiltonian. Adjustments have been made for the use of the current-value Hamiltonian in this
chapter.
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Household / Preference Parameters
H > 0 Total number of households in the economy. H is fixed
over time.
n ∈ [0, δ) Rate of growth in household size. n is constant over time
and identical for all households in the economy.
δ > 0 Household rate of time preference. δ is constant over time
and identical for all households in the economy.
ε ∈ (0,∞) Elasticity of substitution between M- and S-sector out-
put in household j’s utility function.
µ ∈ (0, 1) Parameter of household j’s utility function that deter-
mines its expenditure shares forM- and S-sector output.
fk (j) ≥ 0 The amount of the fixed factor in region k, k = a, b,
owned by household j.
Table 1.1: Household / Preference Parameters
Household / Preference Variables
lj (t) Household j’s size at time t. Household members supply
their labor inelastically, so lj (t) also denotes household j’s




lj (t) Total population (i.e., total labor supply) at time t.
U (YjM(t), YjS(t), lj (t)) Household j’s utility at time t.
YjM(t) & YjS(t) Household j’s consumption of M- and S-sector output
at time t.




Ej(t) Societal expenditure at time t.
aj (t) Household j’s asset holdings at time t.
Table 1.2: Household / Preference Variables
28
Technology Parameters
α ∈ (0, 1) Technology parameter in the M-sector. α determines the
output elasticities of Ik (t) and LkM (t) in M -sector production.
In addition, (1− α)−1 is the elasticity of substitution between
any two intermediate inputs in M -sector production.
Γ ≥ 1 "Iceberg" transportation costs for intermediate inputs.
The transport of an intermediate input within the region where
it is produced is costless, but when the intermediate input is
transported between regions, only a fraction, 1/Γ ≤ 1, of the
input arrives.
η ∈ [0, 1] Technology parameter in I-sector innovation. η is pro-
portional to the ease of transferring knowledge between workers
in I-sector innovation in region a and region b.
β ∈ (0, 1) Technology parameter in the S-sector. β determines the
share of total cost devoted to labor and to the fixed factor in
the S-sector.
Fk > 0 The quantity of the fixed factor in region k, k = a, b.
Table 1.3: Technology Parameters
1.4.2 Technology
In this section, the technology in the M -, I-, and S-sectors is described.
M-Sector
M -sector output is produced competitively using a constant returns to scale Cobb-
Douglas production technology that combines labor and a number of differentiated
intermediate inputs to produce a final output,
YkM (t) = Ik (t)
α LkM (t)





 1α , (1.16)
where YkM (t) is the quantity of M -sector output produced in region k at time t,
LkM (t) ≥ 0 is the quantity of labor employed in the M -sector in region k at time t,
and Ik (t) is an index of intermediate inputs used in M -sector production in region
k at time t, where qik (t) ≥ 0 is the quantity of I-sector firm i’s intermediate input
used in M -sector production in region k at time t and M (t) is the set of I-sector
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Prices
r (t) The interest rate at time t.
p (t) Price of S-sector output at time t (in units of M -sector
output).
pikk(t) Price in region k, k = a, b, at time t of the intermediate
input produced by the I-sector firm ik that is located in
region k (in units of M -sector output).
pikl(t) Price in region l, l 6= k, at time t of the intermediate
input produced by the I-sector firm ik that is located in
region k (in units ofM -sector output). Transportation costs in
the I-sector imply that pikl(t) = Γpikk(t) for all ik ∈ M (t) and
for all t.
Pk (t) Price index that gives the minimum cost for M-sector
firms in region k, k = a, b, of purchasing a unit of Ik (t)
at time t (in units of M -sector output).
wj(t) Average wage of members of household j at time t (in
units of M -sector output).
wk (t) Wage in region k, k = a, b, at time t (in units of M -sector
output).
wFk (t) Rent to the fixed factor in region k, k = a, b, at time t







lj (t) Total labor supply (i.e., total population) at time t.
LkP (t) Labor employed in the P -sector, P = M, I, S, in region k, k = a, b,
at time t. LP (t) = LaP (t) +LbP (t) is total labor employed in the P -sector
at time t.
λP (t) ≡ LaP (t)LP (t) Proportion of P -sector employment, P = M, I, S, in region a at time
t. λN (t) ≡ Na (t) /N (t) is the proportion of I-sector firms in region a.
YkP (t) Quantity of P -sector output, P = M, I, S, produced in region k,
k = a, b, at time t. YP (t) = YaP (t) + YbP (t) is the total quantity of
P -sector output produced in the economy at time t.
ΠkP (t) P -sector profits, P = M, I, S, in region k, k = a, b, at time t. Because
constant returns to scale technology is assumed in the M - and S-sectors and
in I-sector innovation, ΠkP (t) = 0 in equilibrium for P = M, I, S.
Mk (t) The set of I-sector firms operating in region k, k = a, b, at time t.
M (t) = Ma (t) ∪Mb (t) is the set of all I-sector firms operating at time t.
N (t) The number of I-sector firms and the number of varieties of in-
termediate inputs in the economy at time t. It is assumed that each
I-sector firm is the monopoly supplier of a single variety of intermediate
input.
Nk (t) Number of I-sector firms in region k, k = a, b, at time t. It is assumed




The quantity of I-sector firm ik that is located in region k’s in-
termediate input demanded by M-sector firms in regions k and l,
respectively, at time t.
Ik (t) Index of intermediate inputs used in M-sector production in region
k, k = a, b, at time t.
Qik(t) The quantity of intermediate input produced by I-sector firm ik
that is located in region k, k = a, b, at time t.
YikM(t) The quantity of M-sector output used in production by I-sector
firm ik that is located in region k, k = a, b, at time t.
πik (t) The profits of I-sector firm ik that is located in region k, k = a, b,
at time t.
Ωk (t) The marginal product of labor in I-sector innovation in region k,







Ṅk (t) The number of new varieties of intermediate input developed in
region k at time t. Ṅ (t) = Ṅa (t) + Ṅb (t) is the total number of new
varieties of intermediate inputs developed in the economy at time t.
V (t) Value of an I-sector firm at time t. V (t) is the present value of future
profits from the production of a unique variety of intermediate input at time
t. As I-sector firms are free to move between regions to maximize profits,
V (t) does not depend on the region in which the firm is located at time t.
Table 1.5: Technology Variables
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firms operating at time t.26 The fixed parameter α ∈ (0, 1) determines the output
elasticities of Ik (t) and LkM (t), where α is the output elasticity of Ik (t) and (1− α) is
the output elasticity of LkM (t). In addition, (1− α)−1 is the elasticity of substitution
between any two intermediate inputs in M -sector production.
The assumption that α determines both the output elasticities of Ik (t) and LkM (t)
and the elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs imposes certain restric-
tions on M -sector production. In particular, the assumption that α ∈ (0, 1) implies
that the output elasticities of Ik (t) and LkM (t) are less than one and that the elas-
ticity of substitution between any two intermediate inputs is greater than one, i.e.,
(1− α)−1 > 1. In addition, α < 1 implies that Ik (t) is a concave function, and α > 0
implies that no intermediate input is essential to M -sector production (see Dixit and
Stiglitz 1977).
I-sector output is subject to transportation costs. In particular, the transport of
an intermediate input within the region where it is produced is costless, but when the
intermediate input is transported across regions, only a fraction, 1/Γ ≤ 1, of the input
arrives. As I-sector firms cannot price discriminate across regions, transportation
costs in the I-sector imply that pikl(t) = pikk(t)Γ, where pikk(t) is the price of firm ik’s
intermediate input in region k at time t and pikl(t) is the price of firm ik’s intermediate
input in region l at time t (the "k" subscript implies that I-sector firm ik is located
in region k at time t).





pik (t) qik(t) + wk (t)LkM (t)
26Constant returns to scale technology means that only regional levels of production and input
use in the M -sector need be considered (this also holds for the S-sector and for innovative activity
in the I-sector, where constant returns to scale are also assumed). See Appendix C for a formal
proof that when all firms in a sector operate with identical constant returns to scale production




1−α − ȲkM ≥ 0, qi (t) ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., N (t) , and LkM (t) ≥ 0,
where wk (t) is the wage in region k at time t and M (t) is the set of all I-sector firms
operating at time t (M (t) = Ma (t) ∪Mb (t)). Appendix D demonstrates that the
cost-minimizing input choices for M -sector firms in region k at time t are derived in
two stages. This two-stage procedure yields the following expressions for the cost-
minimizing input demands:


















and for the cost function for the M -sector in region k at time t:















α−1α is a price index that gives the minimum cost
for M -sector firms in region k of purchasing a unit of Ik (t) at time t. (1.18) implies
that the average cost of production for the M -sector in region k at time t is constant
(i.e., independent of output). That the average cost of production in the M -sector
is constant follows directly from the assumptions that the M -sector operates with
constant returns to scale technology and no fixed costs.
Factors of production will move into the M -sector in region k at time t until the
factor prices, Pk (t) and wk (t), have adjusted so that the price of M -sector output
(which is normalized to 1) is equal to the constant average cost of production and
profits are driven to zero. From 1.18, the condition that the price ofM -sector output












(1.19) defines the relationship between wk (t) and Pk (t) in region k at time t as





In addition, the two-stage cost minimization procedure described in Appendix D
implies that the demands for firm ik’s variety of intermediate input byM -sector firms
in region k and region l at time t are


















wl (t)LlM (t)Pl (t)
−α
a−1 .
where pikk(t) is the price of I-sector firm ik’s intermediate input in region k at time
t and pikl(t) is the price of firm ik’s intermediate input in region l at time t. Using
these expressions and the fact that pikl(t) = pikk(t)Γ for all t because I-sector firms
cannot price discriminate across regions, the total demand for firm ik’s variety of
intermediate input at time t is given by
qikk(t) + Γqikl(t) = pikk (t)
1
















From (1.22), firm ik faces a constant elasticity demand curve for its variety of inter-
mediate input, where (α− 1)−1 is the price elasticity of demand.
S-Sector
S-sector output is produced competitively using a constant returns to scale Cobb-
Douglas production technology that combines labor and the fixed factor to produce
a final output




where LkS (t) ≥ 0 is the quantity of labor employed in the S-sector in region k, Fk > 0
is the quantity of the fixed factor in region k, and β ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that
determines the share of total cost devoted to labor and to the fixed factor. Regions a
and b are identical except for their endowments of the fixed factor. The fixed factor
represents all of a region’s innate geographic characteristics that influence either firm
production. As is detailed in Chapter 1.2, these innate geographic characteristics, or
first-nature features, include the amount of available land in a region and its proximity
to deposits of natural resources.





1−β − wk (t)LkS (t)− wFk (t)Fk. (1.24)
LkS (t) must be greater than zero at an optimum because lim
LkM (t)→0
dYkS (t) /dLkS (t) =
∞ for β ∈ (0, 1). The first-order condition for (1.24) is
βp (t)LkS (t)
β−1 Fk
1−β − wk (t) = 0. (1.25)








The second-order condition for (1.24) is
−β (1− β) p (t)LkS (t)β−2 Fk1−β < 0,
which establishes that p (t)LkS (t)
β Fk
1−β−wk (t)LkS (t)−wFk (t)Fk is strictly concave
on R+ and that (1.26) is the unique maximum of (1.24).
I-Sector Production
The development of new varieties of intermediate inputs takes place in the I-sector.
The I-sector is characterized by monopolistic competition. The monopoly position
of each I-sector firm allows it to charge a price over average cost and make positive
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profits in equilibrium; however, as in a competitive economy, the demand for each
I-sector firm’s variety of intermediate input is influenced by the production decisions
of all other firms in the I-sector. It is assumed that each I-sector firm is the monopoly
supplier of a single variety of intermediate input, so that N (t) is both the number
of I-sector firms at time t and the number of varieties of intermediate inputs at time
t.27
Each I—sector firm produces with a linear production technology that uses one unit
of M -sector output to produce one unit of its unique variety of intermediate input.
Given this technology, the term Yik(t) ≥ 0 denotes the quantity of intermediate input
produced by I-sector firm ik at time t and YikM(t) denotes the quantity of M -sector
output used in production by I-sector firm ik with Yik(t) = YikM(t). It is assumed
that the development of an intermediate input involves the construction of indivisible,
firm-specific physical capital, so that each intermediate input is produced in only one
region. This means that at time t there are Na (t) I-sector firms in region a and Nb (t)
I-sector firms in region b, with Na (t) +Nb (t) = N (t).
As firm ik is the monopoly supplier of its unique variety of intermediate input,
it maximizes profits at time t by setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost.
That firm ik faces a constant elasticity demand curve for its variety of intermediate
input implies that its marginal revenue function is a constant fraction of its inverse
demand function. In particular, from (1.22), pikk (t) = ∆k (t)
1−α qik(t)
α−1 is firm ik’s
27The assumption that each I-sector firm is a monopoly supplier of a single variety of intermediate
input could be relaxed so that a single I-sector firm is the monopoly supplier of several varieties of
intermediate inputs; however, given that there are no economies of scope in I-sector production, this
change would not affect the analysis. Conversely, if this assumption were relaxed so that multiple
firms could produce the same variety of intermediate input (i.e., so that there is no legal institution
protecting each I-sector firm’s monopoly position), there would stop being an incentive for firms to
invest in developing new varieties of intermediate inputs, which would remove the driver of economic
growth from the model.
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α−1) = αpikk (t)
is its marginal revenue function at time t. As the marginal cost of production for firm
ik is equal to one for all t, the condition that marginal revenue equals marginal cost
implies that firm ik maximizes profits by setting its price at a constant mark-up over
its marginal costs, pikk (t) = α
−1, regardless of the level of demand it faces.
I-Sector Innovation
Firms entering the I-sector develop new varieties of intermediate inputs using a con-
stant returns to scale production technology where labor is the only input. The
productivity of labor in developing new varieties of intermediate inputs — i.e., in
I-sector "innovation" —in region k at time t is










where η ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter proportional to the ease of transferring knowledge
between workers in I-sector innovation in region k and region l. Hence, each firm
entering the I-sector in region k at time t requires (Ωk (t))
−1 units of labor to produce
its unique variety of intermediate input. It is assumed that there is a large number of
firms entering the I-sector at any time t, so that each firm’s location choice (region
k or l) has a negligible impact on Ωk (t). As such, firms entering the I-sector do not
take into account the impact of their location choice on Ωk (t).
(1.27) implies that there are positive knowledge spillovers in I-sector innovation,
i.e., that developing a new variety of intermediate input becomes easier as the economy
becomes more technologically advanced (as N (t) increases). (1.27) also implies that
when η < 1, I-sector knowledge spillovers are a partially local public good so that
I-sector innovation in region k is more productive when a larger share of total I-sector
employment is located in region k.
The number of new varieties of intermediate input developed in region k at time
37
t is
YkI (t) = Ṅk (t) = Ωk (t)LkI (t) , (1.28)
where LkI (t) ≥ 0 is the total quantity of labor employed in developing new varieties
of intermediate inputs in region k at time t. From (1.27) and (1.28), the total number
of new varieties of intermediate inputs developed at time t is
YI (t) = Ṅ (t) = Ṅa (t) + Ṅb (t) = N (t)LI (t)
[








Examining (1.29), when η < 1, Ṅ (t) is increasing as I-sector innovation becomes
concentrated in either region a or region b.
Entrepreneurs will develop new varieties of intermediate inputs and enter the I-
sector until the value of an I-sector firm at time t, V (t), is equal to the cost of
developing a new variety. (As I-sector firms are free to move between regions to
maximize profits, V (t) does not depend on the region in which the firm is located.)
Using the expression from (1.28), this means that the number of new varieties of
intermediate inputs developed in region k at time t, Ṅk (t), will increase until
V (t) Ṅk (t)− wk (t)LkI (t) = V (t) Ωk (t)LkI (t)− wk (t)LkI (t) = 0. (1.30)
(1.30) must hold, because if V (t) were greater than the cost of development of a new
variety of intermediate input at time t, there would be more innovation, which would
drive down V (t) until (1.30) held. Conversely, if the cost of development of a new
variety of intermediate input at time t were greater than V (t), there would be no
innovation at time t. (1.30) implies that the value of an I-sector firm at time t is
V (t) = wk (t) /Ωk (t) for k = a, b.
Market-Clearing
The market-clearing condition in the labor market at time t is that total labor in M -
and S-sector production and in I-sector innovation is equal to the total labor supply
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in the economy. The market-clearing condition in the labor market at time t can be
written as
LaM (t) + LbM (t) + LaS (t) + LbS (t) + LaI (t) + LbI (t) = L (t) , (1.31)
where L (t) =
H∑
j=1
lj (t) is the total labor supply in the economy at time t.
The market-clearing condition for M -sector output at time t is that the total
consumption of M -sector output by households and total use of M -sector output by
I-sector firms is equal to the total supply of M -sector output in the economy. The
market-clearing condition for M -sector output at time t can be written as
H∑
j=1














the total quantity of M -sector output used by I-sector firms in region k at time t.
The market-clearing condition for S-sector output at time t is that the total
consumption of S-sector output by households is equal to the total supply of S-
sector output in the economy. The market-clearing condition for S-sector output at
time t can be written as
H∑
j=1




YjS(t) is total demand for S-sector output at time t.
Finally, the market-clearing condition for I-sector firm ik’s variety of intermediate
input at time t is that its total use byM -sector firms is equal to its total supply in the
economy. The market-clearing condition for I-sector firm ik’s variety of intermediate
input at time t can be written as
Yik(t) = qikk(t) + Γqikl(t), (1.34)
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where qikk(t) ≥ 0 is the demand for firm ik’s variety of intermediate input from M -
sector firms in region k and qikl(t) ≥ 0 is the demand from M -sector firms in region
l.
1.5 Static Equilibrium
The characterization of the equilibrium for the economy is divided into two parts:
the static equilibrium and the dynamic equilibrium. The static equilibrium, which is
described and analyzed in this section, defines an allocation of factors of production
and a set of prices such that firms maximize profits, works maximize their wage,
households maximize utility from consumption, and the markets for labor and for
M -, S-, and I-sector output clear at time t and for given levels of technology, N (t),
societal expenditure, E (t) =
H∑
j=1
Ej(t), and population, L (t). A formal definition
for the static equilibrium is presented below. The dynamic equilibrium, which is
described and analyzed in Chapter 1.6, is a series of static equilibria for the economy
over time where the evolution of N (t) and E (t) is consistent with the first-order
conditions for each household’s intertemporal program.
Definition 1 The static equilibrium is a set of prices —the relative price of S-sector
output, p (t), the wage in regions a and b, wa (t) and wb (t), the rent to the fixed factor
in regions a and b, wFa (t) and w
F
b (t), prices of intermediate inputs, {piaa(t)}ia∈Ma(t),
and {pibb(t)}ib∈Mb(t), and the value of I-sector firms, V (t) —labor allocations, LaM (t),
LbM (t), LaS (t), LbS (t), LaI (t), and LbI (t), and levels of production YaM (t), YbM (t),
YaS (t), YbS (t), YaI (t), YbI (t), {Yia(t)}ia∈Ma(t), and {Yib(t)}ib∈Mb(t), at a given time t
and for given levels of technology, N (t), societal expenditure, E (t), and population,
L (t), such that each household maximizes their utility from consumption, firms in
the M-, I-, and S-sectors maximize profits, workers maximize their wage, and the
market-clearing conditions hold for the labor market, for M- and S-sector output,
40
and for each I-sector firm’s variety of intermediate input.
The static equilibrium in Definition 1 defines a Walrasian equilibrium for the
economy at time t. In a Walrasian equilibrium for the economy: (i) Each firm in
the M -, I-, and S-sectors maximizes profits given the equilibrium prices; (ii) Each
household maximizes their utility from consumption given equilibrium prices and
total household expenditure; and (iii) All markets clear at equilibrium prices (i.e.,
all households and firms are able to achieved their desired trades at the equilibrium
prices). A formal definition of a Walrasian equilibrium (with formal descriptions of
the production sets, consumption sets, and preference relations in the economy) and
a proof that a Walrasian equilibrium exists for the economy in this chapter are both
given in Appendix E.
The static equilibrium for the economy is characterized in two stages. In the
first stage, expressions for prices, sectoral employment, and sectoral output when the
economy is in static equilibrium are derived. These expressions are summarized in
Proposition 1. In the second-stage, the expressions for prices, sectoral employment,
and sectoral output from the first stage are used to define the distributions of factors
of production across regions a and b at time t such that workers cannot increase their
wage and firms cannot increase their profit by moving between regions , i.e., such
that the economy is in a spatial equilibrium. The static equilibrium is analyzed via
comparative static analysis in Chapter 1.5.3.
1.5.1 Static Equilibrium: Prices, Sectoral Employment, and
Sectoral Output
Proposition 1 When the economy is in static equilibrium at time t, the prices for a
given I-sector firm in region k’s intermediate input in regions k and l are (k, l = a, b,
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k 6= l)
pikk(t) = pkk (t) = 1/α and pikl(t) = pkl (t) = Γ/α for all ik ∈Mk (t) , (1.35)
the price index that gives the minimum cost for M-sector firms in region k of pur-
chasing a unit of Ik (t) at time t is
Pk (t) = α
−1
(






the wage in region k is









the rental rate for the fixed factor in region k is







the relative price of S-sector output, p (t), is defined implicitly in terms of E(t), wa (t),















































All I-sector firms in region k produce








for all ik ∈Mk (t) , (1.41)
intermediate inputs at time t, and make profits equal to








for all ik ∈Mk (t) ; (1.42)





































LSCI (t) = L (t)− LSCM (t)− LSCS (t) ; (1.45)
And output in M- and S-sectors and in I-sector innovation is
YkM (t) =
(






























YI (t) = Ṅ (t) = Ṅa (t) + Ṅb (t) = N (t)LI (t)
[








Proof. See Appendix F.
In Proposition 1, the expressions for prices, sectoral employment, and sectoral
output when the economy is in static equilibrium are functions of N (t), E (t), and
L (t), of the spatial distribution of labor in theM -, S-, and I-sectors, and of the spatial
distribution of I-sector firms. In the next section, these expressions are used in two
theorems to characterize the spatial distribution of labor in theM -, S-, and I-sectors
and the spatial distribution of I-sector firms so that no worker can increase their wage
and no I-sector firm can increase its profits by moving between regions. Together,
Proposition 1 and the two theorems presented in the next section characterize the
static equilibrium for the economy.
Several of the expressions in Proposition 1 reflect the influence of agglomeration
externalities on productivity in M -sector production and I-sector innovation, and on
the profits of I-sector firms. For example, (1.37) implies that when transportation
costs for intermediate inputs are positive (Γ > 1), the zero-profit wage in theM -sector
in region k, wk (t), is increasing with the total number of I-sector firms in region k,
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Nk (t). Similarly, (1.42) implies when Γ > 1 that that the profit of each I-sector
firm in region k is increasing in the level of employment in the M -sector in region k,
LkM (t). These two results reflect the influence of agglomeration externalities related
to forward and backward linkages between the M - and I-sectors (see Theorem 1 for
further discussion).
In addition, from (1.40), the value of an I-sector firm, V (t), is increasing as I-
sector firms become concentrated in either region a or b when Γ > 1, which reflects
the influence of agglomeration externalities on I-sector profits, and, hence, on V (t).
In addition, when η < 1, V (t) is decreasing as the I-sector innovation become concen-
trated in either region a or b.28 This latter result reflects the fact that when I-sector
innovation becomes concentrated in a region, knowledge spillovers reduce the costs
of developing a new variety of intermediate input. This reduction in development
cost leads to more new varieties of intermediate input being developed at time t,
which lowers V (t). The next section will demonstrate the role of these agglomeration
externalities in determining the spatial distribution of labor in the M -, S-, and I-
sectors and in the spatial distribution of I-sector firms when the economy is in static
equilibrium.
The expression forM -sector production in region k at time t in (1.46) from Propo-
sition 1 illustrates how an increase in the number of varieties of intermediate input —
i.e., technological advance —leads to Hicks-neutral technical change in the M -sector.
To see why this is the case, (1.46) can be re-expressed as
YkM (t) =
(













28Recall that η ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter proportional to the ease of transferring knowledge between
workers in I-sector innovation in region a and region b, so that when η < 1 I-sector knowledge is a
partially local public good.
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where Nk (t) qkk (t) + Nl (t) qlk (t) = qkk (t)
(




is the total quan-
tity of intermediate inputs used in the M -sector in region k at time t. (1.49) im-
plies that for a given LkM (t) and a given total quantity of intermediate inputs,
qkk (t)
(




, YkM (t) increases in accordance with the term
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This reflects the benefit of spreading a given number of intermediate inputs over a
wider range of N (t). These benefits exist because there are diminishing returns for
each qik(t) individually. Moreover, (1.49) implies that increases in N (t) lead to Hicks-
neutral technical change in theM -sector, as the marginal rate of substitution between
labor and the total quantity of intermediate inputs does not change with changes in
N (t).
1.5.2 Static Equilibrium: Regional Factor Distributions
This section presents two theorems that together characterize the distributions ofM -,
S-, and I-sector labor and I-sector firms across regions a and b at time t such that
workers cannot increase their wage and firms cannot increase their profit by moving
between regions. The first theorem uses the expressions for the wage in region k at
time t (1.37) and I-sector profits in region k at time t (1.42) from Proposition 1 to
characterize the distributions ofM -sector labor and I-sector firms across regions a and
b such no worker in the M -sector can increase their wage and no firm in the I-sector
can increase its profits by moving between regions. The second theorem uses the
expression for the value of an I-sector firm in region k at time t (1.40) to characterize
the distribution of workers in I-sector innovation across regions a and b such no worker
in I-sector innovation can increase his wage by moving between regions. Together
with Proposition 1, these two theorems complete the characterization of the static
equilibrium.
Before presenting the two theorems, it is necessary to introduce some new notation.
To begin, let λP (t) ≡ LaP (t) /LP (t) , P = S,M, I, be a spatial distribution of P -
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sector labor, and let Na (t) /N (t) be a spatial distribution of I-sector firms. λ
∗
P (t) ∈
[0, 1] is a spatial equilibrium in the P -sector at time t if no worker in the P -sector can
increase their wage at time t by moving between regions. Similarly, N∗a (t) /N (t) ∈
[0, 1] is a spatial equilibrium for I-sector firms at time t if no I-sector firm can increase
its profits at time t by moving between regions.
Next, a spatial equilibrium of P -sector labor, λ∗P (t), is stable if there exists a
bounded, convex set ΛP containing λ
∗
P (t) defined by ΛP = (λ
∗
P (t)− ρ, λ∗P (t) + ρ) ∩
[0, 1] , ρ > 0, such that from any point λP (t) ∈ ΛP workers in the P -sector will increase
his wage by moving between regions until λ∗P (t) is restored as the spatial distribution
of P -sector labor. Similarly, a spatial equilibrium of I-sector firms, N∗a (t) /N (t), is
stable if there exists a bounded, convex set ΛN containing N∗a (t) /N (t) defined by
ΛN = (N
∗
a (t) /N (t)− ρ,N∗a (t) /N (t) + ρ) ∩ [0, 1] , ρ > 0, such that from any point
Na (t) /N (t) ∈ ΛN firms in the I-sector will increase their profits by moving between
regions until N∗a (t) /N (t) is restored as the spatial distribution of I-sector firms.
Theorem 1 When there are positive transportation costs for intermediate inputs,
Γ > 1, there are three spatial equilibria for M-sector labor and I-sector firms:
1. λM (t) = 1 (LaM (t) = LM (t) , LbM (t) = 0) and
Na(t)
N(t)
= 1 (Na (t) = N (t) , Nb (t) = 0) ;
2. λM (t) = 0 (LaM (t) = 0, LbM (t) = LM (t)) and
Na(t)
N(t)
= 0 (Na (t) = 0, Nb (t) = N (t)) ;
3. λM (t) = 0.5
(















The first two spatial equilibria are stable; the third, unstable. When there are no
transportation costs for intermediate inputs, Γ = 1, any spatial distribution of M-
and I-sector firms is an unstable spatial equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix F.
The intuition for Theorem 1 follows from how agglomeration externalities influence
production in the M - and I-sectors. The combination of increasing returns to scale
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in the I-sector and transportation costs for intermediate inputs provides an incentive
for the demanders and suppliers of the intermediate inputs to locate in the same
region. M -sector firms locate in the region with the larger concentration of I-sector
firms because doing so lowers their cost of intermediate inputs through reduced trans-
portation costs. This allows M -sector firms to use more intermediate inputs, which
raises M -sector labor productivity and the zero-profit wage in the region, i.e.,


















when Nk (t) > Nl (t). This, in turn, causes M -sector production in the region with a
smaller number of I-sector firms to not be an equilibrium, and leads to the spatial
concentration of the M -sector in the region with a larger concentration of I-sector
firms.
I-sector firms locate in the region with the large concentration of M -sector firms
because doing so lowers the cost of their variety of intermediate inputs to M -sector
firms, which increases the demand for their variety and, hence, their profits. For
example, when LkM (t) > LlM (t),














a−1LkM (t) + LlM (t)
)
= πli (t) .
(1.51)
This will cause I-sector firms to concentrate themselves in the region with the larger
concentration of M -sector firms.
Theorem 1 also implies that when Γ > 1, M - and I-sector production will only
take place in both regions if Na (t) = Nb (t) and LaM (t) = LbM (t). When there are
no transportation costs (Γ = 1), wa (t) = wb (t) and πai (t) = πbi (t) always hold, and
there are no incentives for spatial concentration in theM - and I-sectors. In this case,
all spatial distributions of M - and I-sector firms are unstable spatial equilibrium.
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Theorem 1 demonstrates that when the M -sector and I-sector production are in
spatial equilibrium, the wage is equalized across regions (e.g., w (t) = wa (t) = wb (t)),
so that (1.52) simplifies to λS (t) = Fa/ (Fa + Fb). That is, when M - and I-sector
production are in spatial equilibria, the spatial distribution of labor in the S-sector
is determined solely by the distribution of the fixed factor across regions a and b.
Theorem 2 When I-sector knowledge is a partially local public good, η < 1, there
are three spatial equilibria for labor in I-sector innovation:
1. λI (t) = 1 (LaI (t) = LI (t) , LbI (t) = 0) ;
2. λI (t) = 0 (LaI (t) = 0, LbI (t) = LI (t)) ;
3. λI (t) = 0.5
(






The first two spatial equilibria are stable; the third, unstable. When I-sector knowl-
edge is a global public good, η = 1, any spatial distribution of labor in I-sector inno-
vation is an unstable spatial equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix F.
The intuition for Theorem 2 follows from how knowledge spillover externalities
influence productivity in I-sector innovation. Labor employed in I-sector innovation
benefits from the exchange of knowledge. When I-sector knowledge is a partially local
public good, η < 1, I-sector workers in the region with the larger concentration of
labor in I-sector innovation are made more productive from the exchange of knowledge
than are I-sector workers in the region with the smaller concentration of labor in
I-sector innovation. As free-entry drives profits from I-sector innovation to zero,
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interregional differences in productivity in I-sector innovation cannot be sustained in
equilibrium. This means that I-sector innovation is either equally split between the
two regions or concentrated in the region where I-sector innovation is most productive.
The analysis in the remainder of this chapter focuses on two spatial configura-
tions (SC) for the economy, where a spatial configuration for the economy at time
t is defined as {λ∗M (t) , N∗a (t) /N (t) , λ∗I (t) , λ∗S (t)}.29 The two spatial configurations
considered in the remainder of this chapter are: full agglomeration (FA), where
M - and I-sector labor and I-sector innovation are concentrated in one region (re-
gion a), i.e., {λ∗M (t) , N∗a (t) /N (t) , λ∗I (t) , λ∗S (t)} = {1, 1, 1, Fa/ (Fa + Fb)}, and full
dispersion (FD), where the M - and I-sectors are evenly dispersed across the two








, Fa/ (Fa + Fb)
}
.30These
definitions imply that region a and b’s populations are
LFAa (t) = L
FA
M (t) + L
FA
aS (t) + L
FA
I (t) and L
FA
b (t) = L
FA
bS (t) (1.53)





















under full dispersion. Focusing on full agglomeration and full dispersion allows for
four relevant cases of regional heterogeneity in economic characteristics to be consid-
ered: 1. Regions differ in their endowment of the fixed factor and in the agglomeration
externalities associated with the concentration of the M - and I-sectors (full agglom-
eration with Fa 6= Fb); 2. Regions differ in the fixed factor but not in agglomeration
externalities (full dispersion with Fa 6= Fb); 3. Regions differ in agglomeration exter-
29Theorems 1 and 2 give five spatial configurations (nine when the symmetry between region a
and region b is ignored): ν (t) = {1, 1, 1, Fa/ (Fa + Fb)}, ν (t) =
{
1, 1, 12 , Fa/ (Fa + Fb)
}
, ν (t) =





2 , 1, Fa/ (Fa + Fb)
}







2 , Fa/ (Fa + Fb)
}
.
30Recall that λS (t) = Fa/ (Fa + Fb) is the unique spatial equilibrium for S-sector labor.
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nalities and not the fixed factor (full agglomeration with Fa = Fb); and Regions are
identical (full dispersion with Fa = Fb).
An immediate corollary of Theorems 1 and 2 and (1.40) is that when the economy
is in static equilibrium, the value of an I-sector firm, V (t), is constant for all t. That
V (t) is constant over time follows from the fact that N (t) determines productivity
in both M -sector production (and, hence, the wage at time t) and productivity in I-
sector innovation (1.27). As such, when the economy is in static equilibrium, increases
in the wage that occur as the economy evolves are matched by increases in labor
productivity in I-sector innovation, leaving the marginal cost of developing a new
variety of intermediate input, w (t) /Ωk (t), k = a, b, and, hence, V (t), constant.
That V (t) is constant over time when the economy is in static equilibrium allows
for a closed-form expression for the interest rate to be derived. To see how this is
the case, recall from Theorem 1 that when the economy is in static equilibrium, the
profits from I-sector firms are equal in both regions (i.e., πai (t) = πbi (t) = πi (t)).










Differentiating (1.55) with respect to t and, using the fact that V (t) is constant over
time, setting the resulting expression equal to zero yields
dV (t)
dt




Substituting the expressions for πi(t) and V (t) from (1.42) and (1.40) gives the fol-




























)] αLM (t) , (1.57)
k = a, b. From (1.57), r (t) is increasing with total household expenditure at time
t because, from (1.43), LM (t) is increasing with total household expenditure in the
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economy at time t. The intuition for this result is that higher household expenditure
at time t lowers the supply of household savings available to entrepreneurs in the
I-sector, leading to higher r (t). (1.57) also implies that r (t) is larger when labor in
I-sector innovation is concentrated in one region. This is because I-sector innovation
is more productive when is it concentrated in a single region. Higher productivity in
I-sector innovation increases the demand for household savings by entrepreneurs in
the I-sector, which leads to higher r (t).
1.5.3 Comparative Static Analysis
This section analyzes the spatial consequences of supply-side NBG when the economy
is in a static equilibrium. The comparative static results presented in this section focus
on the elasticity of several of the key variables in the model with respect to societal
expenditure, E (t), technology, N (t), and population, L (t), all of which are fixed in
the static equilibrium. Comparative static results for the case of demand-driven NBG
are presented in Chapter 1.7.1 and for the case of NBG in an open economy in Chapter
1.7.2. Following the arguments presented in Chapter 1.5.2, results are presented for
two spatial configurations of the economy: full agglomeration, where the M - and I-
sector labor and I-sector innovation are concentrated in region a, and full dispersion,
where the M - and I-sectors are evenly dispersed across the two regions.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, 1.d ln p
SC(t)
d lnN(t)
> 0; 2. d ln p(t)
d lnE(t)
> 0; and 3. d ln p(t)
d lnL(t)
= 0,
where SC = FA, FD.
Proof. See Appendix G.
There are three implications of Proposition 2 that are important for understanding
the other comparative statics presented in this section. First, part 1 of Proposition
2 establishes that the elasticity of p (t) with respect to N (t) is always positive. This
result follows from the fact that technological advance — i.e., increases in N (t) —
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increases productivity in the M -sector but not the S-sector. The increase in pro-
ductivity in the M -sector reduces the cost of producing a given amount of M -sector
output, thereby increasing the relative price of S-sector output.
Second, part 2 of Proposition 2 establishes that the elasticity of p (t) with respect
to E (t) is also always positive. This result follows from the fact that an increase in
E (t) increases the demand for bothM - and S-sector output (see (1.5)). Meeting this
increase in demand increases the marginal cost of production in the S-sector, where
there is decreasing returns to scale, but not in theM -sector, where, from (1.18), there
is a constant marginal cost that is invariant to the level of production. Given that
zero profits must hold in both sectors, p (t) must increase in response to an increase
in S-sector output to compensate for the increase in the marginal cost of production.
Third, from part 3 of Proposition 2, the relative price of S-sector output, p (t),
is invariant to change in population, L (t). The intuition for this result, and how it
relates to the assumption of homothetic household preferences, is presented in the
discussion of Proposition 3 below.






































= 1 > 0;
where SC = FA, FD.
Proof. See Appendix G.
Part 1 of Proposition 3 implies that an increase in technology, N (t), will reduce
employment in both the M - and S-sectors —i.e., will reduce employment dedicated
to producing consumption goods —and increase employment in I-sector innovation,
52
which increases the rate of development of new varieties of intermediate inputs (i.e.,
the rate of technical progress) in the economy. The intuition for part 1 of Proposition
3 follows from the fact that an increase in N (t) increases productivity in the M -
and I-sector sectors (see (1.27) and (1.49)), but not in the S-sector. Proposition
2 establishes that by increasing productivity in the M -sector but not the S-sector,
an increase in N (t) increases the relative price of S-sector output, p (t). For fixed
E (t), this increase in p (t) reduces the demand for S-sector output, (1.5), and thereby
reduces S-sector employment, LSCS (t). Furthermore, from (1.5), an increase in p (t)
also decrease the demand of M -sector output, and, hence, employment, when ε < 1
(i.e., when M - and S-sector output are gross complements). Meanwhile, while an
increase in p (t) will increase the demand for M -sector output when ε > 1, the
increase in N (t) reduces the amount of M -sector labor required to meet a given
level of M -sector demand. Proposition 3 establishes that this latter effect dominates,
and LSCM (t) decreases with an increase in N (t) even when ε > 1.
It follows from the market-clearing condition for labor, (1.31), that LSCI (t) must
increase with N (t) because both LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t) decrease with N (t). The intu-
ition for this result is that an increase in N (t) increases the productivity of labor in
the I-sector, which attracts labor to the I-sector, and, by increasing productivity in
theM -sector, reduces the amount of labor required to satisfy consumption ofM - and
S-sector output for a given level of E (t). Given this result, a noteworthy implication
of part 1 of Proposition 3 is that, all else equal, a more technically advanced economy
will deploy a larger portion of its labor force towards innovation and have a higher
rate of technological progress.
Part 2 of Proposition 3 establishes that both LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t) increase, and
LSCI (t) decreases, with an increase in E (t). The intuition for Proposition 3 is that,
from (1.5), an increase in E (t) increases the demand for bothM - and S-sector output,
which leads to higher levels of employment in both sectors. The increase in M - and
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S-sector employment necessarily decreases employment in I-sector innovation. In this
way, part 2 of Proposition 3 illustrates the trade-off in the model between expenditure
on current consumption, E (t), and investment in I-sector innovation, which is the
source of productivity growth.
Part 3 of Proposition 3 demonstrates that changes in population, L (t), do not
influence LSCM (t) or L
SC
S (t). Indeed, both L
SC
M (t) and L
SC
S (t) are determined in the
static equilibrium by N (t) and E (t) alone. In Section 1.7.1, it is shown that when
household preferences are non-homothetic, population growth does indeed change
output and employment in the M - and S-sectors. This is because when household
preferences are non-homothetic, output demand in theM - and S-sectors, and, hence,
employment in either sector, is determined by per capita expenditure, which is influ-
enced by total population. In the baseline model of supply-side NBG analyzed here,
household preferences are homothetic, and it is total societal expenditure, rather than
per capita expenditure, that influences output demand in theM - and S-sectors. Fur-
ther, part 3 of Proposition 3 demonstrates that, all else equal, the rate of technological
progress in the economy is increasing in the size of the population (i.e., is increasing
in L (t)).
Taken as a whole, Proposition 3 demonstrates that N (t), E (t), and L (t) have
countervailing influences employment in the M -, S-, and I-sectors. As such, ana-
lyzing the rates of employment growth in each sector (and, hence, the direction of
change in sectoral employment shares) entails analyzing changes in N (t), E (t), and
L (t) simultaneously, which can only be accomplished in the analysis of the dynamic
equilibrium in the next section.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium,
1.
d ln(LSCM (t)/LSCS (t))
d lnN(t)
> 0⇔ ε > 1;
2.
d ln(LSCM (t)/LSCS (t))
d lnE(t)










where SC = FA, FD.
Proof. See Appendix G.
Proposition 4 illustrates how changes in technology, N (t), and societal expendi-
ture, E (t), influence employment in the M -sector, LSCM (t), relative to the S-sector,
LSCS (t). (Recall from Proposition 3 that change in population, L (t), do not influence
employment in the M - and S-sectors.) Proposition 4 implies that the direction of
NBG in the economy —i.e., whether LSCM (t) increases relative to L
SC
S (t), or vice versa,
as the economy grows —is determined by the elasticity of substitution between M -
and S-sector output, ε. Notice that in contrast to Proposition 3, where increases in
N (t) and E (t) have opposing effects on the absolute levels of LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t),
Proposition 4 establishes that increases in N (t) and E (t) have symmetric effects on
LSCM (t) /L
SC
S (t) for most values of ε.
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The intuition for Proposition 4 is that an increase in either N (t) or E (t) has two
countervailing effects on LSCM (t) /L
SC
S (t). First, increases in N (t) or E (t) increase
the marginal product of labor in the M -sector relative to the S-sector, which draws
labor to theM -sector.32 Second, from Proposition 3, increases in both N (t) and E (t)
raise the relative price of S-sector output, pSC (t). In the case of an increase in N (t),
when ε < 1, and M - and S-sector output are gross complements, the increase in
pSC (t) dominates, and LSCM (t) /L
SC
S (t) declines with N (t). Conversely, when ε > 1,











32From Proposition 1, the marginal product of labor in the M -sector is
(1− α)α 2α1−α
[








1−β , k = a, b. An increase in N (t) increases the marginal product of labor in
the M -sector but not the S-sector for fixed employment in two sectors. Similarly, as is established
in Proposition 3 an increase in E (t) increases both LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t). This increases do not
change the marginal product of labor in the M -sector, but decrease the marginal product of labor
in the S-sector.
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andM - and S-sector output are gross substitutes, the relative decline in the marginal
product of labor in the S-sector dominates, and LSCM (t) /L
SC
S (t) expands with N (t).
When ε = 1, the two effects cancel, and LSCM (t) /L
SC
S (t) is unchanged by change in
N (t). The same intuition holds for an increase in E (t), with the only difference being
that LSCM (t) /L
SC








The role of ε in determining the direction of the change in LSCM (t) /L
SC
S (t) as
a result of increases in N (t) and E (t) that is illustrated in Proposition 4 is consis-
tent with previous studies that have emphasized supply-side explanations for non-
balanced growth (e.g., Baumol 1967; Ngai and Pissarides 2007; and Acemoglu and
Guerrieri 2008). As is discussed in Chapter 1.2.1, these previous studies posit that
non-balanced growth occurs primarily as the result of differential rates of productiv-
ity growth across sectors. To explain deindustrialization, these studies contend that
productivity growth has proceeded more slowly in services, but, because the elastic-
ity of substitution between service-sector output and output from goods-producing
sectors is low, the increase in the relative price of service-sector output that results
from slower sectoral productivity growth more than compensates for the decrease in
the relative return to factors of production in the service sector, causing the sector’s
share of total employment to increase as the economy grows.

































> 1⇐⇒ Fa − Fb < 0.
Proof. See Appendix G.
The intuition for Proposition 5 follows directly from Proposition 3. In particular,
from Proposition 3, an increase in N (t) increases employment in the I-sector at the
56
expense of both the M - and S-sectors. Under full agglomeration, this increase in I-
sector employment will occur entirely in region a, where the I-sector is concentrated.
Under full dispersion, as employment in the I-sector is evenly distributed between the
two regions, the increase in I-sector employment does not influence the interregional
distribution of employment in the I-sector. On the other hand, the share of S-sector
employment in region a relative to region b is determined by each region’s endowment
of the fixed factor. The decline in S-sector employment as a result of an increase in
N (t) is greater in the region with the larger endowment of the fixed factor. This
is the intuition for the first term in part 2 of Proposition 3, where the region with
smaller endowment of the fixed fact or grows in population as a consequence of an
increase in N (t).
Similarly, Proposition 3 establishes that an increase in E (t) increases employment
in the M - and S-sectors at the expense of the I-sector. Under full agglomeration,
when the I-sector is concentrated in region a, the decline in I-sector employment oc-
curs entirely in region a, thereby lowering region a’s population. Under full dispersion,
an increase in E (t) does not influence the interregional distribution of employment
in either the M - or I-sectors; however, the region with the larger endowment of the
fixed factor will experience a larger increase in S-sector employment as a result of an
increase in E (t), and, as a consequence, will increase in population.
Finally, again from Proposition 3, an increase in population, L (t), increases em-
ployment in the I-sector, and does not affect employment in either the M - or S-
sectors. As such, under full agglomeration, an increase in L (t) increases population
in region a, where the I-sector is concentrated. Conversely, under full dispersion,
the increases in I-sector employment occurs evenly across regions a and b, thereby
increasing the relative employment share of the region with the smaller endowment
of the fixed factor, and, hence, the smaller share of S-sector employment.
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Proposition 5 is similar to Proposition 3 in that it illustrates the limits to compar-
ative static analysis in this chapter. In particular, Proposition 5 demonstrates that
N (t), E (t), and L (t) have countervailing influences on the distribution of population
between regions, and that understanding the influence of NBG on regional population
movements will require analyzing changes in N (t), E (t), and L (t) simultaneously,
which can only be accomplished in the analysis of the dynamic equilibrium.
1.6 Dynamic Equilibrium
Definition 2 The dynamic equilibrium is a set of dynamic trajectories for prices —
the relative price of S-sector output, p (t), the wage in regions a and b, wa (t) and
wb (t), the rent to the fixed factor in regions a and b, wFa (t) and w
F
b (t), prices of
intermediate inputs, {piaa(t)}ia∈Ma(t), and {pibb(t)}ib∈Mb(t), the value of I-sector firms,
V (t), and the interest rate, r (t) —labor allocations, LaM (t), LbM (t), LaS (t), LbS (t),
LaI (t), and LbI (t), and levels of production, YaM (t), YbM (t), YaS (t), YbS (t), YaI (t),
YbI (t), {Yia(t)}ia∈Ma(t), and {Yib(t)}ib∈Mb(t) such that the economy is in static equilib-
rium at every time t and that the first-order conditions for household j’s intertemporal
program hold for every household j = 1, ..., H in the economy (i.e., that every house-
hold j’s expenditure path is characterized by its Euler equation, (1.13), budget-flow
constraint, (1.6), initial conditions lj (0), aj(0), fja, and fjb, and transversality con-
dition, (1.12)).
This section characterizes and analyzes the dynamic equilibrium for the economy.
This section begins with a proposition that defines the necessary conditions for the
economy to be in dynamic equilibrium. These necessary conditions are used to char-
acterize the optimal dynamic trajectory for the economy. Following this, a long-run
growth path for the economy is defined that features a constant real interest rate and
constant growth in total societal expenditure. It is shown that along this long-run
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growth path, economic growth is non-balanced, with output and employment growing
at different rates across sectors. This section ends by demonstrating that there is a
unique optimal dynamic trajectory for the economy, and that this trajectory con-
verges with the long-run growth path. Analyzing the behavior of the economy along
this optimal trajectory yields many of the key results in this chapter concerning the
implications of NBG for the spatial development of the economy.
Proposition 6 A dynamic equilibrium satisfies the following three differential equa-
tions,















































] − (δ − n) (1.59)















] − (δ − n) ,
and
L̂ (t) = n, (1.60)
where, from (1.37), wFA (t) = (1− α)α
2α










and pSC(t), SC = FA, FD, is defined implicitly in terms of E (t) and N (t) (as
well as the parameters ε, µ, α, Γ, and β) by the S-sector market-clearing condition,











 = 0, (1.61)




(1 + η)LFDM (t) with L
SC
M (t) defined in (1.43).
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Proof. See Appendix H.
Proposition 6 defines a set of necessary conditions for the economy to be in dy-
namic equilibrium. In particular, (1.59) - (1.61) are necessary conditions for the first-
order conditions for household j’s intertemporal program to hold for every household
in the economy.33 The necessary conditions in Proposition 6 are used in the remainder
of this chapter to characterize the dynamic trajectories for sectoral output, sectoral
employment, and regional population when the economy is in dynamic equilibrium.
1.6.1 Equilibrium Growth Path
This section defines an equilibrium growth path (EGP) as a dynamic equilibrium for
the economy that features a constant real interest rate and constant growth in societal
expenditure.34 Theorem 3 (below) shows that when ε < 1, there exists a unique EGP
for the economy and that along this EGP the S-sector dominates the asymptotic
distribution of employment. Theorem 3 provides closed-form solutions for the growth
rates of N (t) and E (t) along this EGP, as well as for growth rates of sectoral output,
sectoral employment, and regional population. In addition, Theorem 3 establishes
that there does not exist an EGP when ε ≥ 1.35
33It was established in Chapter 1.4.1 that these first-order conditions are both necessary and
suffi cient to identify a unique maximum for household j’s intertemporal program.
34Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001) refer to a long-run growth path for the economy undergoing
NBG that features a constant real interest rate as a "generalized balance growth path".
35That an EGP for the economy only exists when ε < 1 is consonant with Acemoglu and Guerrieri
(2008), who impose a set parameter restrictions on their model of NBG that ensure that the less-
progressive, labor-intensive sector will be the "asymptotically dominant sector", where they define
the asymptotically dominant sector as the sector that determines the long-run growth rate of the
economy. These restrictions are necessary for Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008)’s model to generate
patterns of NBG in sectoral output and employment, while also exhibiting long-run growth consistent
with the "Kaldor Facts" (i.e., constancy of the rate of consumption growth, real interest rate, capital-
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Before presenting Theorem 3, it is necessary to introduce new notation for the
asymptotic growth rates in the economy:
gSCE = lim
t→∞



























p̂SC (t) , gSCw = lim
t→∞
ŵSC (t) , gSCwF = limt→∞
ŵF,SC (t) , gSCP = lim
t→∞
P̂ SC (t) , r̄SC = lim
t→∞
rSC (t) ;
SC = FA, FD and k = a, b.
Theorem 3 When ε < 1, there exists a unique EGP for the economy where expen-

















SC = FA, FD, S-sector output and employment grow at the constant rates
gSCS = βn and n
SC
S = n, (1.63)
the relative price of S-sector output, the wage, the rental rate of the fixed factor, and
the price index that gives the minimum cost for M-sector firms of purchasing a unit
of ISC (t), grow at the constant rates
gSCp = (1− ε)






1− β [(1− β) ε+ β]













to-output ratio, and the share of capital income in total output).
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(1− ε) β + ε
(1− ε)
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α (1 + η)
{[
(1− ε) β + ε
(1− ε)
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I-sector employment is constant and equal to
L̄FAI =
[
(1− ε) β + ε
(1− ε)
]















b = n, (1.67)










In addition, there does not exist an EGP when ε ≥ 1.
Proof. See Appendix H.
Theorem 3 implies that along the EGP, economic growth is non-balanced, with
employment and output in the M - and S-sectors growing at different asymptotic
rates. (Along the EGP, output grows at the same rate in the M - and I-sectors, and
employment in the M - and I-sectors is constant.) The intuition for the mechanics
of NBG in the model follow from the fact that productivity growth occurs in the
M -sector but not in the S-sector. All else equal, faster productivity growth in the
M -sector would cause employment to grow more rapidly in the M -sector than in
the S-sector. However, productivity growth in the M -sector also causes output to
grow faster in the M -sector than in the S-sector, which increases the relative price of
S-sector output, p (t). The increase in p (t) induces the reallocation of labor to the
S-sector. When ε < 1, the increase in relative price of S-sector output is more than
proportional to the increase in the marginal product of labor in theM -sector, and the
S-sector gains in employment relative to the M -sector along the EGP. In particular,
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along the EGP, the increase in the relative price of S-sector output is exactly such
that no new labor is allocated towards or taken away from either the M -sector (or
the I-sector) as the economy grows.
Notice that the reallocation of labor to the S-sector along the EGP cannot offset
the increase in output in the M -sector relative to the S-sector that results from M -
sector productivity growth because, if it did, the change in relative prices would not
take place, and there would be no force in the economy attracting labor to the S-
sector. For this reason, even though employment in the S-sector is growing along
the EGP while employment in the M -sector is constant, output in the M -sector is




The fact that the S-sector dominates the asymptotic distribution of employment
along the EGP implies that the rate of population growth, n, determines the asymp-
totic growth rates for the economy. This is the case because output in the S-sector
can only increase as a result of an increase in employment in the S-sector. For this
reason, the asymptotic growth rate of output in the S-sector, and, as a consequence,
the asymptotic growth rates for the other aggregates in the economy, is determined
by n. The asymptotic growth rate of S-sector output along the EGP is gSCS = βn,
where β is the output elasticity of labor in S-sector production. The asymptotic
growth rate of S-sector output is increasing in β because a larger value of β implies a
larger increase in S-sector output for a given increase in S-sector employment. The










n). The asymptotic growth rates of these aggregates
along the EGP are closer to the asymptotic growth rate of S-sector output for lower
values of ε. Lower values of ε imply that M - and S-sector output are more comple-
mentary. As a result, lower values of ε lead to a larger portion of total labor being
devoted to S-sector production at each point along the EGP, with less labor devoted
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to I-sector innovation, which depresses the growth rates of N (t), E (t), and Y SCM (t).
The fact that the S-sector determines the asymptotic growth rates for the economy
explains the fact that the spatial distribution of the economy, and, hence, agglom-
eration externalities, do not influence the asymptotic growth rates of E (t) or N (t).
The S-sector, after all, does not benefit from agglomeration externalities. Agglom-
eration externalities do, however, influence the constant levels of employment along
the EGP in the M - and I-sectors. Indeed, from (1.65) and (1.66), the constant levels
of employment in the M - and I-sectors are higher under full dispersion than under
full agglomeration. This reflects the role of knowledge spillovers, captured by the
parameter η, in I-sector innovation, which make it so that more I-sector labor is
required under full dispersion to maintain a given growth rate of N (t) along the
EGP. In addition, agglomeration externalities related to forward and backward link-
ages between the M - and I-sectors imply that, all else equal, the profits of I-sector
firms are lower under full dispersion than under full agglomeration. Lower I-sector
profits reduce the incentive for firms to develop new varieties of intermediate input
and enter the I-sector, which reduces the growth rate of N (t). For N (t) to grow at
the same constant rate under both full agglomeration and full dispersion, M -sector
production, and, hence, M -sector employment and demand for intermediate inputs,
must be higher under full dispersion. Higher M -sector demand for intermediate in-
puts increases the profits of I-sector firms, which compensates for the reduction in
profits due to the decreased benefit from agglomeration externalities to I-sector firms
under full dispersion.
That the S-sector dominates the asymptotic distribution of employment along
the EGP also implies that the S-sector determines the asymptotic population growth
rates of regions a and b, which are equal to the rate of population growth, n, under
both spatial configurations of the economy, as well as the asymptotic regional popula-
tion shares, which are determined by the distribution of S-sector employment across
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regions a and b (which, in turn, are determined by the distribution of the fixed factor
across regions a and b, i.e., Fa and Fb).
Regional employment shares are constant along the EGP because employment in
the M - and I-sectors along the EGP becomes, to use the terminology of Acemoglu
and Guerrieri (2008), "vanishingly small" relative to S-sector employment.36 That
employment in the M - and I-sectors becomes vanishingly small means that analyz-
ing the EGP does not address the dynamic behavior of the economy when there are
comparable (i.e., non-trivial) levels of employment in the M -, S-, and I-sectors. The
next section demonstrates that there is a unique dynamic trajectory for the econ-
omy that is consistent with the necessary conditions for a dynamic equilibrium from
Proposition 6, and analyzes the dynamics of sectoral employment, sectoral output,
regional population along this dynamic trajectory when there are non-trivial levels of
employment in the M -, S-, and I-sectors.
1.6.2 Optimal Dynamic Trajectory
In this section, phase diagram analysis is used to characterize the dynamic equilibrium
outside of the EGP. Phase diagram analysis is used to establish that there is a unique
dynamic trajectory for the economy that is consistent with the necessary conditions
for a dynamic equilibrium from Proposition 6, and that along this optimal dynamic
trajectory N (t) and E (t) grow at the same rate. Furthermore, it is shown that this
optimal dynamic trajectory approaches the EGP. The dynamic behavior of sectoral
employment, sectoral output, and regional population along the optimal dynamic
trajectory defined in this section is analyzed in Chapter 1.6.3.
36Along the EGP, the share of labor allocated to the S-sector tends to one. Despite this, output
in the M - and I-sectors continue to grow at positive rates, and both sectors maintain positive levels
of employment. This implies that this limit point, i.e., lim
t→∞
LSCS (t) /L (t) = 1, SC = FA,FD, is
never reached.
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Proposition 6 demonstrates that the dynamic equilibrium for the economy is rep-
resented by a boundary value system of three ordinary differential equations in time,
the initial values of technology, N (0), and population, L (0), and the transversal-
ity condition in (1.61). By incorporating the expression for L̂ (t) from (1.60) into
the expression for N̂ (t) from (1.58), this system can be re-expressed as a system
of one autonomous differential equation for E (t), (1.59), and one non-autonomous
differential equation for N (t):






































where, from (1.37), wFA (t) = (1− α)α
2α










and pSC(t), SC = FA, FD, is defined implicitly in terms of E (t) and N (t) by the
S-sector market-clearing condition, (1.39). Standard phase diagram analysis cannot
be used for non-autonomous systems. For this reason, phase diagram analysis with
moving isoclines is used in this section.
It is established that the N̂SC (t) = 0, N̂SC (t) = ÊSC (t), and ÊSC (t) = 0 isoclines
are as depicted in Figure 1.1 for all t in three steps. First, that the three isoclines are
upward sloping and pass through the origin follows from the expressions for N̂SC (t)
and ÊSC (t), SC = FA, FD, from (1.69) and (1.59). In particular, using (1.69)
and the S-sector market-clearing condition from (1.39), under full agglomeration,






















































Next, using (1.69), (1.59), and the S-sector market-clearing condition from (1.39),
under full agglomeration, N̂FA (t) = ÊFA (t) implies
N (t) =
1























and, under full dispersion, N̂FD (t) = ÊFD (t) implies
N (t) =
1



































































It is clear from (1.70)-(1.75) that the N̂SC (t) = 0, N̂SC (t) = ÊSC (t), and ÊSC (t) = 0
isoclines are all upward sloping and pass through the origin.
Second, that the N̂SC (t) = 0 and N̂SC (t) = ÊSC (t) isoclines move to the south-
east as t gets larger (as is depicted in Figure 1.1) follows from the fact that the
term L (0) ert appears in the denominator of the expressions for the N̂SC (t) = 0 and
N̂SC (t) = ÊSC (t) isoclines.
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Third, to establishes that the N̂SC (t) = 0, N̂SC (t) = ÊSC (t), and ÊSC (t) = 0
isoclines are always in the same relation to one another as is depicted in Figure 1.1,
it is suffi cient to demonstrate that EÊ=0 (t) < EÊ=N̂ (t) < EN̂=0 (t) for all N (t) > 0
and for all t, where
EÊ=0 (t) =
{









E (t) | N̂SC (t) = 0, N (t)
}
.




































































< 0 is established in Proposition (3).
Next, the phase diagram in Figure 1.2 is used to establish that the saddle-path
defined by ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t) is the only dynamic trajectory for the economy that
is consistent with the dynamic equilibrium conditions from Proposition 6. As the
discussion above establishes that the N̂SC (t) = 0, N̂SC (t) = ÊSC (t), and ÊSC (t) = 0
isoclines are as depicted in Figure 1.1 for all t, the phase diagram in Figure 1.2
indicates the directions of movement for N (t) and E (t) for any time t. Also, Figures
1.1 and 1.2 depict the N̂SC (t) = 0, N̂SC (t) = ÊSC (t), and ÊSC (t) = 0 isoclines





















Figure 1.1: The N̂SC (t) = 0, N̂SC (t) = ÊSC (t), and ÊSC (t) = 0 isoclines for t = 0,
t = t1, and t = t2 > t1. See text for further detail.
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isoquants are depicted as linear because doing so does not affect the demonstration of
the key result that the saddle-path defined by ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t) is the only dynamic
trajectory for the economy that is consistent with the necessary conditions for a
dynamic equilibrium from Proposition 6.
The optimality of the saddle-path defined by ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t) is established in
two steps. First, consider a dynamic trajectory of the economy to the northwest of
the ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t) isocline, such as trajectory "A" in Figure 1.2. Along such
trajectories, N (t) is growing faster than E (t). This will cause the trajectory to
eventually cross the ÊSC (t) = 0 isocline and results in E (t) = 0 in finite time. From
(1.57) and (1.58), that E (t) = 0 in finite time along trajectory "A" implies that in
the long-run, rSC (t) = 0 and N̂SC (t) > 0, which violates the necessary condition
for households’transversality conditions to hold in (1.61) from Proposition 6. Hence
trajectory "A" and any trajectory to the northwest of the ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t) isocline
will not be optimal because it will violate the transversality condition for at least
one household in the economy. Along such trajectories, households would realize that
they were over-investing in the develop of new varieties of intermediate inputs, and
would choose to move to an expenditure path that entailed less investment.
Second, consider a dynamic trajectory for the economy to the southeast of the
ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t) isocline, such as trajectory "B" in Figure 1.2. Along such trajecto-
ries, where ESC (t) is growing at a faster rate than NSC (t), (1.59) from Proposition
6 is violated. (1.59) implies that for all points to the southeast of the ÊSC (t) = 0 iso-
cline, ÊSC (t) > 0. However, along trajectory "B", N̂SC (t) = 0 in finite time, which
means that ÊSC (t) jumps to zero in finite time, violating (1.59). Along trajectory
"B" and any trajectory to the southeast of the ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t) isocline, households
would realize that they were under-investing in the development of new varieties of
intermediate inputs and would choose to move to an expenditure path that entailed













Figure 1.2: That the saddle-path defined by ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t) is the only dynamic
trajectory for the economy that satisfies the necessary conditions for a dynamic equi-
librium described in Proposition 6 is established in two steps: (1) Along trajectory A,
(1.61) from Proposition 6 (the necessary condition for each household’s transversality
condition to hold) is violated; (2) Along trajectory B, (1.59) from Proposition 6 (the
necessary condition for each households Euler equation to hold) is violated. See text
for further detail.
defined by ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t) is the only dynamic trajectory for the economy that
satisfies the necessary conditions for a dynamic equilibrium from Proposition 6.
Proposition 7 A suffi cient condition for the optimal dynamic trajectory defined by
ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t), SC = FA, FD, to approach the EGP is for L̂SCS (t) to approach
n from above as t→∞.
Proof. See Appendix H.
Proposition 7 states that a suffi cient condition for the dynamic trajectory defined
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by ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t), SC = FA, FD, to approach the EGP is that the S-sector’s
share of total employment is expanding relative to the M - and I-sector’s (i.e., that
L̂SCS (t) > n) as the economy grows along the dynamic trajectory defined by Ê
SC (t) =
N̂SC (t).37 This condition agrees with the description of the EGP in Theorem 3 in
that when L̂SCS (t) > n along the dynamic trajectory defined by Ê
SC (t) = N̂SC (t)
then the S-sector will dominate the asymptotic distribution of employment, as is the
case along the EGP, and both M -sector employment (and, from (1.57), the interest
rate) will tend towards a constant, as is also the case along the EGP. The results
presented in Propositions 8 and 9 (below) discuss the implications of the condition
that L̂FAS (t) > n for the dynamic behavior of sectoral output, sectoral employment,
and regional population as the economy grows along the dynamic trajectory defined
by ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t).
1.6.3 Optimal Dynamic Trajectory: Analysis
This subsection analyzes how sectoral output, sectoral employment, and regional pop-
ulation evolve as the economy grows along the optimal dynamic trajectory defined
by ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t). The comparative static results in Chapter 1.5.3 demonstrate
that increases N (t), E (t), and L (t) have countervailing influences on sectoral output,
sectoral employment, and regional population. For this reason, in order to analyze
how these aggregates change as the economy evolves it is necessary to consider simul-
taneous growth in N (t), E (t), and L (t), as is done in this section.
Many of the key results concerning the implications of supply-side NBG for the
spatial development of the economy are presented in this section. In particular, it is
shown that supply-side NBG can undermine the self-reinforcing relationship between
agglomeration and regional population growth, and the positive relationship between
37If L̂SCS (t) > n, then the rate of growth of L
SC
M (t) + L
SC
I (t) must be less than n in order for
total population to grow at rate n.
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regional productivity growth and regional population growth predicted in previous
models of urban and regional development. In addition, in the case of deindustrializa-
tion, it is shown that the positive relationship between regional productivity growth
and regional population growth emphasized in previous models may be systemati-
cally reversed. Further, the results presented in this section confirm Theorem 3 by
demonstrating that the long-run spatial distribution of the economy is dominated by
the region whose economic characteristics most advantage the sector that dominates
the long-run distribution of employment.
Proposition 8 Along the optimal dynamic trajectory defined by ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t):
1. L̂SCM (t) > 0 ⇔ ε > 1; 2. L̂SCS (t) > 0 ⇔ ε < 1; 3. Ŷ SCM (t) > 0; 4. Ŷ SCS (t) >











Proof. See Appendix H.
Parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 8 extend the comparative static results presented in
Proposition 4. Proposition 4 establishes that the direction of NBG in the economy
(whether the progressive M -sector is gaining employment relative to the S-sector,
or vice-versa) will be determined by the elasticity of substitution between M - and
S-sector output, ε. Proposition 8 extends Proposition 4 by establishing that when
the economy is growing along the optimal trajectory defined by N̂SC(t) = ÊSC(t)
that whether LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t) grow in absolute terms is also determined by ε.
In particular, when ε > 1, LSCM (t) expands and L
SC
S (t) contracts as the economy
grows. The converse holds when ε < 1. This implies that when N̂SC(t) = ÊSC(t)
and ε > 1, the increase in the marginal product of labor in theM -sector is more than
proportional to the increase in the relative price of S-sector output, p (t), so that
S-sector employment contracts and M -sector employment expands as the economy
grows. Conversely, when N̂SC(t) = ÊSC(t) and ε < 1, the increase in p (t) is more
73
than proportional to the increase in the marginal product of labor in the M -sector,
and the opposite result holds.
Parts 3 and 4 of Proposition 8 relate to the growth in M - and S-sector output.
Notice that M -sector output, Y SCM (t), is growing for all parameter values. This
implies that when ε < 1 and the economy is growing along an optimal trajectory
defined by N̂SC(t) = ÊSC(t), the increase in M -sector productivity that results from
increases in N (t) is always great enough to offset the decline in LSCM (t). Part 4 of
Proposition 8 confirms that S-sector output, Y SCS (t), is growing if and only if ε < 1.
This result follows from part 1 of Proposition 8 in that the output growth in the S-
sector can only be achieved by an increase in employment, and S-sector employment
is growing if and only if ε < 1.
Part 5 of Proposition 8 implies that whether I-sector employment, LSCI (t), and,
hence, Y SCI (t) = N̂
SC(t), is increasing or decreasing as the economy grows depends
on whether the combined increase in employment in the M - and S-sectors is greater
than or less than the increase in total population, nL (t). The intuition for this result
is that if the combined increase in LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t) is greater than nL (t), then
LSCI (t) must decline as the economy grows. The reverse is true if the combined
increase in LSCM (t) + L
SC
S (t) is less than nL (t). Proposition 9 (below) demonstrates
that the population growth rate, n, through its influence on the growth of LSCI (t),
plays a key role in determining how NBG influences regional population dynamics.
Proposition 9 Along the optimal dynamic trajectory defined by ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t):






Proof. See Appendix H.
Proposition 9 describes the influence of NBG on regional population shares when
the economy is growing along the optimal dynamic trajectory defined by N̂SC(t) =
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ÊSC(t). The intuition for parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 9 is that NBG will increase the
population share of the region whose economic characteristics give it a comparative
advantage in the sector(s) whose share of total employment is growing. Under full
agglomeration, agglomeration externalities cause theM - and I-sectors to concentrate
themselves in region a. This implies that under full agglomeration, region a has a
comparative advantage inM - and I-sector production, and region b has a comparative
advantage in S-sector production (under full agglomeration, if Fa > Fb then region
a has an absolute advantage over region b in M -, I-, and S-sector production). As
such, from part 1 of Proposition 9, when the S-sector’s share of total employment
is expanding as the economy grows (L̂FAS (t) > n), region a’s population declines
relative to region b’s, and when the S-sector’s share of total employment is declining
(L̂FAS (t) < n), region a’s population increases relative to region b’s.
Under full dispersion, the even distribution of the M - and I-sectors across the
two regions implies that the region with the larger endowment of the fixed factor
has a comparative (and absolute) advantage in S-sector production, while the region
with the smaller endowment of the fixed factor has comparative advantage inM - and
I-sector production. As such, from part 2 of Proposition 9, when the S-sector’s share
of total employment is expanding as the economy grows (L̂FAS (t) > n), the share of
total population in the region with the larger endowment of the fixed factor increases.
Conversely, when the S-sector’s share of total employment is declining (L̂FAS (t) < n),
the share of total population of the region with the smaller endowment of the fixed
factor increases.
A corollary to Proposition 9 is that regions need only differ in their economic
characteristics on one dimension for NBG to influence regional population shares. To
see that this is the case, in part 1 of Proposition 9, under full agglomeration where
the benefits of agglomeration externalities in the M - and I-sectors differ between re-
gions, NBG results in changes in regional population shares when Fa = Fb. Similarly,
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in part 2 of Proposition 9, under full dispersion where the benefits of agglomeration
externalities are the same in both regions, NBG results in changes in regional popu-
lation shares provided that Fa 6= Fb. Part 2 of Proposition 9 also demonstrates that
when regions are identical in their economic characteristics (i.e., under full dispersion
and Fa = Fb) NBG does not influence regional population shares.
The main results concerning the implications of supply-side non-balanced growth
for the relationship between agglomeration and regional population growth and the
relationship between regional productivity growth and regional population growth
are established in part 1 of Proposition 9. First, part 1 of Proposition 9 implies
that NBG can undermine the self-reinforcing relationship between agglomeration and
regional population growth that is traditionally emphasized in models of urban and
regional development. When L̂FAS (t) > n, NBG increases the employment share of the
sector that benefits less from agglomeration, i.e., the S-sector. The increase in the S-
sector’s share of total employment causes the fixed factor, which is of relatively greater
importance to the S-sector, to become salient relative to agglomeration externalities,
and causes the agglomerated region (region a) to lose population relative to the less
agglomerated region (region b). Conversely, when L̂FAS (t) < n and the M - and I-
sectors share of total employment is expanding, NBG reinforces the advantage of
the agglomerated region, region a, causing it to gain population relative to region
b. It is noteworthy that the model can generate a negative relationship between
agglomeration and regional population growth without including congestion costs or
disamenities related to the spatial agglomeration of population and production, such
as air and noise population, as is done in studies such as Lange and Quaas (2007).
Part 1 of Proposition 9 also illustrates how NBG attenuates the positive relation-
ship between regional productivity and population growth emphasized in previous
models of urban and regional development. When L̂FAS (t) > n and the S-sector’s
share of total employment is expanding, region a, which is concentrated both in the
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innovative I-sector and the progressive M -sector, loses population as a consequence
of economic growth. This result suggests that NBG may cause a divergence between
the determinants of national economic growth —factors that influence productivity
growth, such as human and physical capital accumulation, innovation, etc. — and
the determinants of regional population growth. Furthermore, this result suggests
that in a deindustrializing economy with supply-side non-balanced growth, where
relative employment is expanding in the less progressive service sector, this diver-
gence between the determinants of regional productivity and population growth may
be systematic, with regions whose employment is concentrated in low productivity
growth, service sector industries experiencing stronger population growth. Alterna-
tively, when L̂FAS (t) < n and the M - and I-sectors share of total employment is
expanding, region a gains in population as a consequence of economic growth, and
there is a positive relationship between regional productivity growth and regional
population growth.
That the presence of supply-side non-balanced growth in the economy can un-
dermine, and, in the case of deindustrialization, reverse, the positive relationship
between regional productivity and population growth agrees with recent patterns of
regional development in the United States and other advanced countries. For ex-
ample, many of the fastest growing regions in the United States in the period of
deindustrialization have been sun-belt cities, such as Phoenix and Las Vegas, whose
economies are concentrated, by and large, in low productivity growth, service sector
industries. Indeed, Glaeser and Tobio (2007) have documented that since 1980, sev-
eral of the fastest growing sun-belt cities have sustained strong population growth
without correspondingly strong regional productivity growth.
That there may be a systematic divergence between the determinants of regional
productivity and population growth in a deindustrializing economy has implications
for previous empirical studies, such as Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1995) and
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Glaeser and Shapiro (2003), that have used population growth as a proxy for regional
productivity growth in the United States over the period of deindustrialization. These
previous studies regress regional population growth on a number of regional economic
characteristics. The coeffi cients on the regressors are interpreted as capturing the
influence of each economic characteristic on regional productivity growth, which is
assumed to spur regional population growth. The analysis in this chapter suggests
that in addition to capturing the influence of the regional economic characteristics
on regional productivity growth, these regressions may also be capturing the change
in the economy-wide importance of these regional economic characteristics over time
that takes place as a consequence of non-balanced growth.
Parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 9 imply that regional comparative advantage deter-
mines how regional population shares change as the economy grows. The long-run
distribution of population across regions, however, is determined by the interregional
distribution of the economic characteristic(s) that advantage the sector that domi-
nates the long-run distribution of employment. For example, Theorem 3 establishes
that along the EGP, where the S-sector dominates the long-run distribution of em-
ployment, each region’s employment share is proportional to its endowment of the
fixed factor, which is the regional economic characteristic that is most important to
S-sector production. Together, Theorem 3 and Proposition 9 imply that it is regional
comparative advantage determines the direction of change in regional population
shares in an economy undergoing NBG, while it is a regions’absolute advantage in
the sector that dominates the long-run distribution of employment that determines
long-run regional population shares.
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1.7 Extensions
This section extends the baseline model of supply-side NBG to consider the two alter-
native explanations for NBG: demand-side NBG, where differential income elasticities
of demand for sectoral output lead to NBG, and NBG resulting from international
trade, where changes in the terms of trade between countries influence sectoral out-
put and employment shares. Along with supply-side NBG, demand-side NBG and
NBG resulting from international trade are the explanations for NBG that are most
emphasized in the literature.
It is shown in this section that these two alternative explanations for NBG have
different implications for the economic forces driving spatial change in the economy
relative to the baseline model of supply-side NBG. Moreover, because supply-side
NBG and these two alternative explanations for NBG are neither mutually exclusive
nor contradictory, all three explanations for NBG may be simultaneously influenc-
ing the spatial development of an economy undergoing NBG. It is also shown that
the mechanism through which NBG influences the spatial development of the econ-
omy discussed in the previous section in the context of supply-side NBG —i.e., that
when there are differences in the relative importance of regional economic character-
istics between the major sectors of the economy, NBG will cause economic activity
and population to shift towards regions whose economic characteristics give them a
comparative advantage the expanding sector(s) —also holds for the two alternative
explanations for NBG considered in this section.
This section defines the static equilibrium and performs comparative static analy-
sis for the models of the spatial consequences of demand-side NBG and NBG in an
open economy, but, in the interest of space, does not define or analyze the dynamic
equilibrium for either model. In addition, because the models presented in this sec-
tion are extensions of the baseline model of supply-side NBG, model development is
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limited to areas where the new models differ from the baseline specification.
1.7.1 Demand-Side Non-Balanced Growth
This section extends the baseline model to consider the spatial consequences of
demand-side NBG, where demand-side NBG results from non-homothetic household
preferences. Non-homothetic household preferences imply differences in the income
elasticities of demand for sectoral outputs and lead to uneven patterns of output and
employment growth between sectors. It is shown that in the case of demand-side
NBG, NBG results from changes in per capita expenditure that accompany economic
growth, rather than differences in productivity growth between sectors. Per capita
expenditure growth drives NBG because differences in the income elasticities of de-
mand for sectoral output cause output and employment growth to be biased towards
certain sectors as expenditure increases on a per capita basis (i.e., as the economy be-
comes wealthier). That growth in per capita expenditure drives NBG in this section
is consistent with previous models of demand-side NBG, including Murphy, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1989), Caselli and Coleman (2001), and Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson
(2002).
The Model
The technology in the M -, S-, and I-sectors in this section is identical to the base-
line model of supply-side NBG. For this reason, the model development in this sec-
tion focuses on how the assumption of non-homothetic household preferences changes
households’optimizing behavior. As in Chapter 1.4.1, it is assumed that household
j’s utility at time t is the summation of the utilities of all household members at time
t, and that household j maximizes utility by spreading consumption evenly across all
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of its members.38 Household j’s utility at time t is



























is utility per household member at time t. γ is a parameter through which non-
homothetic preferences are included in the model and is the only parameter that
appears in this section that does not appear in the baseline model. In keeping with
the baseline model, YjM(t) and YjS(t) are household j’s total consumption ofM - and
S-sector output at time t (hence, YjM(t)/lj (t) and YjS(t)/lj (t) are consumption ofM -
and S-sector output per household member at time t), and µ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter
that determines household j’s expenditure shares for M - and S-sector output. (1.77)
implies that the elasticity of substitution between M - and S-sector output is a fixed
parameter equal to one.
The household j’s indirect utility function at time t corresponding to the direct
utility function in (1.77) is
Vj (t) = lj (t) ln
[
µµ (1− µ)(1−µ) (Ej(t)− γlj (t))p(t)µ−1
]
. (1.78)
where, as in Chapter 1.4, Ej(t) is household j’s expenditure at time t, p (t) is the
price of S-sector output at time t, and the price of M -sector output normalized to
1.39 Household j’s demands for M - and S-sector output at time t corresponding to
the direct utility function in (1.78) are
YjM(t) = µEj(t)+(1−µ)γlj (t) and YjS(t) = (Ej(t)−γlj (t))(1−µ)p(t)−1. (1.79)
38Appendix A gives a formal proof that household j maximizes utility at time t by spreading
consumption evenly across all of its members for the case of non-homethetic preferences considered
in this section.
39(1.78) and (1.79) are dervied in Appendix B.
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condition guarantees that YjM(t) > 0 and YjS(t) > 0 for all t.40
To see how non-homothetic preferences result in NBG, consider the expressions
40The specification for utility per household member in (1.77) does not guarantee that household
j will consume positive quantities of M - and S-sector output. In particular, the Inada conditions
that guaranteed that household j will consume positive quantities of M - and S-sector output in the
baseline model do not hold for (1.77) when γ 6= 0. As the analysis focuses on NBG, where both
the M - and S-sectors are in operation, the corner solutions where household j’s demands for M - or
S-sector output are equal to zero are not of interest. For this reason, it is necessary to place two
assumption on Ej(t) and lj (t) in the remainder of this chapter that guarantee that YjM (t) > 0 and
YjS(t) > 0 for all t.
The first condition is that Ej (t) /lj (t) > γ. To see why this condition guarantees YjM (t) > 0
and YjS(t) > 0, notice that when γ > 0, (1.77) is only defined for YjM (t)/lj (t) > γ. A suffi cient
condition for YjM (t)/lj (t) > γ is for household expenditure per member, Ej (t) /lj (t), to be greater
than γ. When this condition holds, the Inada conditions apply and household j will demand positive
quantities of both M - and S-sector output.
The second condition is that γ > − µ1−µ
Ej(t)
lj(t)
. When γ < 0, a suffi cient condition for YjM (t) > 0
and YjS(t) > 0 is that the marginal rate of substitution between S-sector output and M -sector
output to be greater than the relative price of M -sector output when YjM (t) = 0 (note that when
γ < 0 the Inada condition ensures that YjS(t) > 0 for all t). The marginal rate of substitution




∂U (YjM (t), YjS(t), lj (t)) /∂YjM (t)





YjM (t)/lj (t)− γ





















. When this condition holds, the amount that household j’s consumption of S-sector
output would have to increase to compensate it for the loss of a unit of M -sector output when
YjM (t) = 0 would be greater than the relative price of M -sector output, p (t)
−1. This means that
when 0 > γ > − µ1−µ
Ej(t)
lj(t)
, YjM (t) = 0 would be inconsistent with household j’s preferences.
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µEj(t) + (1− µ)γlj (t)






> 1⇔ γ > 0 . (1.82)
(1.81) and (1.82) show that non-homothetic preferences lead to different income elas-
ticities of demand for sectoral output. When γ > 0, an increase in household j’s
expenditures leads to a less than proportional increase in the consumption of YjM(t)
and a greater than proportional increase in the consumption of YjS(t); when γ < 0,
the converse holds. When γ = 0 and household preferences are homothetic, household
j’s consumption of YjM(t) and YjS(t) increase proportionately with its expenditure.
These differences in income elasticities of demand imply that when preferences are
non-homothetic (γ 6= 0), an increase in household j’s per capita expenditure (e.g., an





(1− µ) p(t)−1 (Ej(t)− γlj (t))2
> 0⇔ γ < 0 . (1.83)
From (1.83), when γ > 0, an increase in per capita expenditure shifts the composition
of household j’s demand in favor of YjS(t); when γ < 0, an increase in per capita
expenditure shifts the composition of household j’s demand in favor of YjM(t); and
when household j’s preferences are homothetic and γ = 0, an increase in per capita
expenditure does not change the composition of household j’s demand. It is the
influence of increases in per capita expenditure on the composition of household
demand, and hence on the composition of aggregate demand, that determines the
direction of NBG in this section.
Static Equilibrium
The definition of the static equilibrium in this section is the same as the definition in
Chapter 1.5. In addition, the static equilibrium conditions in this section are identical
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to the static equilibrium conditions from Proposition 1 and Theorems 1 and 2 in
Chapter 1.5 with the exception of the expressions for M - and S-sector employment
and for the relative price of S-sector output, which are different because the new
expressions for the aggregate demands for M - and S-sector output implied by (1.79)
change the market-clearing conditions in the M - and S-sectors. In particular, the






Ej(t) + (1− µ)γ
H∑
j=1













(1− µ)p(t)−1 = (E(t)− γL (t))(1− µ)pSC(t)−1,
for SC = FA, FD, where, as in Chapter 1.4, E(t) is societal expenditure and L (t)
is total labor supply.41 Note that the conditions on Ej(t) and lj (t) that ensure that
YjM(t) > 0 and YjM(t) > 0 hold for every household in the economy for all t imply
that aggregate demands for M - and S-sector output in (1.84) are positive for all t.
Using the expression for aggregate demand for M -sector output from (1.84) and
the M -sector market-clearing condition from (1.32), M -sector employment at time t
is
LSCM (t) =
µE(t) + (1− µ)γL (t)
(1 + α)wSC (t)
, (1.85)
where, from (1.37), wFA (t) = (1− α)α
2α










Similarly, using the expression for aggregate demand for S-sector output from (1.84),
and the S-sector market-clearing condition from (1.39), the relative price of S-sector
41Household demand functions can be aggregated to form societal demand functions because
all households have the same linear Engel curves (dYjM (t)/dEj(t) = µ and dYjS(t)/dEj (t) =
(1− µ) p(t)−1 for all j = 1, ...,H and for all t). Linear Engel curves imply that changes in household
demand that would result from a redistribution of a given level of societal expenditure between
households would cancel out, leaving aggregate demands for M - and S-sector output unaffected.
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output at time t is
pSC (t) =
[





1−β (Fa + Fb)
]1−β
, (1.86)
and, using the expression for S-sector employment from (1.26), S-sector employment
at time t is
LSCS (t) = L
SC





β (1− µ) (E(t)− γL (t))




β (1− µ) (E(t)− γL (t))




β (1− µ) (E(t)− γL (t))
wSC (t)
.
The expressions for LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t) from (1.85) and (1.87) change the static equi-
librium expressions for M - and S-sector output from Proposition 1. The expression
for M - and S-sector output under the assumption of non-homothetic preferences are
not presented here because they are not used in the analysis and discussion in the
remainder of this section.
Comparative Static Analysis
This section presents comparative static results for the influence of demand-side NBG
on relative employment on the M - and S-sectors and on regional population move-
ments. As in Chapter 1.5.3, comparative static results are presented for two spatial
configurations of the economy: full agglomeration, where the M - and I-sector labor
and I-sector innovation are concentrated in region a, and full dispersion, where the
M - and I-sectors are evenly dispersed across the two regions.
Proposition 10 In equilibrium, when preferences are non-homothetic, 1.




d ln(LSCM (t)/LSCS (t))
d lnE(t)






> 0 ⇔ γ > 0,
SC = FA, FD.
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Proof. Proposition 10 follows directly from the expressions for LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t)
from (1.85) and (1.87).
Part 1 of Proposition 10 implies that technological advance (i.e., growth in N (t))
does not influence M -sector employment relative to S-sector employment in this
section. The intuition for why this is the case is given in the discussion of Proposition
4 in Chapter 1.5.3. In particular, Proposition 4 demonstrates that when the elasticity
of substitution between M - and S-sector output is equal to 1 (which is the case in
(1.77)), the increase in the marginal product of labor in the M -sector resulting from
an increase in N (t), which attracts labor to the M -sector, is precisely proportional
to the increase in the relative price of S-sector output, p (t), which attracts labor to
the S-sector, leaving LSCM (t) /L
SC
S (t) unchanged.
Parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 10 demonstrate that sectoral employment growth as
a result of an increase in per capita expenditure will be biased towards the sector
whose output has a higher income elasticity of demand. This result holds regardless
of whether the increases in per capita expenditure occur as a result of increases in
E (t) for fixed L (t) (part 2 of Proposition 10) or a decrease in L (t) for fixed E (t)
(part 3 of Proposition 10). When γ > 0, an increase in per capita expenditure leads
to a greater than proportional increase in consumption of S-sector output and a less
than proportional increase in consumption ofM -sector output (see (1.81) and (1.82)),
which causes the S-sector to gain employment relative to theM -sector. The converse
result holds when γ < 0. When γ = 0 and consumption of both M - and S-sector
output increases proportionately with expenditure, LSCM (t) /L
SC
S (t) does not change
with increases in E (t) or L (t).
Re-expressing LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t) from (1.85) and (1.87) in terms of per capita
expenditure, e (t) = E (t) /L (t), yields
LSCM (t) =
[µe(t) + (1− µ)γ]L (t)
(1 + α)wSC (t)
and LSCS (t) =




From (1.88), LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t) change proportionately with L (t) for constant e (t).
This implies that holding e (t) constant, changes in L (t) do not affect LSCM (t) /L
SC
S (t).
Parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 10 demonstrate when household preferences are non-
homothetic, changes in per capita expenditure lead to changes in the composition
of household demand for M - and S-sector output, and that these changes in the
composition of household demand lead to NBG. It is the case, of course, that sustained
growth in per capita expenditure is only possible in a growing economy. This means
that demand-side NBG in this section is ultimately driven by growth inN (t), which is
the source of productivity growth in the model. The direction of NBG in this section,
however, is determined by the income elasticities of demand for sectoral output, and
not by differences in productivity growth between sectors, as was the case in the
baseline model of supply-side NBG.



























SC = FA, FD.
Proof. Proposition 11 follows directly from the expression for LSCkS (t), k = a, b,
from (1.88) and the expressions for region a’s population under full agglomeration
and full dispersion from (1.53) and (1.54).
Proposition 11 demonstrates that, as is the case with supply-side NBG, demand-
side NBG will cause employment, and, hence, population, to move into the region
whose economic characteristics give it a comparative advantage in the expanding
sector(s). In particular, Proposition 11 demonstrates that an increase in N (t) in-
fluences the distribution of population between regions a and b because, from (1.85)
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and (1.87), an increase in N (t) reduces LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t), and, thus, increases
LSCI (t).
42 Under full agglomeration, an increase in N (t) causes region a’s population
share to increase because agglomeration externalities cause the expanding I-sector
to concentrated itself in region a (i.e., because region a has a comparative advan-
tage in I-sector production). Under full dispersion, an increase in N (t) expands the
population share of the region with the smaller endowment of the fixed factor. The
region with the smaller endowment of the fixed factor has a comparative advantage
in M - and I-sector production relative to S-sector production because the benefits
from agglomeration externalities to the M - and I-sectors are the same in regions a
and b under full dispersion.
Similarly, Proposition 11 demonstrates that an increase in per capita expenditure,
e (t), changes the distribution of population between regions a and b because, from
(1.88), an increase in e (t) increases LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t), and, thus, reduces L
SC
I (t).
Under full agglomeration, an increase in e (t) increases S-sector employment in region
b, and, thus, region b’s population, because region b has a comparative advantage in
S-sector production. Under full dispersion, where the benefits from agglomeration
externalities in the M - and I-sectors are the same in both regions, the region with
the larger endowment of the fixed factor has a comparative advantage in S-sector
production and will experience the larger increase in S-sector employment —and will
thus expand its population —as a result of an increase in e (t).
Proposition 11 also demonstrates that increases in L (t) do not influence regional
population shares. This is because, from (1.88), an increase in L (t) leads to propor-
tional increases in employment in the M -, S- and I-sectors for fixed N (t) and e (t),
42As in Proposition 3 in Chapter 1.5.3, an increase in N (t) reduces LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t) becuase
the improvement in M -sector productivity resulting from the increase in N (t) reduces the total
labor required to meet the quantity of M - and S-sector output demanded by consumers for a given
level of societal expenditure, E (t).
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and thus does not influence regional population shares.
Proposition 11 illustrates the limits to comparative static analysis with regards to
the interregional population distribution. In particular, Proposition 11 demonstrates
that N (t) and e (t) have countervailing influences on regional population movements,
so that the influence of NBG on regional population movements will depend on the
growth rates of both N (t) and e (t). Despite this limitation, the comparative static
results presented in Propositions 10 and 11 suggest that many of the key results
concerning the implications of supply-side NBG for regional population movements
developed in the dynamic analysis in Chapter 1.6.3 will hold in the case of demand-
side NBG. In particular, Proposition 10 indicates that when γ > 1, an increase in
per capita expenditure will cause the employment share of the less progressive S-
sector to expand. Proposition 11 demonstrates that this will cause the population
share of the region with a comparative advantage in S-sector production to grow,
and will thus undermine the positive relationship between regional productivity and
regional population growth emphasized in the previous literature and discussed in
Chapter 1.6.3. In addition, the sector that is expanding in employment benefits
less from agglomeration externalities, so that demand-side NBG will undermine the
self-reinforcing relationship between agglomeration and regional population growth
emphasized in the previous literature and discussed in Chapter 1.6.3.
1.7.2 Non-Balanced Growth in an Open Economy
This section extends the baseline model to consider the spatial consequences of NBG
in an open economy, where NBG results from changes in the terms of trade between
countries. International trade will cause the process of NBG to unfold differently
across countries because, as has been pointed out in Matsuyama (2007), faster pro-
ductivity growth in a given sector will shift a country’s comparative advantage towards
that sector. In this case of deindustrialization, this means that while faster produc-
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tivity growth in goods production relative to services in a given country may lead to
deindustrialization globally, it may not cause employment in goods-producing sectors
in the country to decline. International trade provides an explanation for why dein-
dustrialization has been uneven across advanced economies, while occurring across
advanced economies as a whole. For example, Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1999)
find, when looking at changes in service sector employment relative to manufactur-
ing employment, that between 1960 and 1994 the total number of workers engaged
in manufacturing across advanced economies as a whole remained roughly constant,
while employment in the service sector grew at an average annual rate of 2.2 percent.
Against this backdrop of a declining employment share for manufacturing across ad-
vanced economies, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) show that Germany and Japan have
experienced smaller declines in manufacturing’s employment share than the United
States and that certain advanced Pacific Rim economies, such as Hong Kong, Tai-
wan, and South Korea, have had their manufacturing sector’s share of employment
continue to rise through the early 1990s.
The analysis in this section considers the spatial consequences of NBG in a small
open economy. This means that production and investment decisions in the domestic
economy are assumed not to influence world prices, as would be the case in a large
open economy. How the results presented in this section would change if the analysis
were extended to consider a large open economy is discussed below.
The Model
There are two differences between the model used in this section to analyze the spatial
consequences of NBG in an open economy and the baseline model of supply-side NBG:
(i) both M - and S-sector output are traded internationally and (ii) households and
firms have access to international capital markets. These assumptions imply that both
p (t) and r (t) are set internationally (henceforth pint (t) and rint (t)). Intermediate
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inputs are not traded internationally in this chapter, though they are traded between
regions. This preserves the mechanism that creates the incentive for agglomeration in
the M - and I-sectors from the baseline model. Furthermore, I-sector innovation can
only develop new varieties of intermediate inputs for the domestic economy, and new
varieties of intermediate inputs developed in foreign economies cannot be imported.
The exogenously determined international prices, pint (t) and rint (t), imply new
expressions for M -, S-, and I-sector employment when the economy is in static equi-
librium. To begin, using (1.26), the expression for S-sector employment in an open
economy at time t is
LSCS (t) = L
SC















for SC = FA, FD, where, from (1.37), wFA (t) = (1− α)α
2α










N (t). Next, using (1.43) and (1.57), the expression for
M -sector employment in an open economy at time t is
LFAM (t) = α





α−1rint (t) . (1.90)
Finally, given the expressions for LSCS (t) and L
SC
M (t) from (1.89) and (1.90),
LSCI (t) is determined by market-clearing condition in the labor market, (1.31).
43
(1.90) implies that in an open economy, the distribution of non-S-sector employ-
ment (i.e., L (t) − LSCS (t)) between M -sector production and I-sector innovation is
43The analysis in this section focuses on the case where M - and S-sector production and I-sector
innovation in operation. The analysis focuses on this case becuase NBG requires that both the M -
and S-sectors are in operation and that there is economic growth in the economy, i.e., that I-sector
innovation produces new varieties of intermediate inputs. Two conditions on pint (t) and rint (t) are
necessary for M -sector production and I-sector innovation to be in operation for all t. Notice that
no additional conditions are necessary to guarantee that S-sector is in operation for all t becuase the
presence of the fixed factor in each region means that the marginal product of labor in the S-sector
will go to infinite in a given region —and, hence, in the domestic economy as a whole —as S-sector
employment in the region goes to zero.
First, it is necessary to place a restriction on the world price of S-sector output, pint (t), to
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determined by the interest rate, rint (t). The intuition for why LSCM (t) is increasing
in rint (t) is that, all else equal, an increase in rint (t) will cause employment to move
from I-sector innovation into theM -sector production until demand for intermediate
inputs from the M -sector, and, hence, the profits of I-sector firms, has increased
to the point that there is once again an incentive to invest in the development of
new varieties of intermediate inputs (i.e., an incentive for positive employment in the
I-sector). Higher values of rint (t) imply that more employment will move from the
I-sector to the M -sector before this point is reached (and, hence, higher total levels
of M -sector employment).
Comparative Statics
Proposition 12 In equilibrium, in a small open economy,
1.
d ln(LSCM (t)/LSCS (t))
d lnN(t)








> 0⇔ Fa − Fb < 0;
2.











guarantee that theM -sector is in operation at time t. Notice that if theM -sector is not in operation
at time t, then I-sector production, which furnishes intermediate inputs to the M -sector, will also
not be in operation at time t. The restriction is that the marginal revenue product of labor in
the S-sector is lower than the marginal revenue product of labor in the M -sector (which is equal






This restriction guarantees that pint (t) will not be so high as to perclude domestic production in
the M -sector.
Second, from (1.42) and (1.56), a suffi cient condition for I-sector innovation













L (t)− LSCS (t)
)
> V SCrint (t). This condition
implies that when all labor not used in S-sector production is directed to the M -sector, that the
profits for I-sector firms are suffi ciently high that there is an incentive to invest in the development
of new varieties of intermediate inputs. Indeed, when this ineqaulity holds, labor will be allocated
from the M -sector to the I-sector until V SCrint (t) = πSCi (t) holds with equality.
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3.
d ln(LSCM (t)/LSCS (t))
d lnL(t)















Fa − Fb > 0;
where SC = FA, FD.
Proof. Proposition 12 follows directly from the expressions for LSCS (t) and L
SC
M (t)
from (1.89) and (1.90), and the expressions for population in regions a and b under
full agglomeration and full dispersion from (1.53) and (1.54).
Part 1 of Proposition 12 shows that in an open economy, productivity growth in
the M -sector caused by technological advance (change in N (t)) shifts a country’s
comparative advantage towards the M -sector. This causes M -sector employment to
increase and causes the population of the region whose economic characteristics give
it a comparative advantage in M -sector production to increase, i.e., region a when
the economy is in full agglomeration and the region with less of the fixed factor when
the economy is in full dispersion. Technological advance unambiguously leads to an
increase inM -sector employment in a small open economy because it is assumed that
domestic technological advance does not affect world prices, so that there is not the
countervailing influence of an increase in p (t) drawing labor into the S-sector that
accompanies increases in N (t) in the baseline model of a closed economy.
Parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 12 follow from the fact that, from (1.90) and (1.89),
changes in E (t) and L (t) do not influence employment in the M - and S-sectors,
and, as such, do not influence either relative employment in the M - and S-sectors or
relative population in regions a and b.
Proposition 12 illustrates the key insight in this section that the direction of
NBG in an open economy is determined by how a country’s comparative advantage,
rather than its absolute advantage, changes over the process of development. In the
case of deindustrialization, this means that the extent of deindustrialization within
a country is determined by the performance of the domestic goods-producing sector
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compared to its global competitors relative to the performance of the domestic service
sector compared to its global competitors. Put differently, in an open economy it
is the differential impact of global competition on each sector that determines the
direction and extent of NBG. This means that even if deindustrialization is occurring
globally as a result of faster productivity growth in the goods-producing sector relative
to services, the extent of deindustrialization, and, hence, the extent of its spatial
consequences, will be different across countries.
Proposition 13 In equilibrium, in an open economy,
1.
d ln(LSCM (t)/LSCS (t))
d ln pint(t)








> 0⇔ Fa − Fb > 0;
2.
d ln(LSCM (t)/LSCS (t))
d ln rint(t)








> 0⇔ Fa − Fb < 0;
where SC = FA, FD.
Proof. Proposition 13 follows directly from the expressions for LSCS (t) and L
SC
M (t)
from (1.89) and (1.90), and the expressions for population in regions a and b under
full agglomeration and full dispersion from (1.53) and (1.54).
Proposition 13 demonstrates that in an open economy, a change in pint (t) will
cause employment to expand in the sector whose relative output price is increasing
and that this will lead to the region whose regional economic characteristics give it a
comparative advantage the expanding sector’s production to increase in population.
Similarly, an increase in rint (t) will reduce investment in I-sector innovation and cause
M -sector employment to expand. This will cause the population of the region whose
economic characteristics give it a comparative advantage in M -sector production to
increase, i.e., region a when the economy is in full agglomeration and the region with
less of the fixed factor when the economy is in full dispersion.
The importance Proposition 13 is that it holds regardless of the cause of the change
in world prices. In particular, the change in world prices could result from differ-
ences in productivity growth between sectors (supply-side non-balanced growth) or
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differences in the income elasticities for sectoral demand (demand-side non-balanced
growth) occurring in either the domestic economy or in any of the domestic economy’s
trading partners. In this way, Proposition 13 demonstrates that economic activity in
one country can "export" NBG and its spatial consequences to other countries. In
addition, Proposition 13 implies that NBG can occur in an open economy without
there being differences in productivity growth between sectors or differences in the
income elasticities of demand for sectoral output in the domestic economy provided
that these differences exist in one or more of the domestic economy’s trading partners.
It is straightforward to extend the comparative static results presented in Propo-
sition 12 and 13 to a large open economy. The most important implication that
would follow from expanding the analysis to consider a large open economy is that
in a large open economy changes in the domestic economy will cause NBG to occur
asymmetrically across countries. For example, in a large open economy, an increase
in N (t) would change the domestic economy’s comparative advantage, as is shown in
Proposition 12, and would also influence pint (t) and rint (t). As is shown in Proposi-
tion 13, changes in pint (t) and rint (t) will influence sectoral and regional employment
in both the domestic economy and in foreign economies; however, the changes in
sectoral and regional employment in the foreign economies will occur without the
offsetting increase in N (t). This means that the consequences of an increase in N (t)
for sectoral and regional employment will differ between the domestic economy and
foreign economies, i.e., that in a large open economy an increase in N (t) will cause
NBG to occur asymmetrically across countries.
1.8 Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
This essay analyzed the consequences of NBG at the national level for the regional
distribution of population and production. To analyze this issue, this essay developed
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a multi-sector, multi-region, dynamic general-equilibrium model of regional develop-
ment in the presence of non-balanced growth. This model extends the previous lit-
erature by allowing for endogenous labor allocations across both sectors and regions
within an analytically tractable growth model and in the presence of agglomeration
externalities. It is argued that these innovations are essential for analyzing the spa-
tial consequences of non-balanced growth, and, in particular, of deindustrialization.
The model is used to consider the implications for regional development of the three
explanations for NBG most emphasized in the literature: supply-side NBG (Chapters
1.4 to 1.6), demand-side NBG (Chapter 1.7.1), and NBG resulting from international
trade (Chapter 1.7.2).
The theoretical analysis in this essay suggests a simple mechanism for how NBG
may influence the spatial distribution of the economy. According to this mechanism,
when there are differences in the relative importance of regional economic character-
istics between the sectors of the economy, NBG will cause population to shift towards
regions whose economic characteristics give them a comparative advantage in the sec-
tor(s) whose share of total employment is expanding. The major theoretical results
in this essay follow from the economic forces driving NBG also influencing regional
economic development and interregional population movements through this mecha-
nism. In addition, the model implies that while it is regions’comparative advantage
that determines the direction of change in regional population shares in an economy
undergoing NBG, it is regions’absolute advantage in the sector(s) that dominates the
long-run distribution of employment that determines long-run distribution of popu-
lation between regions.
The theoretical results demonstrate that the presence of NBG at the national
level can influence several of the relationships between regional economic activity and
regional population growth that are emphasized in the previous literature. In par-
ticular, it is shown that both supply-side and demand-side NBG can undermine the
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self-reinforcing relationship between agglomeration and regional population growth
and the positive relationship between regional productivity growth and regional pop-
ulation growth that have been predicted in previous studies. In addition, in the case
where deindustrialization results from slower productivity growth in the service sec-
tor (i.e., from supply-side NBG), it is shown that the positive relationship between
regional productivity growth and regional population growth may be systematically
reversed. It is argued that this result agrees with the recent experience of the United
States and other advanced economies undergoing deindustrialization, where many of
the regions that have sustained strong population growth have regional economies
that are concentrated in relatively low-productivity growth industries in the service
sector.
The analysis in this essay suggests several directions for further research. For ex-
ample, the analysis demonstrates that NBG can lead to systematic differences between
regional productivity growth and regional population growth, with regions concen-
trated in high productivity growth sector(s) experiencing relatively weak population
growth and vice versa. This result suggests that further research into how NBG
can lead to interregional differences in the process of economic development may be
merited. For example, if the model in this essay were extended to included physi-
cal capital, NBG may also lead to systematic differences in the rates of population
growth and capital accumulation between regions. These differences would express
themselves in interregional variation in capital-to-labor ratios.
The analysis in this essay suggests that international trade can cause the NBG
to occur asymmetrically across countries, and that this may lead to the process of
regional development unfolding asymmetrically across countries as well. This result
suggests that future research into how differences in patterns of regional development
between countries are related to differences in the process of NBG between countries
is merited. In addition to cross-country differences in the process of NBG resulting
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from international trade, differences in the process of NBG between countries due to
cross-country differences in factors such as human and physical capital accumulation,
the distribution of income, and natural resource endowments could also be considered.
Finally, the analysis in this essay considers how regional economic characteris-
tics influence firm productivity, and, hence, firm location decisions, but does not
consider how regional economic characteristics influence household utility or loca-
tion decisions. Numerous studies, beginning with Roback (1982), have shown that
households will accept a lower wage and a higher rent in order to live in a region
with desirable economic characteristics (e.g., desirable climate amenities, high envi-
ronmental quality, low congestion). Given this previous work, a potential topic for
further research is whether NBG changes the economy-wide importance of the re-
gional economic characteristics that influence household utility relative to those that
influence firm productivity. This research could shed light on the findings in previous
empirical studies, such as Cheshire and Magrini (2006), that in recent decades climate
amenities (low rainfall, warm winters, etc.) have been important determinants of not
only regional population levels but also of regional population growth in advanced
economies. This empirical finding may be explained by deindustrialization if it has
increased the overall importance of climate amenities in household and firm location
decisions relative to the regional economic characteristics that originally informed
the location decisions of firms in declining industries in goods-producing sectors (e.g.,




Non-Balanced Growth in the United States:
Evaluating Supply-Side versus Demand-Side
Explanations
2.1 Introduction
The term non-balanced growth (NBG) refers to systematic changes in the employment
and output shares of the major sectors of the economy over time in the process of
economic development.1 In reference to advanced economies, the term NBG generally
refers to what Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001) term the "Kuznets facts": the
decline in the relative importance of the agricultural sector in terms of employment
and output shares in the early stages of development, and the successive rise in the
1Certain studies have used the term "structural change" rather than NBG to refer to changes in
sectoral employment and output shares that occur in the process of economic development (e.g., Ngai
and Pissarides 2007). This essay uses the term NBG rather than structural change because, as has
been pointed out in Matsuyama (2007), in addition to changes in the sectoral composition of output
and employment, the term structural change has also been used refer to changes in the distribution
of income and wealth, changes in demographics (population age distribution, etc.), and changes in
institutions, such as the financial system, the organization of industry, and political institutions,
that occur in the process of economic development.
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relative importance of the manufacturing and service sectors. In the United States
and other advanced economies, however, NBG consistent with the Kuznets facts has
occurred against the backdrop of otherwise balanced economic growth. In particular,
the Kuznets facts have been observed concurrently with the "Kaldor facts": the
relative constancy of (i) the growth rate output, (ii) the real interest rate, (iii) the
capital-to-output ratio, and (iv) the share of capital income in total output (see Barro
and Sala-i-Martin 2004).
Several studies have attempted to reconcile NBGwith the Kaldor facts (Kongsamut,
Rebelo, and Xie 2001; Ngai and Pissarides 2007; Acemoglu and Guerrieri 2008;
Foellmi and Zweimuller 2008). These studies have proposed theoretical models of
economic growth that generate equilibrium growth paths that are consistent with the
Kaldor facts and also feature NBG at the sector level. These studies, however, have
focused on either supply-side NBG, where NBG results from differential rates of pro-
ductivity growth across sectors (see Ngai and Pissarides 2007; Acemoglu and Guerrieri
2008), or demand-side NBG, where NBG results from changes in the composition of
demand for sectoral output that occur as the economy grows (see Kongsamut, Rebelo,
and Xie 2001; Foellmi and Zweimuller 2008).2 The exclusive focus on only one of these
two complementary explanations for NBG is problematic given that recent work has
demonstrated the inability of either explanation, on its own, to generate patterns of
NBG that match the dramatic changes in sectoral output and employment shares as-
sociated with the Kuznets facts for the United States and other advanced economies
(Buera and Kaboski 2009; Iscan 2010; Guillo, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian
2011).
This essay develops and calibrates a dynamic general equilibrium model that in-
2Supply-side non-balanced growth is also referred to as technology-based non-balanced growth.
Demand-side non-balanced growth is also referred to preference-based non-balanced growth.
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tegrates supply-side and demand-side explanations for NBG, and uses it to evaluate
the extent to which the two explanations for NBG —both alone and in combination —
can account for patterns of NBG consistent with the Kuznets and Kaldor facts in the
post-war United States (1949 to 2012). The model is calibrated using data from the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). The analysis focuses on the model’s ability to generate equilibrium
dynamics that feature NBG consistent with the Kuznets facts and an approximately
constant growth rate for output, real interest rate, capital-to-output ratio, and cap-
ital’s share of total output, consistent with the Kaldor facts. The analysis examines
the potential trade-offs between the model’s ability to match the large changes in
sectoral output and employment shares observed in the United State over the study
period and its ability to generate a balanced growth path for the economy as described
by the Kaldor facts.
In order to evaluate the Kuznets facts, the model divides the economy into three
sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and services. In doing so, the analysis builds
on previous three-sector models of NBG. In the two studies closest to this essay,
Buera and Kaboski (2009) and Iscan (2010) develop three-sector models that include
the agricultural, manufacturing, and service sectors to evaluate the importance of
supply- and demand-side explanations for NBG in explaining the Kuznets facts for
the United States. These previous studies, however, only match the Kuznets facts
in terms of sectoral employment shares, and either do not consider (Iscan 2010) or
fail to match (Buera and Kaboski 2009) the Kuznets facts regarding sectoral output
shares. Further, these previous studies do not fully explore their models’abilities
to match the Kaldor facts. On the other hand, Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001)
and Foellmi and Zweimuller (2008) attempt to reconcile NBG with the Kaldor facts
within a three-sector model of NBG that includes the agricultural, manufacturing,
and service sectors, but only consider one causal mechanism for NBG in their models
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(demand-side NBG), and, hence, are subject to the critique mentioned above that
models that focus on only one mechanism for NBG cannot match the Kuznets facts
for the United States and other advanced economies.3
The analysis in this essay focuses on the model’s ability to generate short-run
transition dynamics that match the Kaldor and Kuznets facts in the post-war United
States. The decision to focus on the short-run transition dynamics —and to ignore
the characterization of the asymptotic equilibrium for the model — is a reflection
of Buera and Kaboski (2009)’s result that any model that integrates supply-side and
demand-side explanations for NBGwill be inconsistent with balanced long-run growth
for output. Buera and Kaboski (2009)’s result is confirmed by Iscan (2010), who is
unable to characterize a long-run steady state that features constant growth rates
for output or a constant capital-to-labor ratio for his model that integrates supply-
side and demand-side explanations for NBG. Further, Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008)
note that the asymptotic equilibrium for models of NBG typically features one sector
becoming "asymptotically dominant" with all other sectors becoming "vanishingly
small" in terms of their shares of employment and other factors. This essay’s focus on
the short-run behavior of the economy allows the model’s ability to match the Kaldor
and Kuznets facts to be evaluated when there are comparable (i.e., non-trivial) levels
of employment and capital in the agricultural, manufacturing, and service sectors.
3Other recent studies have developed three-sector models to analyze: changes in sectoral employ-
ment shares between the manufacturing, service, and agricultural sectors in a small open economy
(South Korea) where exogenous price changes as a result of international trade influence the process
of NBG (Mao and Yao 2012); changes in employment shares between manufacturing and the "pro-
gressive" and "asymptotically stagnant" components of the service sector (Kapur 2009); and recent
changes in sectoral labor allocations in China between the agricultural, non-agricultural, and public
sectors, where changes in the scale of the public sector and institutional barriers to labor mobility
between sectors are important drivers of changes in sectoral labor allocations (Lei, Zhang, and Wu
2013).
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As mentioned above, supply-side explanations for NBG posit that NBG occurs
as the result of differential rates of productivity growth between sectors. Following
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), the model in this essay considers two drivers sectoral
productivity growth: (i) sector-specific rates of Hicks-neutral technical change and
(ii) capital-deepening. Capital-deepening refers to the increase in the capital-to-labor
ratio over time in a growing economy.4 Capital-deepening can contribute to NBG
because more capital-intensive sectors derive greater benefit from the increase in the
capital-to-labor ratio in the economy, which causes their output shares to increase
relative to less capital-intensive sectors and influences the distribution of labor and
other factors of production between sectors.
Following previous models of supply-side NBG (e.g., Ngai and Pissarides 2007;
Acemoglu and Guerrieri 2008), the direction of supply-side NBG in the model is de-
termined by the elasticity of substitution between the outputs of the more progressive
and less progressive sectors in the economy. In particular, a less progressive sector’s
factor shares will increase as the economy grows when the elasticity of substitution
between its output and the output of more progressive sectors is low (less than 1).
This is because, when the elasticity of substitution is low, the increase in the relative
price of output in the less progressive sector is more than proportional to the relative
declines in the marginal products of capital, labor, and other factors of production in
the sector, which causes the sector’s factor shares to increase as the economy grows.
The converse holds when the elasticity of substitution between the outputs in the
more and less progressive sectors is high (greater than 1).
4Hicks-neutral technical change is a form of total factor productivity growth where technical
change does not influence the marginal rate of substitution between inputs. Formally, total factor
productivity is the ratio of output to an index of inputs (Chambers 1988). Growth in total factor
productivity is a useful measure of technical change because the ratio of total factor productivity
from two different time periods provides a measure of the change in the effectiveness of the index of
inputs in producing output.
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As mentioned above, demand-side explanations for NBG posit that NBG occurs
as the result of changes in the composition of demand for sectoral output that occur
as the economy grows. In most previous models of demand-side NBG, the changes
in the composition of demand occur as a result of difference in the income elastic-
ities of demand for sectoral output that arise because of non-homothetic consumer
preferences (see Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie 2001; Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson
2002; Iscan 2010). In contrast to these previous models, changes in the composition
of demand for sectoral output in the model presented in this essay occur as a result
of differences in the elasticities of demand for sectoral output with respect to total
output in the economy. This approach has three important advantages.
First, as is described in detail in Chapter 2.2, considering the elasticities of demand
for sectoral output with respect to total output allows physical capital to be produced
in the model using the output from all three sectors. That physical capital is produced
using output from all three sectors helps the model to produce realistic behavior of
both sectoral output and employment shares. It is likely that the inability of Buera
and Kaboski (2009) or Iscan (2010) to match the Kuznets facts in terms of changes
in sectoral output shares is due, in part, to their unrealistic restriction that physical
capital is produced using output from only one sector (manufacturing).
Second, as detailed in Chapter 2.3.2, considering the elasticities of demand for
sectoral output with respect to total output allows the model to be calibrated using
data on nominal value added in each sector rather than data on consumption expen-
ditures in each sector. Iscan (2010) describes the empirical issues associated with
mapping the parameters for a utility function capturing non-homothetic consumer
preferences to data on consumption expenditure from NIPA. These empirical issues
are related to properly accounting for intermediate inputs and for the relationship
between consumption categories and categories of sectoral output.5
5For this reason, Iscan (2010) uses total expenditures on food, non-food goods, and services to ap-
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Third, it is unlikely that the model’s predictions concerning changes over time in
the composition of demand for sectoral output would change significantly if elasticities
of demand for sectoral output were modeled with respect to consumption expenditure
rather than total output. This is because over the period considered in this study, the
ratio of consumption expenditure to total output —the consumption-to-output ratio —
has been relatively constant in the United States. King et al. (1991) find evidence in
support of the constancy of the consumption-to-output ratio for the United States for
the period 1954 to 1988; more recent studies by Clemente et al. (1999) and Attfield
and Temple (2006) confirm this result in econometric models that allow for structural
breaks in the data.6
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. In Chapter 2.2, the three-
sector model of NBG used in the model calibration is developed and the model equi-
librium conditions are presented. Chapter 2.3 describes the calibration procedure and
explains how parameters and initial values are chosen to correspond to the observed
data on the U.S. economy. In Chapter 2.4, the calibration results are presented and
discussed. Finally, in Chapter 2.5, conclusions are given and directions for future
research are discussed.
proximate consumptions shares for agricultural, manufacturing, and service sectors when calibrating
his model.
6The constancy, or stationarity, of the consumption-to-output ratio —or, equivalenty, the con-
stancy of the savings rate —is a standard feature of neoclassical economic growth models starting
with Solow (1956). Indeed, neoclassical growth models predict a balanced growth path in terms of
per capita output, consumption, and investment, which implies a constant consumption-to-output
ratio. Empirical evidence suggests that the consumption-to-output has been approximately constant
for some advanced countries, but not others (Clemente et al. 1999). For developing countries, Li
and Daly (2009) find that the Chinese economy followed a growth path that featured a constant
consumption-to-output prior to the 1970s, but not afterwards.
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2.2 The Model
This section develops the three-sector model of NBG that is used in the model cal-
ibration. This section has two parts. First, Chapter 2.2.1 describes the preferences
and the technology in the model. Second, Chapter 2.2.2 describes the equilibrium
conditions for the model and demonstrates that the dynamic competitive equilibrium
of the model can be represented by a boundary value system of ordinary differential
equations. In the next section, it is shown that the boundary value system of ordi-
nary differential equations that defines the dynamic equilibrium can be approximated
by a system of difference equations whose parameters and initial values correspond
to observed data on the U.S. economy. It is this parameterized system of difference
equations that is used in the model calibration.
The competitive equilibrium for the model presented in this section is character-
ized by solving the social planner’s problem of maximizing the utility of the repre-
sentative household. The equivalence between the social planner’s problem and the
competitive equilibrium for the economy in this chapter follows the first and second
fundamental theorems of welfare economics (Arrow and Debreu 1954).7 Together,
7That the first and second welfare theorems hold for the economy in this chapter follows from the
facts that (i) all households and firms in the economy are assumed to be price takers (i.e., all markets
function competitively), (ii) there are perfectly defined property rights for all assets in the economy
(i.e., markets are complete), (iii) household preferences are locally non-satiated (each household’s
utility function is strictly increasing) and convex (as is demonstrated in Appendix E for the economy
in Chapter 1, that household preferences are convex follows directly from the concavity of household
utility functions in this chapter), (iv) that all production sets in the economy are convex, and (v)
the "cheaper consumption" condition is always satisfied (Mas Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995).
That all production sets are convex follows from the fact that, as in Chapter 1, they represent the
intersection of upper-contour sets of quasi-concave functions which are convex. The proof that the
cheaper consumption condition always holds for the economy in this chapter is identical to proof
offered in Appendix E for the economy in Chapter 1.
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the first and second fundamental theorems of welfare economics establish that any
competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal and that any distributional objective (such
as the solution to the social planner’s problem) can be achieved through competitive
markets using an appropriate lump-sum redistribution of wealth. The economy in
this chapter admits a representative household because each household has the same
linear Engel curve for the single consumption good. Linear Engel curves imply that
the distribution of wealth between households does not influence aggregate demand,
which further implies that the competitive equilibrium will not be influenced by the
distribution of wealth across households and that, by the second welfare theorem,
the competitive equilibrium will coincide with the solution to the social planner’s
problem.8
2.2.1 Preferences and Technology
Preferences
In the model, the population L (t) at time t grows at the exponential rate n ∈ [0, δ),
where δ is the rate of time preference for households in the economy, so that
L (t) = entL (0) . (2.1)
Each household member supplies inelastically one unit of labor per unit of time, so
L (t) also denotes total labor supply at time t.
The representative household derives utility at time t from per capita consumption
8A well-known necessary and suffi cient condition for the economy to admit a representative
household is for all households in the economy to have Gorman-form indirect utility functions (see
Gorman 1953; Muellbauer 1976). The property of Gorman-form indirect utility functions that drives
this result is that Gorman-form indirect utility functions imply identical linear Engel curves for all
households.
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of a unique final good
u [c (t)] =
c (t)1−θ
1− θ , (2.2)
where c (t) is per capita consumption at time t, and θ > 0 is the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The representative household’s dynamic op-
timization problem is presented below in Chapter 2.2.2.
Technology
The unique final good is produced competitively by combining manufacturing, service,
and agricultural (M -, S-, and A-sector) output according to
Y (t) =
[
µM (YM (t)− γM)
ε−1
ε + µS (YS (t)− γS)
ε−1







where YM(t) ≥ 0, YS(t) ≥ 0, and YA(t) ≥ 0 are M -, S-, and A-sector output at time
t. ε ∈ [0,∞) is the elasticity of substitution between M -, S-, and A-sector output in
the production of Y (t); µM , µS ∈ (0, 1) determine the relative importance of YM (t),
YS (t), and YA (t) in the production of Y (t); γM , γS, γA are parameters such that
the elasticity of demand for YM(t) (YS(t), YA(t)) with respect to Y (t) is less than 1
when γM > 0 (γS, γA > 0) and greater than 1 otherwise. Further, it is assumed that
YM (t) − γM ≥ 0, YS (t) − γS ≥ 0, and YA (t) − γA ≥ 0 for all t. As is discussed in
Chapter 2.4, the parameters ε, γM , γS, and γA are key ingredients in the explanations
for NBG considered in this essay.
It is assumed that physical capital is produced according to a linear production
technology where Y (t) is the only input. That Y (t) is both the sole consumption good
and the sole input in the production of physical capital implies a resource constraint
for the economy. In particular, the resource constraint is that aggregate consumption,
C (t) ≡ c (t)L (t), plus aggregate investment in physical capital, K̇ (t), cannot be
greater than total output of the final good, Y (t), net of capital depreciation, dK (t),
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where K (t) is capital stock at time t and d ≥ 0 is the depreciation rate of capital.
That is,
Y (t) ≥ C (t) + K̇ (t) + dK (t) . (2.4)
(2.4) must hold with equality in equilibrium because if it did not the social plan-
ner could costlessly raise the utility of the representative household by increasing
consumption.
M -, S-, and A-sector output is produced competitively using constant returns to
scale Cobb-Douglas production technology that combines labor and capital to produce
final output
YM (t) = AM(t)LM (t)
αM KM (t)
1−αM , (2.5)




YA (t) = AA(t)LA (t)
αA KA (t)
1−αA ,
where LM (t) ≥ 0, KM (t) ≥ 0, LS (t) ≥ 0, KS (t) ≥ 0, LA (t) ≥ 0, and KA (t) ≥ 0 are
the levels of labor and capital used in the M -, S-, and A-sectors; and the parameters
αM , αS, αA ∈ [0, 1] determine labor and capital’s shares of total cost in the M -, S-,
and A-sectors (i.e., αM , αS, and αA are the elasticity of output with respect to labor
in the M -, S-, and A-sectors; and (1− αM), (1− αS), and (1− αA) are the elasticity
of output with respect to capital in the M -, S-, and A-sectors).
Technical progress in theM -, S-, and A-sectors takes the form of exogenous Hicks-
neutral technical change
ÂM(t) = aM > 0, ÂS(t) = aS > 0, and ÂA(t) = aA > 0. (2.6)
The labor and capital market-clearing conditions at time t are given by
LM (t) + LS (t) + LA (t) = L (t) (2.7)
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and
KM (t) +KS (t) +KA (t) = K (t) . (2.8)
2.2.2 Equilibrium
The characterization of the equilibrium is divided into two parts: the static equi-
librium and the dynamic equilibrium. The static equilibrium defines the allocations
of factors across the M -, S-, and A-sectors —LM (t), KM (t), LS (t), KS (t), LA (t),
and KA (t) —at a given time t that maximize output of the final good, Y (t), taking
the values of the state variables, K (t), L (t), AM (t), AS (t), and AA(t), as given. In
the dynamic equilibrium, the state variables are determined endogenously and evolve
according to the representative household’s intertemporal utility maximization. The
dynamic equilibrium is characterized by solving for the optimal dynamic allocation
for the social planner’s problem. The results from this section are used in Chapter
2.3 to describe the equilibrium dynamics of the economy used in the calibration.
Static equilibrium
In this section, the static optimal allocations for the social planner are presented. Note
that four of the state variables —L (t), AM (t), AS (t), and AA(t) —evolve exogenously
((2.1) and (2.6)), so that, for given the initial conditions, L (0), AM (0), AS (0), and
AA (0), their values at time t are exogenous. For this reason, the optimal static
allocations derived in this section will be defined in terms of time, t, and capital,
K (t), which is the only endogenous state variable in the model.
The maximized value of current output at time t for a given level of capital, K (t),
is
Y (K (t) , t) = max
LM ,KM ,LS ,KS ,LA,KA
Y (t) , (2.9)
where Y (t) is defined in (2.3), subject to the labor and capital market-clearing con-
ditions, (2.7) and (2.8), and given L (0) > 0, AM (0) > 0, AS (0) > 0, and AA (0) > 0.
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As the objective function in (2.9) is continuous and strictly concave, and as the
constraint set defined by (2.7) and (2.8) is a convex set, the social planner’s sta-
tic optimization problem will have a unique solution that corresponds to the unique
competitive equilibrium at time t.
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− λK (t) = 0
L (t)− LM (t)− LS (t)− LA (t) = 0
K (t)−KM (t)−KS (t)−KA (t) = 0
where λL (t) and λK (t) are the Lagrangean multipliers associated with (2.7) and (2.8).
The first-order conditions can be used to determine the optimal allocations of LM (t),
KM (t), LS (t), KS (t), LA (t), and KA (t) in terms of K (t), and, hence, can be used
to determine the maximized value of output in terms of K (t), Y (K (t) , t).
The competitive prices for M -, S-, and A-sector output, pM (t), pS (t), and pA (t),
as well as the prices for labor and capital, w (t) and R (t), are implied by the social
planner’s static optimization problem. To begin, the price of final output is normal-
ized to one. Given this normalization, and setting the prices of M -, S-, and A-sector
output equal to their marginal revenue products, yields






















Next, the factor prices, w (t) and r (t), must equal the marginal revenue products of
labor and capital in the M -, S-, and A-sectors (i.e., w (t) and R (t) must equal the
Lagrangean multipliers for the constraints given by (2.7) and (2.8)). That is,











R (t) = pM (t) (1− αM)
YM (t)
KM (t)
= pS (t) (1− αS)
YS (t)
KS (t)





where R (t) ≡ r (t) + d is the rental price of capital that is equal to the interest rate,
r (t), plus the depreciation rate of capital, d.
Further, (2.10) implies the following expressions for the M -, S-, and A-sectors’

















































= 1− ψM (t)− ψS (t) .
Similarly, (2.10) implies the following expressions for theM -, S-, andA-sectors’shares


















































= 1− φM (t)− φS (t) .
Dynamic equilibrium
In this section, the dynamic equilibrium is characterized as the solution to the so-
cial planner’s dynamic optimization problem. The social planner’s objective is the






subject to the resource constraint for the economy, (2.4), which can be rewritten as
K̇ (t) = Y (K (t) , t)− dK (t)− c (t) entL (0) , (2.19)
and given the initial conditions L (0) > 0, K (0) > 0, AM (0) > 0, AS (0) > 0, and
AA (0) > 0.9 Recall that Y (K (t) , t) is the maximum value of Y (t) at time t for given
K (t) implied by the first-order conditions for the social planner’s static maximization
problem.
The solution to the representative household’s program is found by maximizing
9A suffi cient condition for the improper intergral in (2.18) to converge is for δ − n > 0 (which is
assumed) and for the representative household’s instantaneous utility to be bounded for all t ∈ [0,∞),
i.e., for
∣∣∣ c(t)1−θ1−θ e−(δ−n)t∣∣∣ ≤ B ∈ R++ for all t ∈ [0,∞). When these two conditions hold, which is
assumed in this chapter, the improper integral in (2.18) will converge and not exceed Bδ−n (Caputo
2005, p.384). The assumption that the representative household’s attainable instantaneous utility
is bounded for all t ∈ [0,∞) is equivalent to assuming that the representative household’s resources
are constrained so that it cannot obtain an arbitrarily large level utility (i.e., an arbitrarily large
level of consumption) at any time t.
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the current value Hamiltonian10
Hc (c (t) , K (t) , ν (t)) =
c (t)1−θ
1− θ + ν (t)
[
Y ∗ (K (t) , t)− dK (t)− c (t) entL (0)
]
(2.20)
where ν(t) is the co-state variable. Applying Theorem 14.3 from Caputo (2005), if
{c∗ (t) , K∗ (t)} is an optimal solution, then it is necessary that there exists piecewise
smooth function v(t) such that for all t ∈ [0,∞),11
∂Hc (c (t) , K (t) , ν (t))
∂c (t)
= c (t)−θ − ν (t) entL (0) = 0 (2.21)
−∂H









= ν̇ (t)− (δ − n) ν (t) ,
and
∂Hc (c (t) , K (t) , ν (t))
∂ν (t)
= K̇ (t) = Y (K (t) , t)− dK (t)− c (t) entL (0) . (2.23)
Applying Theorem 14.4 and Lemma 14.1 from Caputo (2005), given that Hc is
a concave function of c (t) and K (t) for all t ∈ [0,∞) over the open convex set
containing all the admissible values of c (t) and K (t), i.e., over the open convex
set {(c (t) , K (t))| c (t) > 0, K (t) > 0}, the necessary conditions in (2.21), (2.22), and
(2.23) are suffi cient to identify the global maximum of the social planner’s dynamic
10As (2.18) and (2.19) and the initial condition K (0) > 0 form a maximization problem with a
continuously differentiable objective function and a non-empty set of controls, Pontryagin’s Max-
imum Principle is a necessary condition for the optimal solution to the social planner’s dynamic
optimization problem.
11The function v(t) is piecewise smooth on the interval t ∈ [0,∞) if its deriative function v̇(t)
is piecewise continous on the interval t ∈ [0,∞) (Caputo 2005, Definition 1.2). The function v̇(t)
is piecewise continous on the interval t ∈ [0,∞) if the inteval t ∈ [0,∞) can be partitioned into a
finite number of points 0 = t0 < t1 < ... < tk < ∞ such that (i) v̇(t) is continous on each open
subinterval tk−1 < t < tk and (ii) v̇(t) approaches a finite limit as the end points of each subinteval
are approached from within the subinterval (Caputo 2005, Definition 1.1).
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optimization problem if the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
K (t) ν (t) e−(δ−n)t = 0 (2.24)
is satisfied.12
Combining (2.21) and (2.22), the optimal consumption path for the representative












[R(t)− d− δ] , (2.25)
together with the initial conditions, L (0) > 0, K (0) > 0, AM (0) > 0, AS (0) > 0,
and AA (0) > 0, the state equation (2.19), and the transversality conditions (2.24).
The following proposition combines this characterization of the optimal consump-
tion path for the representative household with the first-order conditions for the social
planner’s static maximization problem from (2.10) to provide a full representation of
the dynamic equilibrium for the economy.
Proposition 14 The dynamic equilibrium for the economy can be represented by a
system of six non-autonomous differential equations representing the rates of change




[R(t)− d− δ] (2.26)
K̇ (t) = Y (t)− dK (t)− c (t)L (t) (2.27)
where R(t) is defined by (2.13) and Y (t) is defined by (2.3); the M-sector’s share of
total employment
ψ̇M (t) = −ψM (t)
2
(
1 + bψMM (t)αMψM (t)− bψMA (t)αA
1







fM (t)− αM 1ψM (t) ψ̇M (t)
]
− bψMS (t) fS (t)
−bψMA (t)
[






12Theorems 14.3 and 14.4 and Lemma 14.1 in Caputo (2005) are presented for the present-value










































































fM (t) = aM + αMn+ (1− αM)
1
K (t)
K̇ (t) + αM
1
ψM (t)




fS (t) = aS + αSn+ (1− αS)
1
K (t)
K̇ (t) + αS
1
ψS (t)









1− ψS (t)− ψM (t)
(




1− φS (t)− φM (t)
(
φ̇M (t) + φ̇S (t)
)
;
the S-sector’s share of total employment:
ψ̇S (t) = −ψS (t)
2
(
1 + bψSS (t)αSψS (t)− bψSA (t)αA
1







fS (t)− αS 1ψS(t) ψ̇S (t)
]
− bψSM (t) fM (t)
−bψSA (t)
[













































































the M-sector’s share of total capital stock:
φ̇M (t) = −φM (t)
2
(
1 + bφMM (t) (1− αM)φM − bφMA (t) (1− αA)
1





















































































and the S-sector’s share of total capital stock:
φ̇S (t) = −φS (t)
2
(
1 + bφSS (t) (1− αS)φS − bφSA (t) (1− αA)
1







fS (t)− (1− αS) 1φS(t) φ̇S (t)
]
− bφSM (t) fM (t)
−bφSA (t)
[









































































four autonomous differential equations:
L̇ (t) = nL (t) > 0, (2.32)
ȦM(t) = aMAM(t) > 0, ȦS(t) = aSAS(t) > 0, and ȦA(t) = aAAA(t) > 0;
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along with the initial conditions
L (0) > 0, K (0) > 0, AM (0) > 0, AS (0) > 0, and AA (0) > 0,
and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
K (t) ν (t) e−(δ−n)t = 0. (2.33)
Proof. To begin, several of the equations in Proposition 14 are unchanged from
above. In particular, (2.26) is (2.25), (2.27) is (2.19), (2.32) follows from (2.1) and
(2.6), and (2.33) is (2.24).
Next, (2.28), (2.29), (2.30), and (2.31) are obtained by differentiating the expres-
sions for the M -sector’s employment share, (2.14), the S-sector’s employment share,
(2.15), M -sector’s capital share, (2.16), and the S-sector’s capital share, (2.17), with
respect to time and substituting the expressions for ẎM (t), ẎS (t), and ẎA (t) obtained
by differentiating YM (t), YS (t), and YA (t) from (2.5) with respect to time.
In the next section, it is shown that the dynamic equilibrium for the economy
described in Proposition 14 can be approximated by a system of difference equations.
It is this system of difference equations that is used in the calibration.
2.3 Calibration Procedure
This section describes the procedure used in the calibration. This section has two
parts. First, in Chapter 2.3.1, it is shown that the dynamic equilibrium for the
economy described in Proposition 14 can be approximated by a system of difference
equations. Second, in Chapter 2.3.2, it is explained how the parameters and initial
values for this system of difference equations are chosen to correspond to the observed
data on the U.S. economy. It is this parameterized system of difference equations that
is used to predict the time paths of sectoral employment, sectoral output, and other
variables in the model calibration.
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2.3.1 Model for Calibration
In the following proposition, Euler’s method is used to generate an approximate so-
lution to the system of differential equations that represent the dynamic equilibrium
for the economy presented in Proposition 14. Euler’s method converts the system of
ordinary differential equations defined in Proposition 14 into a system of difference
equations that give an approximate solution to the dynamic equilibrium of the econ-
omy. As is mentioned above, this system of difference equations is used to generate
the calibration results presented in Chapter 2.4.
The advantage of Euler’s method is that its implementation, described in Judd
(1998), is straightforward, but its drawback is that it does not provide an estimate of
the error in the approximation. This drawback of the Euler method, however, is not
relevant to this application. The periodicity of the NIPA data —most of the relevant
series used in the calibration are only available on an annual basis —means that in
the model calibration, which involves second-order difference equations, the step-size
in the Euler method must be set equal to one year. In the Euler method, the error
in the approximation is proportional to the step-size. Even if an alternative means of
approximating the dynamic equilibrium of the economy were used which did provide
an estimate of the error, it would not be possible to decrease the step-size to improve
the approximation given the periodicity of the available data.
Before continuing, it is necessary to introduce new notation to distinguish vari-
ables and parameters in the calibration from those in the theoretical model developed
in Chapter 2.2. For starters, the variables in the calibrated model are discrete and
are denoted with a t subscript. For example, K (t) denotes total capital stock at
time t in the theoretical model, while Kt denotes total capital stock in year t in the
calibration. Similarly, the parameters in the calibration are denoted with a tilda to
distinguish them from the parameters in the theoretical model. For example, αM
is labor’s share of total cost in the M -sector in the theoretical model, while α̃M is
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labor’s share of total cost in Manufacturing Sector in the calibration, which is calcu-
lated directly from NIPA data (see Chapter 2.3.2). Finally, the terms Manufacturing
sector, Service sector, and Agricultural sector are capitalized in the context of the cal-
ibration, where they denote specific groupings of industries. The industries included
in the Manufacturing, Service Sector, and Agricultural Sectors in the calibration are
described in Chapter 2.3.2. The subscripts M , S, and A are used in the calibration
to denote the Manufacturing, Service, and Agricultural Sectors.
Proposition 15 Using the Euler method, the dynamic equilibrium of the economy
can be approximated by a system of five non-autonomous, second-order difference
























µ̃M (YM,t − γ̃M)
ε̃−1
ε̃ + µ̃S ( YS,t − γ̃S)
ε̃−1































1− ψM,t − ψS,t
)α̃A (1− φM,t − φS,t)1−α̃A ,







, P = A,M, S, (2.37)
ψM,t =












































































the M -sector’s share of total employment,

















































































































































































the S-sector’s share of total employment,











































































































































































































































































































four autonomous, first-order difference equations
Lt+1 = (1 + hñ)Lt, (2.46)
AM,t+1 = (1 + hãM)AM,t, AS,t+1 = (1 + hãS)AS,t, and AA,t+1 = (1 + hãA)AA,t;
and the initial conditions
L0, L1, K0, K1, AM,0, AM,1, AS,0, AS,1 AA,0, AA,1,
ψM,0, ψM,0, ψS,0, ψS,1, φM,0, φM,1, φS,0, and φS,1.
The step size, h, is set equal to one. This implies that tt+1 = tt + 1.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 15 is a straightforward application of the Euler
method as described in Judd (1998). To begin, many of the expressions in Propo-
sition 15 are simply discretized version of expressions presented in Chapter 2.2. In
particular, (2.35) is (2.3), (2.36) is (2.5), (2.37) is (2.13), (2.38) and (2.39) are (2.14)
and (2.15), and (2.40) and (2.41) are (2.16) and (2.17).
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(2.34) is derived in three steps. First, discretizing (2.19) and (2.25) using the
Euler method yields
Kt+1 = Kt + h
[









Rt − d̃− δ̃
)]
. (2.48)



















Rt − d̃− δ̃
)]
. (2.49)
Third, moving the time subscript in (2.49) back one period and substituting the re-
sulting expression for ct into (2.47) yields (2.34). It is necessary that (2.47) and (2.48)
be combined to form (2.34) because household consumption, ct, while performing a
useful role in the model, does not correspond to any observed data on the U.S. econ-
omy. Note that (2.34) is a second-order difference equation and thus requires two
years of initial values. For this reason, Table 2.3 reports initial values for both 1949
and 1950.
The remaining difference equations follow from the straightforward application of
the Euler method. In particular, (2.42) follows from (2.28), (2.43) from (2.29), (2.44)
from (2.30), and (2.45) from (2.31). Similarly, (2.46) follows from (2.32).
The system of difference equations described by Proposition 15 is used to derive
the calibration results presented in Chapter 2.4. Before continuing, there are two
features of Proposition 15 that require further explanation. First, the expressions for
(2.42), (2.43), (2.44), and (2.45) approximate the expressions for the rates of change
in ψM (t), ψS (t), φM (t), and φS (t) on the right hand sides of (2.28), (2.29), (2.30),














, etc., is known
at the time step that ψM,t+1, ψM,t+1, ψM,t+1, and ψM,t+1 are calculated. An alternative




, etc. This approximation
would change the difference equations (2.42), (2.43), (2.44), and (2.45) into a system
of four equations and four unknowns (i.e., ψM,t+1, ψS,t+1, φM,t+1, and φS,t+1) to be
solved at each step of the calibration. This system of four equations could be solved
simultaneously at each stage of the calibration, which would introduce the issue of
how to deal with multiple real roots, or solved recursively to obtain an expression
for ψM,t+1, ψS,t+1, φM,t+1, or φS,t+1 in terms of variables determined before t+ 1 and
fixed parameters, which would further complicated an already complex calibration
procedure.
Second, the transversality condition in Proposition 15, (2.33), is not represented
in Proposition 15. The transversality condition is not represented in Proposition
15 because, as is discussed in the Introduction, the analysis in this essay focuses
on the calibrated model’s ability to generate short-run patterns of NBG consistent
with those observed in the U.S. economy in the post-war era, and, as such, does not
consider whether the dynamic equilibrium for the economy that is approximated in
Proposition 15 converges to a asymptotic growth path along which the transversality
condition is satisfied.
2.3.2 Variables, Initial Values, and Parameters
In this section, it is explained how the variables and parameters in the calibration
are chosen and how they correspond to the observed data on the U.S. economy. As
is mentioned in the Introduction, the data used in the calibration is taken from the
NIPA from the U.S. BEA.
In the calibration, industries are classified according to the North American Indus-
try Classification System (NAICS). Using the NAICS, the definitions of the Manufac-
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turing, Service, and Agricultural sectors in the calibration are as follows. To begin, the
Agricultural sector corresponds to the BEA’s definition of the Agriculture, Forestry,
Fishing, and Hunting industry. The Manufacturing sector corresponds to the BEA’s
definition of the set of "Private goods-producing industries" minus the Agricultural
sector. The Manufacturing sector includes (i) Mining, (ii) Construction, and (iii)
Manufacturing (durable and non-durable goods). The Service sector corresponds to
BEA’s definition of the set of "Private services-producing industries". The Service
sector includes (i) Utilities, (ii) Wholesale Trade, (iii) Retail Trade, (iv) Transporta-
tion and Warehousing, (v) Information, (vi) Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Rental,
and Leasing (without Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing), (vii) Professional and Busi-
ness Services, (viii) Educational Services, Health Care, and Social Assistance, (ix)
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodation, and Food Services, and (x) Other
Services.13 These definitions of the Manufacturing, Service, and Agricultural sectors
include all private industries in the economy, so that only the Government sector
from the BEA is not included in the analysis.
The initial values of the variables in the calibration are calculate for the base
years 1949 and 1950. The calibration procedure requires two years of initial data
because, from Proposition 15, the system of difference equations that approximates
the dynamic equilibrium for the economy includes several second-order difference
equations that require two years of data to be initialized. The base years of 1949 and
1950 where used despite the fact that employment data was available from the BEA
at the industry-level starting in 1948. Using 1948 and 1949 as the base year, however,
undermined the performance of the calibrated model because total employment and
13The BEA industry Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing is excluded because it has a large capital
share that does not reflect the share of capital in the industry production function. Rather, the high
capital share in the Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing —an average of 0.94 between 1987 and 2011 —











Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Rental, and
Leasing**
Professional and Business Services
Educational Services, Health Care, and Social As-
sistance
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommoda-
tion, and Food Services
Other Services
Agriculture Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting
*According to the 2002 North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS)
**Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing not included. See text for explana-
tion.
Table 2.1: Industries in the Manufacturing, Service, and Agricultural Sectors
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real output in all three sectors was lower in 1949 than in 1948. The calibrated model
is constructed to analyze upward secular trends in output, employment, and capital
stock, and not fluctuations in these variables.
Variables and Initial Values
Real and nominal value-added by industry is available according to the NAICS from
1947 to 2012. Nominal value-added in (industry i) sector P in year t is expressed as
(Y Ni,t ) Y
N
P,t. As is demonstrated below, nominal value-added is used to calculate the
initial sectoral employment and capital shares used in the calibration. Real value-
added expressed in 2005 dollars (billions) is calculated as the product value-added
quantity index for industry i in year t and nominal value-added for industry i in 2005
(divided by 100).14 Nominal and real value-added in the Manufacturing, Service, and
Agricultural sectors is the sum of the nominal and real value-added in their component
industries.
Nominal value-added in the base years of 1949 and 1950 in the Manufacturing,
Service, and Agricultural sectors are Y NM,1949 = 86.1, Y
N
M,1950 = 99.9, Y
N
S,1949 = 109.7,
Y NS,1950 = 118.5, Y
N
A,1949 = 18.6, and Y
N
A,1950 = 19.9. Real value-added in the base
years of 1949 and 1950 in the Manufacturing, Service, and Agricultural sectors are
YM,1949 = 577.6, YS,1950 = 650.5, YS,1949 = 839.7, YS,1950 = 887.1, YA,1949 = 28.5, and
YA,1950 = 29.7 (in billions of 2005 dollars). The variables and initial values of real and
nominal value added and other quantities used in the calibration are summarized in
Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
14This procedure for calculating real value-added implies that the accuracy of the real value-added
figures used in the calibration depends on the accuracy of the BEA’s value-added quantity and price
indices. The dependence of the results on the BEA’s quantity and price indices is an important caveat
to the analysis in this essay given that several previous authors have questioned the appropriateness
of the methodology employed by the BEA to construct these indices (e.g., Nordhaus 2001).
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Variables and Data
Y Ni,t Nominal value-added of industry i at time t. Nominal
value-added by industry (in billions) is available according to





i,t Nominal value-added of the P -sector, P = M,S,A at time
t. (ΩP denotes the subset of industries in the P -sector.)
Yi,t Real value-added of industry i at time t. Yi,t is the value-
added of industry i at time t expressed in 2005 dollars (billions).
Yi,t is the product of the value-added quantity index (chain-
weighted) for industry i at time t, V AQIi,t, divided by 100, and
the industry nominal value added in 2005, Y Ni,2005. V AQIi,t is
available according to NAICS from 1947 to 2012.
YP,t =
∑
i∈ΩP Yi,t Real value added of the P -sector, P = M,S,A at time t.
Lt Employment at time t. Employment is total full-time and
part-time private sector employment, in thousands of employ-
ees. Total full-time and part-time employment data is available
according to NAICS from 1948-2011.
Wi,t Total employee compensation in industry i at time t (in
millions). Total employee compensation data, in billions, are
available according to NAICS from 1987 to 2011.
KNt Nominal net stock of private fixed assets at time t (in
billions). Private fixed asset data are available from 1924 to
2012.
Kt Real net stock of private fixed assets at time t (in bil-
lions). Kt is expressed in 2005 dollars (billions). Kt is the prod-
uct of the "chain-type quantity index" of private fixed assets,
divided by 100, and the nominal total value of private fixed as-
sets in 2005.
Note: The data in Table 2.2 are from the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Nominal value-added and
value-added quantity indexes use the 2007 NAICS and are available in the 25 April
2013 release. Total full-time and part-time private sector employment from 1948 to
1997 use the 2002 NAICS and from 1997 to 2011 use the 2017 NAICS and are available
in the 13 November 2012 release. Compensation of employees by industry use the
2007 NAICS and are avaiable 13 November 2012 release. "Current-cost" net stock of
private fixed assets and "chain-type quantity indexes" for net stock of private fixed
assests are available in the 30 September 2013 release.
Table 2.2: Variables and Data Sources used in the Calibration
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The measure of employment used in the calibration is total full-time and part-
time employment by industry from NIPA (i.e., it is assumed in the calibration that
the labor input is proportional to total full-time and part-time employment in a
given year). Total full-time and part-time employment data are available from 1948
to 2011. Total full-time and part-time employment is used because it is the only
employment measure that extends back to 1948 using the NAICS classifications. All
other employment measures are only available according to the Standard Industrial
Classifications (SIC) prior to 1997. Total private-sector employment in the base years
of 1949 and 1950 are L1949 = 41, 306 and L1950 = 43, 054.
The total real value of capital stock in the economy is calculated as the real value
of the net stock of private fixed assets in the economy in 2005 dollars. Real values
of the net stock of private fixed assets are calculated for years 1924 to 2012 as the
product of the nominal value of the net stock of private fixed assets in 2005 and the
quantity index for the net stock of private fixed assets for the years 1924 to 2012. The
total real value of capital stock in the base years of 1949 and 1950 are K1949 = 5, 286.5
and K1950 = 5, 522.1 (in billions of 2005 dollars).
Using the expressions for sectoral output prices from (2.11), the expression the
Manufacturing and Service sectors’shares of total employment in year t from (2.14)


































A,t are nominal value-added (output) in the Manufacturing,
Service, and Agricultural sectors in year t. Similarly, again using the expressions for
sectoral output prices from (2.11), the expressions for the Manufacturing and Service
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Initial Values
Y NM,1949 = 86.1,
Y NM,1950 = 99.9
Nominal value-added in 1949 and 1950 in the Manufacturing
sector (in billions).
Y NS,1949 = 109.7,
Y NS,1950 = 118.5
Nominal value-added in 1949 and 1950 in the Service sector (in
billions).
Y NA,1949 = 18.6,
Y NA,1950 = 19.9




Real value-added in 1949 and 1950 in the Manufacturing sector
(in billions of 2005 dollars).
YS,1949 = 839.7,
YS,1950 = 887.1
Real value-added in 1949 and 1950 in the Service sector (in
billions of 2005 dollars).
YA,1949 = 28.5,
YA,1950 = 29.7
Real value-added in 1949 and 1950 in the Agricultural sector (in
billions of 2005 dollars).
L1949 = 41, 306,
L1950 = 43, 054
Total private-sector employment in 1949 and 1950 (in thou-
sands).
K1949 = 5, 286.5,
K1950 = 5, 522.1
Real capital stock in 1949 and 1950 (in billions of 2005 dollars).
ψM,1949 = 0.4213,
ψM,1950 = 0.4390
Manufacturing sector’s shares of employment in 1949 and 1950.
ψS,1949 = 0.5390,
ψS,1950 = 0.5229
Service sector’s shares of employment in 1949 and 1950.
φM,1949 = 0.3746,
φM,1950 = 0.3920
Manufacturing sector’s shares of capital in 1949 and 1950.
φS,1949 = 0.4742,
φS,1950 = 0.4621
Service sector’s shares of capital in 1949 and 1950.
AM,1949 = 0.0781,
AM,1950 = 0.0807




Total factor productivity in the Service Sector in 1949 and 1950.
AA,1949 = 0.0292,
AA,1950 = 0.0305
Total factor productivity in the Agricultural Sector in 1949 and
1950.
Table 2.3: Initial Values used in the Calibration
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Given the values of α̃M and α̃S (which are calculated below), initial values of the
Manufacturing and Service sectors’ shares of total employment and capital in the
base years of 1949 and 1950 can be calculated using (2.50), (2.51), (2.52), and (2.53)
and the values for nominal value added in the base years of 1949 and 1950. The
Manufacturing and Service sectors’shares of total employment and capital in 1949
and 1950 are ψM,1949 = 0.4213, ψM,1950 = 0.4390, ψS,1949 = 0.5390, ψS,1950 = 0.5229,
φM,1949 = 0.3746, φM,1950 = 0.3920, φS,1949 = 0.4742, and φS,1950 = 0.4621.
Given that data on real value-added, real capital stock, and employment, the
calculated values for the Manufacturing and Service sectors’shares of employment
and capital from (2.50), (2.51), (2.52), and (2.53), and the values of α̃M and α̃S
(which are calculated below), (2.5) can be used to calculate initial values for total
factor productivity. The calculated values of total factor productivity in 1949 and
1950 are AM,1949 = 0.0781, AM,1950 = 0.0807, AS,1949 = 0.0886, AS,1950 = 0.0923,
AA,1949 = 0.0292, AA,1950 = 0.0305.
Parameters
There are 16 fixed parameters in the model, of which ten, α̃M , α̃S, α̃S, ãM , ãS, ãA,
ñ, d̃, δ̃, and θ̃, are determined by the available data or from the literature and are
fixed across simulation runs. The remaining parameters, ε̃, γ̃M , γ̃S, γ̃A, µ̃M , and µ̃S,
are varied between simulation runs in order to evaluate the relative importance of
the competing explanations for NBG at explaining the observed patterns of sectoral
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output and employment growth in the U.S. economy. In this section, it is explained
how the values for the parameters used in the calibration were chosen.
To begin, labor’s share total cost in each sector in year t is computed as α̃P,t =
WP,t/Y
N
P,t, P = M,S,A, where Y
N
S,t is nominal value-added in sector P in year t
and WP,t is total employee compensation in sector P in year t. The values of α̃P ,
P = M,S,A, used in the calibration are calculated as the average value of α̃P,t
between 1987 and 2011 (data on "compensation of employees" by industry is only
available from 1987 to 2011 using the NAICS industry definitions).15 The values for
labor’s share of total cost in the Manufacturing, Service, and Agricultural sectors
used in the calibration are α̃M = 0.6065, α̃S = 0.6090, and α̃A = 0.2647. Capital’s
share of total costs in the Manufacturing, Service, and Agricultural sectors are then
calculated as (1− α̃P ), P = M,S,A.
The growth rate of total employment, ñ, is chosen so that the calibrated model
matches employment growth over the sample period. That is, ñ is chosen so that
L2011 = (1 + ñ)
62L1949. (2.54)
Equation 2.54 gives ñ = 0.0153.
Estimates of the rates of Hick’s neutral technical change (i.e., the rates of total fac-
tor productivity growth) in the Agricultural, Manufacturing, and Service sectors are
obtained from several different sources. Estimates of the productivity growth rate in
Agriculture are obtained from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economics Research
Service (USDA-ERS). The USDA-ERS reports an average total factor productivity
growth of 1.5% in the agricultural sector for the period 1948-2006. For the manufac-
turing sector, Bureau of Labor Statistics reports annual productivity growth rates of
15The use of aveage values of α̃P,t, P = M,S,A, to calculate α̃P is justified because there is not
a significant trent in α̃M,t, α̃S,t, or α̃A,t between 1987 and 2011. Indeed, when α̃M,t, α̃S,t, and α̃A,t
are regressed on a constant and a time trend, the coeffi cient on the time trend is very close to zero






Labor’s share of value-added in the Manufacturing, Ser-
vice, and Agricultural Sectors. α̃M , α̃S, and α̃A are com-
puted as the average values between 1987 and 2011 using data
on (i) nominal value added by industry and (ii) total employee
compensation by industry from the BEA. Data on "compensa-
tion of employees" by industry is only available from 1987 to
2011 using the NAICS industry definitions.*
ãM = 0.0135,
ãS = 0.005, ãA =
0.015
Rates of Hick’s neutral technical change in the Agri-
cultural, Manufacturing, and Service sectors. Calculated
from a variety of sources. See text for details.
ñ = 0.0153 Employment growth rate. Calculated from growth in total
full-time and part-time employment in the private sector from
1948-2011 using (2.54).
d̃=0.05 Depreciation rate. Taken from Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2004).
δ̃=0.02 Discount rate. Taken from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
θ̃
−1
=0.594 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Taken from
Havranek et al. (2013).
Note: All the data used to compute α̃M , α̃S, and α̃A are described in Table 2.2.
Table 2.4: Parameter Values used in the Calibration
1.35% for the period 1987-2006 (reported in Iscan 2010). For the service sector, there
is evidence of significant sector-specific acceleration and deceleration of productivity
growth over the study period. In particular, Triplett and Bosworth (2003) report
service sector productivity growth in the United States of 0.1% for the period 1977 to
1995, while Bosworth and Triplett (2007) report an average service sector productiv-
ity growth of 0.99% for the period 1987 to 2006. For this reason, three scenarios for
service sector productivity growth are considered that encompasses these extremes
(i.e., ãS = 0.001, 0.005, and 0.01) . In addition, in order to appraise the importance of
capital-deepening alone in driving supply-side NBG in model, an additional scenario
is considered where the rate of total factor productivity growth is set equal to 0.76%
in all three sectors. This corresponds to the average annual total factor productivity
growth rate in the United States as a whole from 1960 to 1995 reported in Jorgenson
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and Yip (2001).16
The values of the discount rate and the depreciation rate of capital used in the
calibration are δ̃ = 0.02 and d̃ = 0.05. The values of δ̃ and d̃ are standard in
the literature and are the same as those used in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)
and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008). The value of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution used in the calibration is θ̃
−1
= 0.594 (θ̃ = 1.684). This corresponds to
the average value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for the United States
from the meta-analysis in Havranek et al. (2013).17
As is mentioned above, the parameters ε̃, γ̃M , γ̃S, and γ̃A are varied between
calibration runs in order to evaluate their relative importance in explaining observed
patterns of NBG in the United States over the study period. The expressions for
sectoral output prices from (2.11), and the fact that nominal value added in the P -
sector Y NP (t) ≡ pP (t)YP (t) , P = M,S,A, imply that the following two equations
























































16Christenson, Cummings, and Jorgenson (1980) report an average annual total factor productivity
growth rate in the United States from 1947 to 1973 of 1.35%. This suggests that the 0.76% figure
from Jorgenson and Yip (2001) is likely to cause the calibrated model to underperform relative to
the U.S. economy in the earlier years of the calibration.
17This value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of θ̃
−1
= 0.594 is similar to estimates
reported by Beaudry and van Wincoop (1996) use a panel of state-level data on the U.S. economy
for the period 1953 to 1991, and report an intertemporal elasticity of substitution for nondurables

























For given values of ε̃, γ̃M , γ̃S, and γ̃A, the values of µ̃M , and µ̃S are chosen so that
the following expressions hold in the initial year of the calibration, 1949.
2.4 Calibration Results
This section presents the results of the model calibration in three parts. First, Chap-
ter 2.4.1 presents results for the case when only supply-side NBG is considered. Next,
Chapter 2.4.2 presents results for the case when only demand-side NBG is considered.
Finally, Chapter 2.4.3 presents results for the case when supply- and demand-side
NBG are considered simultaneously. In all three cases, the calibrated model is evalu-
ated based on its ability to match both the Kuznets and Kaldor Facts for the United
States over the study period.
Several previous studies have used a goodness-of-fit criteria to select the parame-
terization of their model calibration that produces the best fit to the observed data
(see Buera and Kaboski 2009; Iscan 2010). For example, Iscan (2010) uses a "root
mean squared error" criteria to select the "preferred" parameterization of his model
of the U.S. economy. In this essay, however, evaluating the ability of the calibrated
model to match both the Kuznets and Kaldor facts does not lend itself to a simple
goodness-of-fit criteria. This is because evaluating the model’s ability to match the
Kaldor facts includes analyzing whether the output growth rate, the real interest rate,
the capital-to-output ratio, and the share of capital income in total output are rela-
tively constant over time, i.e., have low variances and do no exhibit significant time
trends. If the only objective of this essay were to match the Kuznets facts in terms of
changes in sectoral output and employment shares over time, then a goodness-of-fit
criteria similar to those used in previous studies could be appropriate.
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Supply-Side Non-Balanced Growth: Kuznets Facts
1949 2011
Variable U.S. Data U.S. Data ε̃ = 1 ε̃ = 0.85 ε̃ = 0.65 ε̃ = 0.50
ψM = LM/L 0.4213
∗ 0.1638 0.4377 0.4182 0.3843 0.3527
ψS = LS/L 0.5390
∗ 0.8245 0.5244 0.5478 0.5871 0.6224
ψA = LA/L 0.0397
∗ 0.0116 0.0379 0.0340 0.0286 0.0249
YM
YM+YS+YA
0.3996 0.2304 0.5411 0.5211 0.4887 0.4624
YS
YM+YS+YA
0.5809 0.7572 0.4174 0.4404 0.4775 0.5074
YA
YM+YS+YA
0.0195 0.0124 0.0414 0.0384 0.0338 0.0302
*ψM,1949, ψS,1949, and ψA,1949 = 1 − ψM,1949 − ψS,1949 are calculate using (2.50) and
(2.51).
Table 2.5: Supply-Side Non-Balanced Growth: Kuznets Facts Results
2.4.1 Supply-Side Non-Balanced Growth: Results
Supply-Side Non-Balanced Growth: Kuznets Facts Results
Table 2.5 presents results on the calibrated model’s ability to match the Kuznets
facts for the case when only the supply-side NBG is considered (i.e., when γ̃M =
γ̃S = γ̃A = 0). Specifically, Table 2.5 reports on the employment and output shares
for the Manufacturing, Services, and Agricultural sectors in the initial year and final
year of the calibration, as well as the value of these variables in the U.S. data. The
results reported in Table 2.5 consider values of ε̃ < 1 because this is the empirically
relevant case for the U.S. economy over the study period, where the less progressive
Service sector has gained in employment relative to the more progressive Agricultural
and Manufacturing sectors. Previous studies that have analyzed supply-side NBG in
the United States that have spanned the study period considered in this essay have
also used ε̃ < 1 (e.g., Acemoglu and Guerrieri 2008; Buera and Kaboski 2009).18
The intuition for the mechanism for the supply-side NBG in the model is that
differences between sectors in rates of Hick’s neutral technical change and in the im-
18Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) use ε = 0.76 in their baseline calibration of the U.S. economy
for the period 1948− 2005, and also run thier model with values of ε as low as 0.56 and as high as
0.86. Buera and Kaboski (2009) use ε = 0.5 in their preferred model calibration.
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pact of capital-deepening in the economy have two countervailing effects. All else
equal, sectors with higher rates of Hick’s neutral technical change and that are more
capital intensive (i.e., benefit more from capital-deepening) will experience stronger
growth in labor and capital relative to other sectors. However, faster productivity
growth and capital accumulation also causes output in more progressive sectors to
grow faster, which will increase the relative price of output of less-progressive sectors.
This increase in relative price will induce labor and capital to move into the less
progressive sectors. When ε̃ < 1, and the output from the less-progressive sector(s)
(e.g., Services) and more-progressive sector(s) (e.g., Agriculture and Manufacturing)
sectors are gross complements, the increase in the relative price of output in the less-
progressive sector is more proportional to the increase in the marginal products of
labor and capital in the more-progressive sectors, which causes the less-progressive
sector’s capital and labor shares to increase as the economy grows.19 Table 2.5 con-
firms that when ε̃ = 1 the model calibration predicts that the sectoral employment
are approximately constant over the study period.
Table 2.5 shows that the model calibration’s predictions concerning changes in
sectoral employment shares is improved as ε̃ decreases. Table 2.5 also shows, how-
ever, that the model predicts a smaller movement of labor out of Agriculture and
Manufacturing and into Service than is observed in the U.S. data even for low values
of ε̃. For example, when ε̃ = 0.50, the model predicts that the Service Sector will
comprise almost 62% of total employment in 2011, compared to over 82% in the data.
Further calibrations (not reported) revealed that considering values of ε̃ less than 0.50
does not improve the fit of the model substantially regarding sectoral employment
shares. For this reason, 0.50 is used in subsequent calibrations of the models as a
19The role of ε̃ in determining the direction of the change factor shares is consistent with previous
studies that have emphasized supply-side explanations for non-balanced growth (e.g., Ngai and
Pissarides 2007; and Acemoglu and Guerrieri 2008).
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low but reasonable value for ε̃. In using ε̃ = 0.50, this essay follows Buera and Ka-
boski (2009), who use an elasticity of substitution of ε = 0.5 in their preferred model
calibration.20
Table 2.5 also shows that the model calibration predicts that the Manufacturing
and Agricultural sectors’shares of total output increase relative to the Service sector’s
over the study period, which is counter to what occurred in reality. The failure of
the model to match the increase in the Service sector’s share of output relative to the
Manufacturing is the result of an insuffi ciency of supply-side explanations for NBG
to explain the Kuznets facts as they apply to both sectoral output and employment
shares. To understand why supply-side explanations are insuffi cient at explaining
the Kuznets facts, recall from the discussion above that higher rates Hick’s neutral
technical change in the Agriculture/Manufacturing leads to an increase in Service
sector’s employment share because the price of Service sector output increases relative
to the price of Agricultural/Manufacturing sector output, which attracts factors of
production, including labor, into the Service sector. This change in relative prices in
favor of the Service sector will only occur, however, if real output growth is more rapid
in Agriculture and/or Manufacturing than in Services. As such, it is not possible for
a model that considers only supply-side NBG to match the Kuznets facts in terms of
both sectoral output and employment shares in the U.S. over the study period.
As is mentioned in Chapter 2.3.2, there is evidence of significant sector-specific
acceleration and deceleration of productivity growth in the Service sector over the
study period. For this reason, three scenarios for the rate of Hick’s neutral technical
change in the Service sector are considered on Table 2.6: the baseline scenario of 0.5%
growth (which is also reported in Table 2.5), as well as 0.1% and 1.0% growth, which
correspond to the estimates of service sector productivity growth in the United States
20Buera and Kaboski (2009) note that the best fit of their model would be under the assumption
of Leontief preferences (i.e., ε→ 0 ), which the authors’deem to be unrealistic.
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Supply-Side Non-Balanced Growth: Kuznets Facts
Varying the Rate of Productivity Growth in the Service Sector (ε̃ = 0.50)
1949 2011
ãS ãM = ãA = ãS
Variable U.S. Data U.S. Data 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.0076
ψM = LM/L 0.4213
∗ 0.1638 0.3197 0.3527 0.4003 0.4388
ψS = LS/L 0.5390
∗ 0.8245 0.6566 0.6224 0.5733 0.5304
ψA = LA/L 0.0397
∗ 0.0116 0.0237 0.0249 0.0264 0.0308
YM
YM+YS+YA
0.3996 0.2304 0.4860 0.4624 0.4353 0.4190
YS
YM+YS+YA
0.5809 0.7572 0.4828 0.5074 0.5358 0.5564
YA
YM+YS+YA
0.0195 0.0124 0.0313 0.0302 0.0289 0.0246
*ψM,1949, ψS,1949, and ψA,1949 = 1 − ψM,1949 − ψS,1949 are calculate using (2.50) and
(2.51).
Table 2.6: Supply-Side Non-Balanced Growth: Varying the Rate of Productivity
Growth in the Service Sector
reported in Triplett and Bosworth (2003) for the period 1977 to 1995 and in Bosworth
and Triplett (2007) for the period 1987 to 2006. Table 2.6 demonstrates that the 0.1%
scenarios provides the best fit for sectoral employment shares, while the 1.0% scenario
provides the best fit for sectoral output shares. Given this apparent trade-offbetween
the model’s ability to match sectoral employment and output shares, the remaining
calibrations reported in this essay will continue using the 0.5% for the rate of Hick’s
neutral technical change in the Service sector.
Table 2.6 also reports the results for the case where the rate of Hick’s neutral tech-
nical change is set equal to 0.76% in all three sectors. In this case, the NBG observed
will be due to capital-deepening given the differences in capital intensities across the
three sectors (α̃M = 0.6065, α̃S = 0.6090, and α̃A = 0.2647). The results reported
in Table 2.6 suggest that supply-side NBG driven by capital-deepening accounts for
very little of the observed changes in sectoral employment or output shares over the
study period.
As is mentioned above in Chapter 2.3.2, labor and capital’s shares of total cost
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Supply-Side Non-Balanced Growth: Kuznets Facts
Alternative Capital/Labor Cost Shares
(α̃M = 0.67; α̃S = 0.66; α̃A = 0.46 )
1949 2011
Variable U.S. Data U.S. Data ε̃ = 1 ε̃ = 0.85 ε̃ = 0.65 ε̃ = 0.50
ψM = LM/L 0.4016
∗ 0.1638 0.4338 0.4148 0.3834 0.3539
ψS = LS/L 0.5117
∗ 0.8245 0.5069 0.5312 0.5699 0.6048
ψA = LA/L 0.0868
∗ 0.0116 0.0593 0.0540 0.0342 0.0413
YM
YM+YS+YA
0.3996 0.2304 0.5375 0.5169 0.4850 0.4582
YS
YM+YS+YA
0.5809 0.7572 0.4213 0.4447 0.4808 0.5108
YA
YM+YS+YA
0.0195 0.0124 0.0412 0.0383 0.0342 0.0309
*ψM,1949, ψS,1949, and ψA,1949 = 1 − ψM,1949 − ψS,1949 are calculate using (2.50) and
(2.51).
Table 2.7: Supply-Side Non-Balanced Growth: Alternative Capital/Labor Cost
Shares
in each sector (i.e., α̃M , α̃S, and α̃A) are calculated using data from 1987 to 2011.21
The value of capital’s share of total costs calculated using this data (i.e., (1− α̃M) =
0.3935, (1− α̃S) = 0.3910, and (1− α̃A) = 0.7353), however, are substantially higher
capital cost shares for the U.S. economy as a whole used in previous macroeconomic
calibrations. In particular, Gomme and Rupert (2007) report that there is "reasonable
agreement" in macroeconomic calibration literature for a value of capital’s share of
total costs (i.e., the elasticity of output with respect to capital) for the U.S. economy
of approximately 0.283.22 In addition, Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) report sector-
level cost shares (factor income shares) for capital for the U.S. economy that are lower
than those calculated in this essay. In particular, Valentinyi and Herrendorf report
(1− α̃M) = 0.33, (1− α̃S) = 0.34, and (1− α̃A) = 0.54. In order to investigate the
impact of our calculated values α̃M , α̃S, and α̃A on the calibrated models performance,
Table 2.7 reports results using Valentinyi and Herrendorf’s estimates of capital and
21Recall that data on "compentation of employees" by industry is only available from 1987 to
2011 using NAICS industry definitions.
22Citing Gomme and Rupert (2007) , Iscan (2010) used 0.283 for capital’s share of total of cost
for the argicultural, manufacturing, and service sectors in his calibration of the U.S. economy.
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labor’s cost shares in the Agricultural, Manufacturing, and Service sectors.
Comparing the baseline results from Table 2.5 with the results reported in Table
2.7 suggests that the model calibration’s ability to match changes in sectoral employ-
ment and output shares is not substantially different when Valentinyi and Herrendorf
(2008)’s estimates of α̃M , α̃S, and α̃A are used. As is to be expected, the fact that
labor’s cost share in Agriculture is larger in Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008)’s es-
timates means that the calibrated model predicts a smaller movement of labor out
of Agriculture in Table 2.7 compared to the baseline results. This increase in em-
ployment in Agriculture comes at the expense of employment in the Service Sector.
Predicted Service Sector employment is reduced when Valentinyi and Herrendorf’s
estimates are used because the Service Sector is less labor intensive relative to the
Manufacturing and Agricultural sectors compared to the baseline estimates of α̃M ,
α̃S, and α̃A. Given the similarity between the results reported in Tables 2.5 and Table
2.7, the remaining calibrations reported in this essay will continue using the baseline





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Supply-Side Non-Balanced Growth: Kaldor Facts Results
Table 2.8 describes the calibrated model’s ability to match the Kaldor facts for the
case of supply-side NBG. Recall that the Kaldor facts describe the relative constancy
of (i) the growth rate of output, (ii) the real interest rate, (iii) the capital-to-output
ratio, and (iv) the share of capital income in total output. Table 2.8 evaluates the
calibrated model’s ability to match the Kaldor facts on two dimensions: the variance
of the four variables relative to their means and whether the variables exhibit sig-
nificant time trends. Note that the last four rows of Table 2.8 report results when
the four variables relevant to the Kaldor facts are calculated using NIPA data on real
output by sector and total capital stock for the case when ε̃ = 0.5 (and, because only
supply-side NBG is considered, γ̃M = γ̃S = γ̃A = 0).
23
Table 2.8 shows that the predicted values of all four variables relevant to the
Kaldor facts have low variances relative to their means. In particular, the coeffi cients
of variation (the ratio of standard deviation to the mean) are low for all four vari-
ables: 0.2562 for the growth rate of output, 0.0761 for the real interest rate, 0.0703
for the capital-to-output ratio, and 0.0050 for the share of capital income in total
output.24 Moreover, the coeffi cients of variation for all four of these variables are
higher —i.e., have higher standard deviations relative to their means —when they are
23The values of Yt from (2.35) and Rt from (2.37) depend on the values of real output by sector
and total capital stock, as well as ε̃, γ̃M , γ̃S , γ̃A, µ̃M , and µ̃S . Recall that µ̃M and µ̃S are determined
by ε̃, γ̃M , γ̃S , and γ̃A and NIPA data on nominal output by sector in the base year through (2.55)
and (2.56).
24In general, the coeffi cient of variation should be computed for data measured on a ratio scale,
i.e., for data that only take on non-negative values and that include a zero value. While none of the
four variables relevant for the Kaldor facts satisfy these conditions —the growth rate of output can
take on non-zero values and the other three variables cannot reasonably take on a value of zero —
they come close enough to holding that the coeffi cient of variation is still useful in describing the
magnitude of the variance in the data relative to the mean.
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calculated using NIPA data on the U.S. economy (1.002, 0.3179, 0.0599, and 0.3186,
respectively).
It is not surprising that the coeffi cients of variation are higher for all four variables
relevant for the Kaldor facts when they are calculated using U.S. data. This is
because the U.S. data contains short-term fluctuations related to the business cycle
and idiosyncratic factors that are not considered in the calibrated model. In an
attempt to control for short-term fluctuations, Table 2.8 reports values for the four
variables calculated after applying a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to the U.S. data.
HP filters are used to remove short-term fluctuations and cyclical components from
time series (Hodrick and Prescott 1998). The coeffi cients of variation for the four
variables when the HP filter is used are: 1.014 for the growth rate of output, 0.3174
for the real interest rate, 0.0522 for the capital-to-output ratio, and 0.3178 for the
share of capital income in total output.25 These coeffi cients of variation are higher
than those for the calibrated model’s predicted values of the four variables, which
suggests that the lower variances of the calibrated model’s predicted values cannot
be attributed entirely to short-term fluctuations in the U.S. data.
Table 2.8 also shows that while the model’s predictions for the four variables
relevant to the Kaldor facts have relatively low variance, three of the four variables
exhibit a significant time trend. In particular, Table 2.8 reports results for four
regressions where the predicted time series for each of the four variables is regressed
on a constant and a time trend. The coeffi cient and p-value for the time trend are
reported in Table 2.8 for each of the four regressions. In each parameterizations of
the model considered, the real interest rate and the share of capital income in total
output exhibit a slight but statistically significant decline over time, the capital-to-
output ratio exhibits a slight but statistically significant secular increase, and the
25The value of the HP filters "smoothing parameter" is set equal to 100, which is the value
suggested by Hodrick and Prescott (1998) for annual data.
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growth rate of output does not exhibit a statistically significant time trend. These
same time trends, however, are also observed when the four variables are calculated
using NIPA data on the U.S. economy. This fact, combined with the low variances of
the variables relative to their means, suggests that overall the model of supply-side
NBG is relatively consistent with the Kaldor facts as they apply to the U.S. economy
over the study period.
Table 2.8 also show that calibrated model’s predictions for the means of the four
variables relevant to the Kaldor facts are significantly different than the means calcu-
lated using NIPA data. In particular, the model calibration’s predictions for the mean
growth rate of output (3.5% v. 2.8%), the capital-to-output ratio (9.883 v. 8.233),
and the share of capital income in total output (0.4347 v. 0.2877) are higher than the
mean values of these variables calculated using U.S. data, while the predicted value
of the rental rate of capital is lower (4.5% v. 8.2%).26 The differences between the
model calibrations predictions for these variables and their values computed using
NIPA data can be attributed to the fact that the model calibration predicts higher
rate of economic growth than is observed in the U.S. data. The model calibration
overstates economic growth because it model predicts larger factor shares for the pro-
gressive Manufacturing and Agricultural sectors than occurred in reality. Larger input
shares in the Agricultural and Manufacturing sectors increase the impact of higher
rates of Hick’s neutral technical change in the two sectors on the overall growth rate
of output. The higher predicted rate of economic growth leads to greater capital ac-
cumulation in the calibrated model than occurred in the U.S. data, which causes the
calibration to overstate the capital-to-output ratio and the share of capital income in
26The 8.2% figure for the average rate of return on capital calculated using the NIPA data is inline
with previous studies that have examined rates of return on capital in the United States over the
study period. For example, Poterba (1998) finds an average return on capital of 8.6% for the period
1959—1996 and Siegel (1992) finds an average return on capital of 7.77% for the period 1800—1990.
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total output, and understate the rate of return on capital.
The results in this section suggest that the calibrated model of supply-side NBG
can produce equilibrium dynamics that are relatively consistent with the Kaldor facts
while at the same time producing large changes in sectoral output and employment
shares. The model’s predicted changes in employment shares, however, are smaller in
magnitude than those observed in the U.S. data over the study period. Furthermore,
any model that only considers supply-side mechanisms for NBG is not capable, by
construction, of matching the Kuznets facts in terms of the expansion of the Service
sector’s shares of both output and employment relative to the Agricultural and Man-
ufacturing sectors. The next section investigates whether demand-side explanations
for NBG can overcome these shortcomings of supply-side explanations for NBG, while
also still matching the Kaldor facts.
2.4.2 Demand-Side Non-Balanced Growth: Results
Demand-side explanations for NBG posit that NBG is a result of changes in the
composition of demand for sectoral output that occur as the economy grows. In this
essay, changes in the composition of demand for sectoral output occur as a result of
differences in the elasticities of demand for sectoral output with respect to the total
production of the unique final good (i.e., total output in the economy), where, as is
described in Chapter 2.2, the unique final good can be consumed by households or
used to produce capital stock. NBG occurs in the model because growth in sectoral
employment and capital shares will be biased towards the sector(s) whose output has
a higher elasticity of demand with respect to the unique final good.
In this essay, it is assumed that γA > 0, γM = 0, and γS < 0. These assumptions
imply an elasticity of demand for Agricultural sector output with respect to the unique
final good less than 1, an elasticity of demand for Manufacturing sector output with
respect to total output equal to 1, and an elasticity of demand for Service sector
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output with respect to total output greater to 1. That is, these assumptions imply
that demand for sectoral output will be biased away from Agriculture and towards
Services as the economy grows. The values of γ̃A and γ̃S used in the calibration are
selected so that γ̃A is set equal to 25% of total output in the Agricultural sector in
the base year (i.e., γ̃A/YA,1949 × 100% = 25%) and |γS| is set equal to 25%, 50%, or
75% of total output in the Service sector output in the base year (|γ̃S/YS,1949| = 25%,
50%, or 75%).27
Demand-Side Non-Balanced Growth: Kuznets Facts Results
Table 2.9 presents results on the calibrated model’s ability to match the Kuznets
facts for the case when only the demand-side NBG is considered (i.e., when ε̃ = 0).
Table 2.9 show that the ability of the model to match the Kuznets facts improves
as both |γ̃S| and γ̃A are increased. As expected, higher values of |γ̃S| increase the
27In models that have emphasized non-homothetic consumer preferences in their explanations
for demand-side NBG (Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie 2001; Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson 2002;
Iscan 2010), non-homothetic preferences are explained by a positive "consumption requirement" for
agricultural sector output and a negative consumption requirement for service sector output (these
models typically assume no consumption requirement for manufacturing sector output). A positive
consumption requirement for agricultural sector output is meant to reflect the fact that a minimum
level of agricultural output is required to meet a populations subsistence needs. This subsisitence
requirement will cause Agricultural output to comprise a large share of total output in the early
stages of development, but also implies that the demand for Agricultural output will increase less
than proportionatly to the increases in societal expenditure as the economy grows. Conversely, the
negative consumption requirement for services is meant to reflect the basic endowment of service in
the economy due to the home production of services. This basic endowment of services will cause
service sector output to comprise a small share of total output (as reported in the national accounts)
in the early stages of development, but also implies that as the economy develops households will
purchase an increasing number of services outside of the home, causing the demand for service sector
output to increase more than proportionately to increases in societal expenditure.
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Demand-Side Non-Balanced Growth: Kuznets Facts
1949 2011
γ̃A/YA,1949 |γ̃S/YS,1949| × 100%
×100% Variable U.S. Data U.S. Data 0% 25% 50% 75%
0% ψM = LM/L 0.4213
∗ 0.1638 0.4377 0.3947 0.3631 0.3382
ψS = LS/L 0.5390
∗ 0.8245 0.5244 0.5710 0.6054 0.6327
ψA = LA/L 0.0397
∗ 0.0116 0.0379 0.0343 0.0315 0.0291
YM
YM+YS+YA
0.3996 0.2304 0.5411 0.4964 0.4619 0.4337
YS
YM+YS+YA
0.5809 0.7572 0.4174 0.4646 0.5012 0.5311
YA
YM+YS+YA
0.0195 0.0124 0.0414 0.0390 0.0369 0.0351
50% ψM = LM/L 0.4213
∗ 0.1638 0.4458 0.4003 0.3672 0.3410
ψS = LS/L 0.5390
∗ 0.8245 0.5333 0.5808 0.6155 0.6428
ψA = LA/L 0.0397
∗ 0.0116 0.0209 0.0189 0.0173 0.0160
YM
YM+YS+YA
0.3996 0.2304 0.5474 0.5003 0.4643 0.4352
YS
YM+YS+YA
0.5809 0.7572 0.4283 0.4771 0.5144 0.5447
YA
YM+YS+YA
0.0195 0.0124 0.0242 0.0227 0.0213 0.0202
*ψM,1949, ψS,1949, and ψA,1949 = 1 − ψM,1949 − ψS,1949 are calculate using (2.50) and
(2.51).
Table 2.9: Demand-Side Non-Balanced Growth: Kuznets Facts Results
growth in the Service sector’s employment share over the study period, while higher
values of γ̃A lead to larger declines in the Agricultural sector’s employment share.
The model, however, predicts a substantially smaller shift in employment towards
Services than occurred in reality. In particular, under the best performing parame-
trization (γ̃A/YA,1949 × 100% = 50% and |γ̃S/YS,1949| × 100% = 75% ), the model
calibration explains 36% of the movement of labor into Services over the study period
(the equivalent figure for the model of supply-side NBG considered in the previous
section is 29%). The model’s predictions concerning changes in the Agricultural
sector’s employment share, however, are improved considerably under the assump-
tion of demand-side NBG. Under the best performing parameterization, the model
of demand-side NBG explain 84% of the decline in Agricultural sector’s employment
share over the study period (compared to the only 33% for the model of supply-side
NBG).
Table 2.9 shows that the model calibration predicts that the Agricultural and
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Manufacturing sector’s output shares rise over the study period, while the Service
sector’s output share declines, which is the exact opposite of what occurred in reality.
The model’s failure the match the direction of change in sectoral output shares is due
to the fact that the model does not produce a suffi cient movement of labor and capital
in Services to offset the lower rate of Hick’s neutral technical change in the sector
and allow the sector’s output share to increase. Recall that for supply-side NBG,
the mechanism for NBG itself precluded increases in both the Service sector’s output
and employment shares. In contrast, the failure of the model of demand-side NBG
considered in this section to match the changes in sectoral output shares is simply
the consequences of the economic forces driving NBG in the model not producing a


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Demand-Side Non-Balanced Growth: Kaldor Facts Results
Table 2.10 describes the calibrated model’s ability to match the Kaldor facts for the
case of demand-side NBG. Table 2.10 shows that the calibrated model’s ability to
match the Kaldor facts for the case of demand-side NBG is similar to the case of
supply-side NBG presented in Table 2.8. In particular, the predicted values of all
four variables relevant to the Kaldor facts have low variances relative to their means
(both in absolute terms and relative to the means and variances of the four variables
when they are calculated using NIPA data), and the three of the four variables (the
interest rate, the share of capital income, and the capital-to-output ratio) display
slight but statistically significant time trends that are also observed when the four
variables are calculated using NIPA data. Together, Tables 2.8 and 2.10 suggest that
the model is capable of approximating the Kaldor facts as they apply to the U.S.
economy over the study period under the assumptions of supply- and demand-side
NBG and for a wide range of different parameterizations.
Table 2.10 indicates that the model predicts a higher mean growth rate output
compared to when the growth rate is calculated using U.S. data (3.0% v. 2.7%). As
with the case of supply-side NBG, the model predicts a higher growth rate of output
because the it predicts larger factor shares for the progressive Manufacturing and
Agricultural sectors than occurred in reality, and these larger factors share lead to a
higher effective rate of technical process in the economy. As in the case of supply-
side NBG, the higher predicted rate of economic growth leads to greater capital
accumulation in the calibrated model than occurred in the U.S. data, which causes
the calibration to overstate the capital-to-output ratio (8.416 v. 6.399) and the share
of capital income in total output (0.3523 v. 0.3439), and understate the rate of return
on capital (4.4% v. 5.4%).
The results in this section suggest that, like the calibrated model of supply-side
NBG presented in the previous section, the calibrated model of demand-side NBG
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can produce equilibrium dynamics that are relatively consistent with the Kaldor facts
while at the same time producing significant changes in sectoral output and employ-
ment shares. In addition, the model of demand-side NBG presented in this sections
improves on the model of supply-side NBG in its ability to reproduce the decline in
the Agricultural sector’s employment share over the study period. The model, how-
ever, predicts a much smaller increase in the Service sector’s employment share than
is observed in the U.S. data over the study period, and this shortcoming causes the
model to predict a decline in the Service sector’s output share and a rise in the Man-
ufacturing and Agricultural sector’s output shares, which is counter to the data. The
next section investigates whether simultaneously considering supply- and demand-
side explanations for NBG can overcome this shortcoming and match the Kuznets
facts concerning both changes in output and employment shares, while still matching
the Kaldor facts.
2.4.3 Joint Model: Results
Tables 2.11 and 2.13 report results on the model calibration’s ability to match the
Kuznets and Kaldor facts, respectively, when both supply- and demand-side mecha-
nisms for NBG are considered simultaneously. The results on Tables 2.11 and 2.13 for
the joint model of supply- and demand-side NBG assume the parameter values that
produced the best fits to the observed data on the U.S. economy when supply- and
demand-side NBG were considered individually (i.e., ε̃ = 0.50, |γ̃S/YS,1949| × 100% =
75%, γ̃A/YA,1949× 100% = 50%, and γ̃M = 0). The values of the other parameters in
this section are set at their baseline levels described in Chapter 2.3.2.
Joint Model: Kuznets Facts Results
Table 2.11 shows that of all the model parameterizations considered in this essay, the
joint model of supply- and demand-side NBG provides the best fit to the U.S. data
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Joint Model: Kuznets Facts
ε̃ = 0.50, γ̃A/YA,1949 × 100% = 50%, γ̃M = 0, and |γ̃S/YS,1949| × 100% = 75%
1949 1969 1990 2011
Variable U.S. Data U.S. Data Model U.S. Data Model U.S. Data Model
ψM = LM/L 0.4213
∗ 0.3795 0.3484 0.2505 0.2919 0.1638 0.2570
ψS = LS/L 0.5390
∗ 0.5970 0.6300 0.7344 0.6946 0.8245 0.7332
ψA = LA/L 0.0397
∗ 0.0235 0.0216 0.0151 0.0135 0.0116 0.0098
YM
YM+YS+YA
0.3996 0.3858 0.3683 0.2838 0.3480 0.2304 0.3476
YS
YM+YS+YA
0.5809 0.6024 0.6171 0.7034 0.6390 0.7572 0.6392
YA
YM+YS+YA
0.0195 0.0119 0.0146 0.0128 0.0130 0.0124 0.0133
pS/pM
∗∗ 0.8764 1.322 1.064 0.6975 1.173 0.4543 1.622
pS/pA
∗∗ 0.1984 0.1880 0.2927 0.3590 0.4271 0.5601 0.7412
*ψM,1949, ψS,1949, and ψA,1949 = 1 − ψM,1949 − ψS,1949 are calculate using (2.50) and
(2.51).
∗∗Relative output prices are calculated using (2.11).
Table 2.11: Joint Model of Supply- and Demand-Side NBG: Kuznets Facts Results
regarding the Kuznets facts. Regarding sectoral employment shares, the joint model
explains 68% of the increase in the Service sector’s employment share, 64% of the
decline in the Manufacturing sector’s decline in employment share, and predicts a 6%
larger decline in the Agricultural sector’s employment share than is observed in the
data in the period 1949 to 2011. These results comport with Iscan (2010), who finds
that, taken together, supply- and demand-side explanations for NBG explain roughly
two-thirds of the reallocation of labor into the Service sector from the Manufacturing
and Agricultural sectors in the United States from 1800 to 2000.
Concerning output shares, Table 2.11 shows that the joint model predicts suffi cient
movement of labor and capital into Services for the sector’s output share to increase,
and for the output shares of the Agricultural and Manufacturing sectors to decline.
As such, unlike when both explanations for NBG are considered individually, the
joint model is able to qualitatively match the Kuznets facts regarding changes in
both employment and output shares. The joint model, however, only explains 31%
of the decrease in the Manufacturing sector’s output share, 87% of the decrease in
the Agricultural sector’s output share, and 33% of the increase in the Service sector’s
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output share.
Table 2.11 reports the model calibration’s predictions for three years: 1969, 1990,
and 2011 (these years correspond to dividing the 63 year study period into three
21-year segments). Table 2.11 shows that the joint model overpredicts the growth
in the Service sectors output and employment shares in the first 21 years of the
calibration, and then underpredicts growth in these two variables in the latter two
21-year segments. An important reason why the joint model is not able to reproduced
the magnitude of changes in output and employment shares in the later periods of
the calibration is that the influence of γ̃S and γ̃A on changes in sectoral output and
employment shares is most significant in the early periods of the calibration, when
the values of these two parameters are large relative to real output in the Service and
Agricultural sectors. In particular, as γ̃S and γ̃A become small in magnitude relative
to output in the Service and Agricultural sectors in the latter part of the calibration,
the elasticities of demand for Service and Agricultural sector output with respect
to the unique final good to become closer to one, which reduces the importance of
demand-side NBG (i.e., exogeneous changes in the compostion of demand for sectoral
output) as a driver of changes in sectoral output and employment shares in the model.
One way for the joint model to match the large movement of employment and output
shares towards Services that is observed in the U.S. data in the latter part of the study
period would be to include a second large, delayed exogenous shift in the composition
of demand for sectoral output towards Services and away from Agriculture in the
model.
To check the robustness of the joint model results reported in Table 2.11 to the
assumption that µ̃M and µ̃S are chosen so that (2.55) and (2.56) hold in the initial
year of the calibration (i.e., 1949), separate values of µ̃M and µ̃S were calculated using
U.S. data on sectoral nominal and real value added for each year of the study period.
Using the values of ε̃, γ̃M , γ̃S, and γ̃A from the joint model, the calculated values
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Joint Model: Kuznets Facts
Sensitivity Analysis on µM and µS
ε̃ = 0.50, γ̃A/YA,1949 × 100% = 50%, γ̃M = 0, and |γ̃S/YS,1949| × 100% = 75%
1949 2011
Variable U.S. Data U.S. Data µ̃S = µ̃S,1949
∗∗ µ̃S = ̂̃µS µ̃S = µ̃minS µ̃S = µ̃maxS
ψM = LM/L 0.4213
∗ 0.1638 0.2570 0.2580 0.2896 0.2150
ψS = LS/L 0.5390
∗ 0.8245 0.7332 0.7331 0.7026 0.7755
ψA = LA/L 0.0397
∗ 0.0116 0.0098 0.0090 0.0078 0.0095
YM
YM+YS+YA
0.3996 0.2304 0.3476 0.3461 0.3754 0.3006
YS
YM+YS+YA
0.5809 0.7572 0.6392 0.6419 0.6141 0.6886
YA
YM+YS+YA
0.0195 0.0124 0.0133 0.0121 0.0105 0.0104
*ψM,1949, ψS,1949, and ψA,1949 = 1 − ψM,1949 − ψS,1949 are calculate using (2.50) and
(2.51).
**The baseline assumption used throughout this essay is that µ̃M and µ̃S are chosen
so that (2.55) and (2.56) hold in the initial year of the calibration (1949).
Table 2.12: Joint Model: Kuznets Facts - Sensitivity Analysis
of µ̃M and µ̃S in the initial year (0.1498 and 0.8498) are close to their means over
the study period (0.1506 and 0.8491). The calculated values of µ̃M and µ̃S, however,
vary over the study period. In particular, µ̃M ranges from 0.0709 and 0.2278 with a
standard deviation of 0.0479 , while µ̃S ranges from 0.7720 and 0.9236 with a standard
deviation also of 0.0479. Given this variation in the calculated values of µ̃M and µ̃S,
Table 2.12 reports results for the joint model with µ̃S set equal to its mean, maximum
value, and minimum value (conveniently, µ̃M attains its maximum value in the year
that µ̃S attains its minimum value, and vice versa).
Table 2.12 demonstrates that the joint model is able to qualitatively match the
Kuznets facts regarding changes in both employment and output shares for the full
range of values of µ̃M and µ̃S implied by the U.S. data over the study period. This
implies that the main results in this section do not depend on the assumption for how
µ̃M and µ̃S are calculated. In addition, Table 2.12 shows that using the mean values
for µ̃M and µ̃S has almost no effect on the joint model’s predicted changes in sectoral
labor and output shares. This results is not surprising given that the calculated values
of µ̃M and µ̃S in the initial year are so close to their means over the study period.
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Figure 2.1: Joint Model Results: Employment Shares by Sector
Table 2.12 also shows that when µ̃minS = 0.7720 is used, the joint model predicts
weaker growth in the Service Sector’s employment and output shares compared to
the baseline model, and that the opposite result holds when µ̃maxS = 0.9236 is used.
Indeed, the joint model does a better job of matching the Kuznets facts for the U.S.
economy relative to the baseline model when µ̃maxS is used.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 confirm that the joint model overpredicts the growth in the
Service sector’s output and employment shares in the early periods of the calibra-
tion relative to the U.S. data, but underpredicts the growth in these two variables in
later periods. Indeed, the joint model predicts almost no change in either the Man-
ufacturing or Service sector’s output shares in the second half of the study period,
while the Service sectors’output share continued to increase at the expense of the
Manufacturing sector in the U.S. data. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show that in the later
stages of the calibration, when the importance of demand-side NBG as a driver of
changes in sectoral output and employment shares has declined, the predictions of
the joint model begin to resemble those of the model of supply-side NBG considered
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Figure 2.2: Joint Model Results: Output Shares by Sector
in Chapter 2.4.1, which underpredicts the growth in the Service sector’s employment
share relative to the U.S. data, and predicts a slight decline in the Service sector’s
output share over time.
Table 2.11 also shows that the joint model predicts that the price of Service
sector output is increasing relative to the prices of Manufacturing and Agricultural
sector output over the study period. This increase in the relative price of Service
sector output is necessary to attract factors of production into the sector despite its
lower rate of Hick’s neutral technical change. Buera and Kaboski (2009) identify
the inability of their model of NBG to generate the simultaneous increases in the
relative price and output share of the Service sector relative to the Manufacturing and
Agricultural sectors that occurred in the post-war United States as a shortcoming of
supply- and demand-side explanations of NBG. The results reported here suggest that
the inability of Buera and Kaboski’s model to match changes the relative prices and
output shares across sectors is an artifact of their assumptions and parameterization,
rather than a more general failing of supply- and demand-side explanations of NBG
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to qualitatively match the Kuznets facts for the U.S. economy.28
28Following Caselli and Coleman (2001), Buera and Kaboski (2009)’s constuct thier model in
large part to explain the deviations between the changes in sectoral employment and nominal values
added (nominal output) shares in the agricultural, manufactuing, and service sectors in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries. In particular, Buera and Kaboski (2009) evalute whether the supply- and
demand-side explanations of NBG can explain the persistently high employment share in agriculture










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Joint Model: Kaldor Facts Results
Table 2.13 illustrates the joint model’s ability to match the Kaldor facts. The results
reported on Table 2.13 show that the joint model’s behavior concerning the Kaldor
facts is almost identical to the results when only supply-side NBG is considered (Table
2.8) and when only demand side NBG is considered (Table 2.10). In particular, the
predicted values of all four variables relevant to the Kaldor facts have low variances
relative to their means, the three of the four variables (the interest rate, the share
of capital income, and the capital-to-output ratio) display slight but statistically
significant time trends that are also observed when the four variables are calculated
using NIPA data, and the model calibration predicts a slightly higher mean growth
rate (and thus a higher rate of capital accumulation) than is observed in the U.S.
data. Taken together with the results Tables 2.8 and 2.10, the results on Table
2.13 further confirm that the model is capable of approximating the Kaldor facts as
they apply to the U.S. economy over the study period for a wide range of different
parameterizations.
The results in this section show that the joint model that considers both supply-
and demand-side mechanisms for NBG is capable of producing equilibrium dynamics
that qualitatively match the Kuznets and the Kaldor facts as they apply to the U.S.
economy over the study period. Unlike the case when only demand-side NBG is
considered, the joint model predicts suffi cient movement of labor and capital into
Services for the sector’s output share to increase, and for the output shares of the
Agricultural and Manufacturing sectors to decline. The model calibration, however,
predicts a smaller increase in the Service sector’s employment share and a smaller
decrease in the Manufacturing sector’s employment share than is observed in the
U.S. data over the study period in the latter stages of the calibration. It is argued
that this shortcoming of the model is due to the fact that the parameters γ̃S and γ̃A
exert a stronger influence on changes in sectoral output and employment shares in
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the early stages of the calibration, when their values are relatively close to the values
for real output in the Service and Agricultural sectors.
2.5 Conclusions
This essay developed a dynamic general equilibrium model that integrates supply-
side and demand-side explanations for NBG and calibrated it using data on the
post-war U.S. economy (1949 to 2012) from the U.S. National Income and Product
Accounts. This essay evaluated the extent that these two complementary explanations
for NBG —both alone and in combination —can generate changes in sectoral output
and employment shares between the agricultural, manufacturing, and service sectors
that are consistent with the Kuznets facts as they occurred in the United States, while
simultaneously predicting approximately constant values of the (i) the growth rate
output, (ii) the real interest rate, (iii) the capital-to-output ratio, and (iv) the share
of capital income in total output consistent with the Kaldor facts. Following previous
studies, supply-side NBG occurs in the model as a result of differential productivity
growth between sectors, while demand-side NBG occurs as the result of changes in
the composition of demand for sectoral output that take place as the economy grows.
It is shown that for a set of realistic parameter values, the calibrated model is
capable of generating changes in sectoral output and employment shares that are
qualitatively consistent with the Kuznets facts as they occurred in the United States
over the study period. The model, however, is only capable of qualitatively matching
the Kuznets facts when the supply-side and demand-side mechanisms are consid-
ered simultaneously. Individually, both mechanisms are only able to match observed
changes in sectoral employment shares. In the case of supply-side NBG, the inability
of the model to match observed changes in sectoral output shares is a consequence
of the mechanism for supply-side NBG itself, which precludes concurrent increases
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in a sector’s output and employment shares, such as occurred in the service sector
over the study period. In the case of demand-side NBG, the inability of the model to
match observed changes in sectoral output shares is due to the fact that the model
predicts smaller increases in the service sector’s employment and capital shares than
occurred in reality. The increases in the service sector’s factor shares predicted by the
model are not suffi cient to offset the lower rate of productivity growth in the sector,
and thus cause the model to predict that the sector’s output share will fall over time.
On the other hand, the joint model that considers both supply- and demand-side
mechanisms for NBG predicts suffi cient movement of labor and capital into services
for the sector’s output share to increase, and for the output shares of the agricultural
and manufacturing sectors to decline. The joint model, however, predicts smaller
changes in sectoral output and employment shares in the latter stages of the calibra-
tion than occurred in reality. It is argued that this is shortcoming of the model is
related to the fact that the parameters that drive demand-side NBG exert a stronger
influence on changes in sectoral output and employment shares in the early stages
of the calibration. This shortcoming of the model implies that while the calibrated
model is able to do a reasonable job of matching changes in sectoral output and factor
shares over the study period as a whole, it is not likely to perform well at predicting
future patterns of non-balanced growth in the United States.
As is mentioned in the Introduction, Buera and Kaboski (2009) developed three-
sector models that integrates supply-side and demand-side explanations for NBG
that is capable of matching the Kuznets facts for the U.S. economy regarding sectoral
employment shares, but not regarding sectoral output shares. In particular, Buera
and Kaboski (2009) where unable to predict the simultaneous increases the relative
price of service sector output (which is necessary to draw labor and capital into the
service sector) and in the service sector’s output share that occurred in the post-war
U.S. economy. The results reported in this essay indicate that Buera and Kaboski
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(2009)’s inability to qualitatively match the Kuznets facts for the U.S. in terms of
both output and employment shares is not a general failing of supply- and demand-
side explanations for NBG to explain the Kuznets facts in the United States, but
rather an artifact of their particular modelling assumptions and parameterization.
In addition to producing significant changes in sectoral output and employment
shares consistent with the Kuznets facts, the model generates equilibrium dynamics
that are broadly consistent with the Kaldor facts as they apply to the U.S. economy
over the study period. As is noted in the Introduction, Buera and Kaboski (2009)
demonstrate that any model that integrates supply-side and demand-side explana-
tions for NBG will be inconsistent with balanced long-run growth for output. The
analysis in this essay demonstrates that despite this result, a relatively simple three-
sector model of NBG can generate short-run transition dynamics that approximately
match the Kaldor facts over a wide range of different parameterizations. Moreover,
the analysis did not reveal any significant trade-off between the magnitude of the
changes in sectoral output and employment predicted by the model and its ability
to match the Kaldor facts. These results suggest that the desire to develop a model
that integrates supply-side and demand-side explanations for NBG and produces a
long-run balanced growth path for the economy as described by the Kaldor facts is
an issue of theoretical rather than practical interest.
The mechanism for demand-side NBG in this essay assumes that changes in the
composition of demand for sectoral output occur as a result of differences in the
elasticities of demand for sectoral output with respect to the total production of a
unique final good, where the unique final good can be consumed by households or
used to produce new capital stock. As is explained in the Introduction, this as-
sumption has the advantages that it allows physical capital to be produced in the
model using the output from all three sectors, which is important for the model’s
ability to match changes in sectoral output shares, and that it allows the parameters
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of the model to be more easily calibrated to U.S. data. This assumption has the
drawback, however, that it implies that the parameters that determine changes the
composition of demand for sectoral output also influence the quantity of the final
output produced, and, as a result, capital accumulation in the economy. While this
assumption blurs the distinction between "preference" and "technology" parameters
in the model, it is in keeping with previous models of supply- and demand-side NBG.
In many previous models of supply-side NBG, the parameter that determines the
elasticity of substitution between output from different sectors is modelled on the
technology side of the economy (e.g., Acemoglu and Guerrieri 2008), and thus influ-
ences total output and capital accumulation, despite the fact that the elasticity of
substitution is ultimately determined by household preferences. Similarly, previous
studies of demand-side NBG such Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001) and Foellmi
and Zweimuller (2005) have placed restrictions on the relationship between prefer-
ence and technology parameters in their models in order to reconciled demand-side
NBG with the Kaldor facts. Future work may be directed towards developing models
that reconcile the Kuznets facts and the Kaldor facts within a theoretical framework
that maintains the distinction between preference and technology parameters that is
traditionally emphasized in macroeconomic models.
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Chapter 3
Regulatory Policy Design for Agroecosystem
Management on Public Rangelands
This essay is co-authored with Tigran Melkonyan and has been published in the
American Journal of Agricultural Economics (Volume 95, Issue 3; pages 606-627).
3.1 Introduction
Rangeland is the dominant land type in the United States, comprising 34.2% of total
land area (731 million acres), compared to 32.4% forested, 17% agricultural, and 2%
urban (Loomis 2002). Over 235 million acres of this rangeland is under the man-
agement of the federal government and is used for livestock grazing via contractual
arrangements between ranchers and federal land management agencies (FLMAs).
Two FLMAs —the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the U.S. Forest Service
(USFS) —manage the livestock grazing leases on over 98% of these 235 million acres
(GAO 2005). Given the amount of rangeland managed by FLMAs through federal
grazing leases, the regulation of ranching on public rangelands plays a central role
in rangeland management, as well as overall natural resource management, in the
United States.
Ranching is, in many respects, a prototypical agroecosystem management prob-
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lem. It generates both private economic gains for agricultural producers as well as
externalities. The latter are caused by the influence of livestock grazing on range-
land vegetation. Grazing stresses native perennial grasses, reducing their ability to
compete with native shrubs, non-native annual grasses, and noxious weeds. The con-
sequences of a change in rangeland vegetation away from native perennials include
a reduction in the quality of wildlife habitat for game animals and sensitive species,
increased frequency and severity of wildfires, and increased soil erosion.1
While ranchers have private incentives to maintain ecosystem health (healthy
rangeland provides more productive and sustainable forage base for livestock) their
private objectives differ from social goals. Reflecting the importance of external
costs on public lands, the “multiple use” and “sustainable yield”mandates of the
BLM, USFS, and other FLMAs require these government agencies to address the
externalities associated with ranching when setting regulation. These two mandates
require that FLMAs take into account wildlife, watershed health, and recreation as
well as commercial interests such as ranching (multiple use), and that they work
to ensure that the resource values on public lands are available at current levels in
perpetuity (sustainable yield).2
1Keith and Lyon (1985), Cory and Martin (1985), Roach, Loomis, and Motroni (1996), and
Shonkwiler and Englin (2005) find that livestock grazing and recreation have competing values on
public rangelands. Other externalities include the influence of rangeland degradation on soil erosion
(Knapp 1996), carbon sequestration (Follett, Kimble, and Lal 2001; Verburg et al. 2004; Brown et
al. 2006; Havstad et al. 2007), and wildfire activity (Billings 1990) and its effects on ranch profits
(Maher 2007) and wildfire suppression costs (Taylor et al. 2011). One of the most robust findings of
this literature is that these external costs increase dramatically with changes in rangeland vegetation
away from native perennial grasses.
2The USFS adopted the principles of multiple use and sustainable yield with the “Multiple Use,
Sustained Yield Act of 1960.”The BLM followed suit in 1964 with the “Classification and Multiple
Use Act of 1964”.
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This article analyzes regulatory design for agroecosystem management on public
rangeland. We develop a model with two parties: an agent (rancher) that uses the
agroecosystem for private economic gain and a principal (FLMA or regulator) that
manages the agroecosystem for both economic gains of the rancher and public goods
related to ecosystem health. We consider an informational environment where the
rancher is better informed than the FLMA about the effectiveness of her/his actions in
achieving both her/his private economic objectives and in influencing the public good
aspects of ecosystem health, and where there is moral hazard in the implementation
of any regulatory scheme because some of the rancher’s actions cannot be observed
by the FLMA. In addition, high costs of monitoring ranch-level ecological conditions
make it infeasible for FLMAs to engage in regular and detailed monitoring of ranch-
level ecological conditions on public rangelands.3 As a result, FLMAs base regulation
on imperfect signals of how the ranchers’activities influence ecosystem health.
In addition to these informational constraints, we model institutional constraints
faced by FLMAs. It is assumed that the FLMA is constrained by its exogenous
budget to fund policy but it can supplement this exogenous budget through taxation.
This feature of the model reflects the current practice on public rangelands, where
FLMAs have fixed budgets in the short-run but are able to use revenues collected
through grazing fees to fund their activities.4 We also consider ranchers’participation
constraints, which require that a rancher’s profit from ranching on public rangeland
3Monitoring costs on public rangelands are high relative to FLMA budgets. Indeed, the high cost
in terms of personnel and other resources to monitor ecosystem health has been cited as a reason
why FLMAs often do not perform the regular monitoring activities that are specified in federal
grazing leases (GAO 1992).
4FLMAs, however, are constrained to spend their grazing-fee revenue on “range improvement”
projects and have to give a large portion (roughly 50%) of their grazing-fee revenues to state gov-
ernments to return to counties as “Payments in Lieu of Taxes” and to the U.S. Treasury (Watts,
Shimshack, and LaFrance 2006).
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exceed her/his outside option. As a result, the FLMA is constrained in the monetary
and non-monetary penalties it can assess.
The modeled informational and institutional environment allows us to define and
compare the most prominent regulatory instruments on public rangelands. These
instruments are input mandates, where the regulator mandates the level of usage of
certain inputs, cost-sharing/taxation, where the regulator subsidizes or taxes the use
of certain inputs, and performance regulation, where the regulator compensates or
penalizes the rancher based on the value of an observed performance measure.
We begin by analyzing the effi ciency of the three regulatory instruments in light
of the informational and institutional constraints faced by FLMAs. We characterize
conditions under which each of the three instruments improves welfare and domi-
nates the other instruments. When FLMAs are unconstrained in the level of bonus
or penalty they can assess and when there is perfect monitoring, the first-best out-
come can be achieved through performance regulation. In a more realistic setting,
however, the FLMA is constrained in the level of bonus/penalty it can assess and/or
monitoring is imperfect. Under these circumstances, both input mandates and cost-
sharing/taxation can dominate performance regulation. After considering each regu-
latory instrument in isolation, we examine relative attractiveness of a joint use of the
regulatory instruments.
To our knowledge, this article is the first to compare the merits of these three
regulatory instruments in a setting that captures the salient informational and in-
stitutional constraints faced by FLMAs on public rangelands. By analyzing these
three regulatory instruments in the same model, we provide a platform to compare
the optimal mix of regulatory instruments with the existing FLMA regulations for
ranching on public rangelands. This allows us to consider how FLMAs’informational
and institutional constraints have shaped the existing regulation and evaluate possi-
ble explanations for the continued reliance of FLMAs on input mandates, in the form
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of grazing restrictions, despite their demonstrated ineffi ciency in reaching a target
level of environmental performance (e.g., Zhao 2008).
The results in this article apply specifically to regulation on public rangeland,
as opposed to regulation on private rangeland, because regulators have a greater
ability to restrict herd size, mandate infrastructure investments, and penalize ranchers
for non-compliance when the latter operate on public land. The informational and
institutional constraints on effi cient management considered in this article, however,
apply equally to the regulation of ranching on both public and private rangelands, as
well as to many other agroecosystem management problems. In particular, in many
agricultural and natural resource extraction activities the (i) externalities associated
with the activity cannot be monitored perfectly, (ii) some management efforts are not
perfectly observed, (iii) there is uncertainty about the effect of management actions
on external costs, and (iv) the public agency tasked with management faces a budget
constraint.5 As such, our findings have implications that extend beyond the regulation
of ranching on public rangelands.
3.2 Regulation on Public Rangelands
FLMAs use several regulatory instruments to reduce the negative externalities asso-
ciated with ranching and to ensure that public rangelands are managed in accordance
with their multiple use and sustainable yield mandates. The most prominent of these
5For example, (i) the external cost of chemical (herbicide and pesticide) use in agriculture on
watershed health cannot be monitored perfectly; (ii) farmer effort to mitigate the external cost of
chemical use cannot be observed perfectly by a regulatory agency; (iii) the external cost of chemical
use cannot be inferred with certainty from usage rates due to a complex, farm-specific relationship
between chemical use and watershed health; and (iv) budget considerations likely constrain a regula-
tory agency’s ability to promote effi cient chemical use through performance bonuses or cost-sharing
of alternative technologies with lower social costs.
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regulatory instruments are restrictions on the number of livestock ranchers can graze
on their public land allotments.6 Livestock grazing restrictions are aimed at ensur-
ing the long-term ecological health of public rangeland allotments by limiting the
rancher’s ability to inflict ecological harm through over-grazing. In addition, as we
explain below, FLMAs can use the possibility of expanded or reduced grazing privi-
leges to motivate the rancher to manage their rangeland in accordance with FLMAs’
ecological health objectives.
In principle, grazing restrictions specify the maximum number of livestock a
rancher can run on her/his public land allotment. In practice, however, ranchers
are also required to make “substantial use” of range forage or risk possible loss of
grazing privileges. Reduced grazing privileges lower ranchers’potential profits from
ranching and can diminish the sale value of their grazing permit and base ranch. The
combination of the maximum grazing restrictions and non-use provisions amounts to
a de facto mandate that forces most ranchers to choose a number of livestock they
graze on their public rangeland allotment from a narrow interval of possible herd
sizes.
In addition to facing grazing restrictions, ranchers must pay a per animal, per
month grazing fee. An effi cient grazing fee would be set equal to the marginal social
value of forage that incorporates the marginal forage value for ranchers and the mar-
ginal external environmental costs. Grazing fees on public rangelands, however, are
set nationally, and are thus ineffi cient for most ranches because of the heterogene-
ity of range conditions. Johnson and Watts (1989) find that despite this ineffi ciency
and the existence of non-use provisions, stocking rates on public land allotments are
6These are often referred to as Animal Unit Month (AUM) restrictions, where an AUM is the
amount of forage needed to sustain one cow and her calf, or one horse, or five sheep or goats for one
month.
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somewhat responsive to changes in grazing fees.7 It has also been suggested that
under certain degraded rangeland conditions, it may be socially effi cient to subsidize
grazing above privately optimal levels as a means of noxious weed control and wildfire
fuels reduction (Papanastasis 2009).
Besides grazing restrictions and fees, ranchers operating on public rangeland are
often obligated to engage in construction or maintenance of “range improvements”
as part of the conditions of their lease (USDI BLM 2008). These include enhanc-
ing livestock grazing management, improving watershed conditions, and enhancing
wildlife habitat. “Range improvements”can be structural, such as water pipes, wells,
and fences, or non-structural, such as re-seeding and prescribed burns. While an
FLMA and a rancher will often work jointly to achieve desired “range improvements”
(FLMAs have budgets for “range improvements” that are funded through grazing
fees) these activities add to the rancher’s cost of operating on public rangelands
(Torell and Doll 1991; Xu, Mittelhammer, and Torell 1994).
FLMAs pursue a strategy of both long- and short-termmonitoring of the ecological
conditions on public rangeland allotments. Monitoring is performed in order to assess
the ranchers’compliance with their contractual obligations on their allotments and
with the “Standards of Rangeland Health,”which are a series of ecological health
goals set forth by the FLMA (USDI BLM 2007).8 Long-term monitoring is focused
on changes in the status of vegetation on an allotment and is generally performed at
the time of permit renewal.9 In contrast, short-term monitoring includes monitoring
7Watts, Shimshack, and LaFrance (2006) argue that because non-use provisions encourage ranch-
ers to graze their maximum allowed number of livestock, grazing fees represent a fixed cost rather
than a variable cost for most ranchers.
8The Standards for Rangeland Health that apply to a given allotment are set by local 15-member
Resource Advisory Councils that have flexibility to adapt the Standards of Rangeland Health to
local conditions and priorities (Swanson 2008, personal interview).
9Long-term monitoring is generally performed at the time of permit renewal unless there is
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the time and intensity of grazing, the total number of animals on the allotment,
pasture, or use area, and utilization, which is an estimate of the amount of forage
removed from the land after the grazing season. The dates of use can be used to
understand plant stresses and determine the amount of time that forage is allowed to
rejuvenate after grazing (Swanson 2006; Swanson 2008: Personal Interview).
If monitoring reveals that current management is degrading rangeland health, or
that the rancher is failing to comply with her/his contractual obligations, reductions
in the rancher’s grazing privileges or mandatory range improvements may be im-
posed.10 Both of these consequences of monitoring serve as penalties on ranchers for
violations of contractual obligations. Conversely, monitoring can result in the expan-
sion of grazing privileges if current grazing is found to do limited ecological harm.
In this way, monitoring and the associated penalties/bonuses provide the rancher
with incentives to manage their allotments in accordance with the FLMAs’ecological
health objectives.
3.3 Related Literature
Of the three regulatory instruments that we consider in this article, cost-sharing/taxation
in the form of grazing fees has received the most attention in the previous literature.
This focus on grazing fees can be explained in part by the considerable controversy
that federal grazing fees have generated (Hess and Holecheck 1995). Some authors
argue that federal grazing fees are set too low relative to the market value of forage
a serious resource concern on the allotment, such as soil erosion or degraded riparian areas, or
the rancher is involved in an ongoing range improvement project that involves a comprehensive
monitoring program.
10While obligatory range improvements may benefit the rancher, they will impose costs on the
rancher if the latter would not have otherwise undertaken the range improvement or if the rancher
would have undertaken it in a different manner than was mandated by the FLMA.
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(Fowler, Torell and Gallacher 1994; LaFrance and Watts 1995), while others maintain
that federal grazing fees are set appropriately given the cost of compliance with fed-
eral regulations on public rangelands (Torell and Doll 1991; Xu, Mittelhammer, and
Torell 1994). Several studies construct theoretical models to characterize the opti-
mal grazing fee in the presence of externalities (McCarl and Brokken 1985; Huffaker,
Wilen, and Gardner 1989) and informational asymmetries between the FLMA and
the rancher (Watts, Shimshack, and LaFrance 2006). Relative to this literature, we
consider the optimal grazing fee taking into account both the externalities associated
with ranching and a richer set of informational and institutional constraints faced by
FLMAs. In addition, we consider how the optimal grazing fee is influenced by other
regulatory instruments in concurrent use on public rangelands.
Regulatory mechanisms other than grazing fees have received substantially less
attention in the literature. Torell, Lyon, and Godfrey (1991) consider the relative
economic importance of current-period animal performance and future forage produc-
tion for a yearling stocker operation in eastern Colorado and find that current period
animal performance defined by weight gain drives economic stocking-rate decisions.
In an analysis of incentive-based mechanisms, Huffaker, Wilen and Gardner (1989)
propose the use of a grazing fee in conjunction with “transfer payments”based on ob-
served range conditions as a potential mechanism to induce ranch compliance with the
FLMA’s ecological health objectives. Our work builds on these studies by consider-
ing both input mandates (stocking-rates) and performance regulation (incentive-based
mechanisms) in a setting that captures the informational and institutional constraints
on public rangelands and allows for a comparison of the effi ciency properties of these
regulatory instruments, along with cost-sharing/taxation.
There is a large and burgeoning economics literature on regulatory design under
asymmetric information. A number of studies examine the relative merits of quantity
instruments (input mandates), price instruments (cost-sharing/taxation), and per-
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formance regulation. Weitzman (1974) demonstrates how a quantity instrument can
dominate price instruments when there is uncertainty and asymmetric information in
policy design. The simultaneous use of different regulatory instruments has also been
analyzed (Shavell 1984; Innes 1998; Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson 1990; and Hueth and
Melkonyan 2009).
The present article makes three innovations relative to the received literature.
First, by constructing a model where closed-form expressions for the social welfare
under the three regulatory instruments can be derived, we directly compare the effi -
ciency of the three regulatory instruments and examine how their relative effi ciency
is influenced by the informational and institutional constraints faced by the regula-
tor. Second, we examine the simultaneous use of multiple regulatory instruments,
identify circumstances under which it is most advantageous for the regulator to use
multiple instruments, and examine how the effi cient use of each individual instrument
changes when a mixture of instruments is optimal. Third, we consider optimal reg-
ulation in the presence of budget constraints. In doing this, we are contributing to
the literature on optimal contracting with a budget-constrained principal operating
under imperfect information. The previous literature on optimal contracting under a
budget constraint has focused on procurement problems, where the principal designs
contracts to overcome adverse selection (Levaggi 2004; Gautier 2004; Anthon et al.
2007). In contrast, the informational environment in our model entails both asym-
metric information and moral hazard. We find that the budget constraint causes the
regulator to rely on instruments that would otherwise be ineffi cient.
An important component of the economics literature on regulatory design is the
large and growing body of work on optimal environmental regulation in agriculture.
By and large, this literature (e.g., Bontems, Turpin, and Rotillon 2005; Feng 2007;
and Sheriff 2008) has focused on the case where the principal has the dual goals of
limiting environmental externalities and providing income support to agricultural pro-
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ducers, and where the effi ciency of regulation is undermined by adverse selection. In a
context similar to these studies, Bontems and Bourgeon (2005) investigate the prop-
erties of the optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy assuming that
emissions can be observed through costly audits and that private information remains
even when an audit is performed. In a related analysis, Bontems and Thomas (2006)
present a model of pollution regulation for a risk averse farmer facing production risk
from nitrogen leaching. Our framework is similar to their model which incorporates
moral hazard and private information on the producer’s part about farm-level eco-
logical conditions. In contrast to these studies, we do not consider adverse selection,
nor does income support for producers enter the principal’s objective (unlike in many
other agricultural contexts, income support for ranchers is not an explicit goal of
FLMA policy). We also do not consider monitoring of compliance with environmen-
tal regulation.11 Indeed, our model departs from the literature by examining how
the combination of the institutional and informational constraints faced by FLMAs
influences the relative effi ciency of three pervasive and relatively unsophisticated reg-
ulatory instruments. In another related work, Anthon, Garcia, and Stenger (2010)
analyze environmental regulation in the presence of both asymmetric information and
moral hazard, but do not consider a budget constrained regulator/principal.
Finally, on a purely formal level, our model extends the work of Baker (1992),
Prendergast (2002), and Hueth and Melkonyan (2009) by examining multiple regula-
tory instruments under an alternative informational environment and by considering
additional institutional constraints. In addition, while there are similarities between
our model and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), we assume linear separability between
actions and, as such, do not examine the multi-tasking issues they consider.
11Rather, we consider a setting where a bonus/penalty is assessed to the rancher based on imperfect




We consider a strategic interaction between two parties, a regulator (she) and a
rancher (he). The rancher utilizes a production process with two inputs, denoted by
e1 ≥ 0 and e2 ≥ 0. In addition to influencing the rancher’s private payoff, these
inputs affect the health of the ecosystem where the rancher carries out his production
activities and, by doing so, cause externalities.
In the absence of regulation, the rancher’s private payoff function12 is given by
π (e1, e2) ≡ F (e1, e2)− w1e1 − w2e2, (3.1)
where F (e1, e2) has the quadratic form
F (e1, e2) =
[
θ1e1 − γ1 (e1)
2]+ [θ2e2 − γ2 (e2)2] , (3.2)
with γ1, γ2 > 0, θ1 > w1 > 0, and θ2 > w2 > 0. The function F (e1, e2) represents the
revenue from ranching. We assume that e1 is purchased from a market and it can
be observed, and, hence, regulated, by the regulator. We let w1 denote the market
price of e1. In contrast, e2 represents the rancher’s effort directed toward enhancing
production and/or the ecosystem health and it is not observed by the regulator. We
let w2 denote the constant marginal cost of effort e2. The most important inputs
chosen by ranchers and observed and used by regulators on public rangelands are
the scale and intensity of livestock grazing. Other observed inputs include certain
12Previous research has found that ranchers receive compensation from ranching in the form of
“consumptive amenities” related to the “ranching lifestyle” (Torell et al. 2005). This amenity
value of ranching, however, is unlikely to vary on the margin with the number of cattle grazed or
with the use of any other input. As such, including the amenity value of ranching in our analysis
would only influence the rancher’s participation constraint. As described below, we normalize the
rancher’s reservation utility, without any loss of generality, to zero. If the amenity value of ranching
is significant, then this normalized reservation utility can be thought to include the expected utility
of not ranching minus any consumptive amenities related to the ranching lifestyle.
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structural (e.g., water pipes, wells, and fences) and non-structural (e.g., re-seeding
and prescribed burns) range improvements. The most important actions performed by
ranchers that are often not observed by regulators are ranchers’grazing management
techniques, such as rotational grazing and preventing cattle from damaging riparian
areas, that reduce the ecological harm from livestock grazing.




π (e1, e2) . (3.3)
Under our assumption that θ1−w1 > 0 and θ2−w2 > 0, the rancher’s optimal choice




> 0 for i = 1, 2. (3.4)
The ex post social value of the public good related to ecosystem health is given
by
V (e1, e2, ε1, ε2) = (µ11 + µ12ε1) e1 + (µ21 + µ22ε2) e2, (3.5)
where µ11, µ21, µ12 and µ22 are parameters of the model and εi (i = 1, 2) is a random
variable with support [−ε′i, ε′i] , E (εi) = 0, and V ar (εi) = σ2εi . Thus, the social value
of the public good is a random variable whose distribution is affected by the rancher’s
choice of inputs.13 It is assumed that neither the rancher nor the regulator observes
the realizations of ε1 and ε2. Given our specification, an increase in input ei (i = 1, 2)
leads to an increase in the variance of V .
We have assumed that both F (e1, e2) and V (e1, e2, ε1, ε2) are separable in e1
and e2 to focus on the direct effects of the regulatory instruments on the rancher’s
13In contrast to the social value of ecosystem health, the rancher’s private payoff is assumed to
be deterministic. In reality, many random factors (e.g., weather) affecting the former likely impact
the latter. One could easily utilize the techniques in Baker (2002) to analyze this more general case.
Although this would yield additional insights, the qualitative results reported in the paper would
not be affected by such enrichment of the model.
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input choices. When the above functional forms are not separable, a regulatory
instrument targeted at a specific input (in our model, an input mandate, cost-sharing,
or taxation) will also have an indirect effect on the use of the other input. As long as
these indirect effects are small compared to the direct effects, our qualitative results
remain unchanged. Our choice of a quadratic functional form for F (e1, e2) and a
linear functional form for V (e1, e2, ε1, ε2) is driven mainly by space considerations.
The ex post social welfare is defined as the sum of the rancher’s private payoff,
F (e1, e2)−w1e1−w2e2, and the value of the public good related to ecosystem health,
V (e1, e2, ε1, ε2). Since any payment related to a regulatory instrument is a transfer
between the regulator and the rancher, it does not influence the social welfare.14
Using enr1 and e
nr
2 from (3.4), we obtain the expected social welfare in the unreg-
ulated case:









µi1 (θi − wi)
2γi
.
The expected social welfare without regulation will be used as a benchmark against
which the effi ciency of each regulatory mechanism will be compared.
Another important benchmark for assessing the effi cacy of the regulatory mech-
anisms is the full-information social optimum, also called first-best, for which the
rancher’s choice of ei is conditioned on the realization of the random variable εi to
maximize the ex post social welfare:
max
e1,e2
[π (e1, e2) + V (e1, e2, ε1, ε2)] . (3.7)
The full-information socially optimal input choices are given by
e∗i (εi) =
 0, if θi + µi1 + µi2εi ≤ wiθi−wi+µi1+µi2εi
2γi
, otherwise
for i = 1, 2. (3.8)
14We do not model the potential welfare costs associated with raising revenue (e.g., due to distor-
tionary taxation) to fund regulation on public rangeland.
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We assume that θi + µi1 + µi2εi > wi (i = 1, 2) for all εi ∈ [−ε′i, ε′i], so that the full-
information socially optimal choices of e1 and e2 are always strictly positive. When
parameter µi2 is strictly positive, the first-best calls for the rancher to increase the
use of input ei in response to increases in εi.



























is the marginal social value of ei, i = 1, 2 (or, alternatively,
Vei is the marginal product of ei on ecosystem health).
It follows immediately from (3.6) and (3.9) that when the expected marginal
social value of ei is non-zero —i.e., E (Vei) = µi1 6= 0, i = 1, 2 —the rancher’s private
optimal choices of e1 and e2 in the absence of regulation are socially ineffi cient, and
that the extent of this ineffi ciency is positively affected by |E (Ve1)| and |E (Ve2)|.
Expression (3.9) also reveals that the ineffi ciency of the rancher’s private optimum in
the absence of regulation is independent of whether input ei is detrimental (E (Vei) <
0) or beneficial (E (Vei) > 0) to ecosystem health. In addition, the degree of the
ineffi ciency of the rancher’s privately optimal choice enri , i = 1, 2, is increasing in the
variance of the marginal social value of the rancher’s effort, V ar (Vei), i = 1, 2, which
measures the heterogeneity of the effect of ei on ecosystem health between ranchers.
An alternative benchmark for assessing the effi ciency of the regulatory mecha-
nisms corresponds to the socially optimal policy that, in contrast to the previous
benchmark, takes into account only the information observed by at least one of the
two parties. As discussed in the next section, the regulator can observe an imperfect
signal, termed performance measure, of the impact of the rancher’s choices of e1 and
e2 on ecosystem health. The rancher receives private signals η1 and η2, correlated
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with ε1 and ε2, that determine how his choices of e1 and e2, respectively, influence the
performance measure. We call this alternative benchmark —where the input choices
can be conditioned on the observations of η1 and η2 to maximize the expected social
welfare —partial-information social optimum. The name reflects the supposition that
the choices can be conditioned on η1 and η2 but not on ε1 and ε2.
The partial-information socially optimal choices of inputs e1 and e2 are given by
e∗∗i (ηi) =
θi − wi + µi1 + µi2E [εi|ηi]
2γi
> 0 for i = 1, 2. (3.10)
The expected social welfare under the partial-information social optimum is equal to










E [V ar (Vei |ηi)]
4γi
.
Relative to the expected social welfare (3.9) evaluated at the first-best, the expected
social welfare is reduced proportionately to E [V ar (Vei |ηi)]. The latter is inversely
related to the value of the information in ηi about εi and, hence, about Vei . This
benchmark illustrates that the first-best social optimum cannot be achieved so long
as ηi provides a less than perfect signal of εi. Note also that like the first-best,
the partial-information social optimum weakly dominates the regulatory instruments
analyzed in this article.
3.5 Regulatory Instruments
Recognizing that the rancher’s privately optimal choices of e1 and e2 do not fully take
into account the effect of his activities on ecosystem health, the regulator contemplates
introducing a regulatory mechanism. The regulator has three regulatory instruments
at her disposal to improve upon the unregulated outcome; (1) input mandate, where
the regulator fixes the rancher’s use of the observable input, (2) cost-sharing/taxation,
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where the regulator subsidizes/taxes the rancher’s use of the observable input, and
(3) performance regulation, where the regulator pays/taxes the rancher based on the
value of an observable performance measure related to the rancher’s use of inputs e1
and e2.15
The regulator, however, does not have full flexibility when choosing a regula-
tory mechanism. First, she faces informational constraints. It is assumed that the
rancher’s private payoff, F (e1, e2)−w1e1−w2e2, and use of input e2 are not observable
by the regulator and, as a result, cannot be a part of a regulatory mechanism. The
regulator, however, has full knowledge of how e1 and e2 influence the rancher’s private
payoff and uses this knowledge when determining the optimal regulatory mechanism.
Neither the regulator nor the rancher observe the value of the public good related to
ecosystem health, V (e1, e2, ε1, ε2), or the realization of the random variables ε1 and
ε2, which determine the influence of the rancher’s input choices on the public good.16
The regulator does observe, however, a subset of relevant ecosystem health outcomes
over which the rancher has influence. This subset of ecosystem health outcomes —
henceforth termed performance measure —provides an imperfect signal of the impact
of the rancher’s choices of e1 and e2 on ecosystem health. This performance measure
is in general different from the actual and expected values of V .
15The performance regulation examined in this article has many similarities with payments for
ecosystem services (PES) systems. Apart from the involuntary nature of participation in the per-
formance regulation conditional on the rancher’s choice to operate on public land, the performance
regulation satisfies the other parts of the definition of a PES system in Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder
(2008). Specifically, the performance regulation is a transaction where (i) a well-defined environmen-
tal service (the performance measure) is (ii) being “bought”by a service buyer (the regulator) from
(iii) a service provider (the rancher) (iv) if and only if the service provider secures service provision
(payment dependent on realization of the performance measure P (·)).
16Our findings would be unchanged if, alternatively, we assumed that V (e1, e2, ε1, ε2), ε1, and ε2
were observable but non-contractible.
182
The rancher receives private signals, η1 and η2, that determine how his choices of
e1 and e2, respectively, influence the performance measure. Each private signal ηi,
i = 1, 2, is correlated with the random variable εi, so that the marginal products of
ei, i = 1, 2, on the performance measure and V (e1, e2, ε1, ε2) are correlated. As with
the rancher’s private payoff, the regulator has knowledge of how e1 and e2 influence
V (e1, e2, ε1, ε2), contingent on ε1 and ε2, and the performance measure, contingent on
η1 and η2.While η1, η2, ε1, and ε2 are not observed by the regulator, their distributions
are known to the regulator. Thus, a regulatory instrument can only be conditioned
on the realizations of e1 and the performance measure.
Second, the regulator’s choice of a regulatory mechanism is constrained by her
available budget B ≥ 0; the regulator cannot implement a regulatory mechanism for
which the expected budget outlay exceeds B.17 In contrast, the ex post payment
to the rancher may exceed B. The assumption that the budget cannot be exceeded
ex ante is reasonable in circumstances where the regulator is proposing a regulatory
mechanism to a large number of ranchers, so that events where the regulator’s ex
post payment to a rancher exceeds B are balanced by events where it is smaller than
B.
Third, the regulator’s choice of a regulatory mechanism is constrained by the
rancher’s participation constraint. The participation constraint requires that the
rancher’s ex ante expected profits from ranching (i.e., the expected profits before
η1 and η2 are learned by the rancher) exceed his ex ante outside option (which we
17An alternative approach to incorporating budgetary considerations into our model is offered by
modelling the shadow cost of public funds as in Laffont and Tirole (1993). There is an important
difference, however, between the approach of Laffont and Tirole (1993) that focuses on a (exogenously
given) marginal cost of public funds and the explicit budget constraint approach taken in the present
article. In particular, the shadow cost of public funds in Laffont and Tirole (1993) is constant
while in our model the shadow cost associated with the regulator’s budget constraint varies with the
regulator’s budget. As such, the level of budgetary outlays has different effects in the two approaches.
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normalize to zero).18 Under the ex ante participation constraint, the rancher’s ex post
profits for some realizations of η1 and η2 may be lower than his ex ante reservation
utility. Our choice to model the ex ante participation constraint rather than the ex
post participation constraint is sensible when, for example, (i) the rancher observes η1
and η2 only after he enters into an agreement with the regulator to operate on public
rangeland, (ii) the rancher commits certain fixed costs in order to operate on public
rangeland, and (iii) the rancher’s profit net of these fixed costs exceeds his reservation
utility for all realizations of η1 and η2 when the ex ante participation constraint is
satisfied. This last condition guarantees that the rancher will remain in operation for
all realizations of η1 and η2 whenever his ex ante participation constraint is satisfied.
In what follows, it is assumed that the monitoring costs do not differ between
the regulatory instruments. In reality, while the monitoring costs may differ between
the instruments, they are not likely to vary significantly with the level of regulation
pursued by the FLMA. That is, it is likely that, for a given ranch, the cost of mon-
itoring compliance with an input mandate (an AUM restriction) does not vary with
the level of the input mandate. We also expect the same relationship to hold for
the level of the cost-share/tax and the piece rate of the performance regulation. In
other words, the monitoring costs of different regulatory instruments are akin to fixed
costs. If monitoring costs are indeed similar to fixed cost, then only FLMA’s exoge-
nous budget to fund regulation would be affected by differences in monitoring costs
across the regulatory instruments. Moreover, while differences in fixed monitoring
costs between the regulatory instruments may be substantial, they will not affect our
18Note that the rancher must participate in the performance regulation if he chooses to graze his
animals on public land. As such, the rancher will graze his animals on public land, and, as a result,
participate in the performance regulation, if his ex ante expected profit from doing so is greater
than his outside option. If instead participation in the performance regulation on public lands were
voluntary, the rancher would participate if his ex ante expected profit was greater than his ex ante
expected profit in the absence of the performance regulation.
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results on how different aspects of ranching on public rangeland influence the relative
effi ciency of the three regulatory instruments considered in this article (when used
either individually or in combinations). For this reason, it is further assumed that
the fixed monitoring costs of all three instruments are the same.19
The analysis in this article focuses on three regulatory instruments that are cur-
rently used on public rangelands. For this reason, we do not consider alternative
regulatory schemes that could improve welfare over the regulatory instruments used
in practice. For example, we do not consider a message game between the rancher
and the regulator that would condition the regulatory instruments on the rancher’s
report of his private information η1 and η2 together with the choice of e1 and the
performance measure. We leave an analysis of such mechanisms to future work.
The timing in our model is as follows. First, the regulator announces the reg-
ulatory mechanism, and the rancher learns the level of each regulatory instrument.
Subsequently, the rancher learns the realization of uncertainty concerning the impact
of his choices of e1 and e2 on the performance measure and selects e1 and e2. Then,
the realization of the performance measure is observed by both parties and the reg-
ulator also learns the rancher’s choice of e1. Finally, the payments (if any) are made
between the regulator and the rancher.
19There are significant practical diffi culties with esimating the FLMAs’monitoring costs associated
with the regulatory instruments considered in this paper. The estimates are diffi cult to obtain for
two reasons. First, much of the monitoring performed by FLMAs would take place even without
grazing on public rangelands. For example, monitoring activities such as vegetation surveys occur
as part of general rangeland management, and should not be considered as a cost of monitoring
ranching on public rangelands (GAO 2005). Second, the information on the monitoring costs of
various regulatory instruments is not readily available in published FLMA documents. It may only
be possible to glean such information through a thorough audit of FLMA monitoring procedures.
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3.5.1 Input Mandate
Input regulation in the form of grazing restrictions is the most prominent form of
regulation on public rangelands. As was discussed above, non-use provisions in federal
grazing leases imply that grazing restrictions are de facto mandates for most ranchers
operating on public rangeland. For this reason, we consider the scenario where the
regulator mandates the rancher’s choice of the observable input, denoted by e′1. Under
this regulatory instrument, the rancher has to pay a relatively high penalty if his use
of e1 differs from e′1 so that the rancher never finds it advantageous to violate the
mandate. It is assumed that it is costless for the regulator to enforce the input
mandate.
Because the rancher’s private payoff function, π (e1, e2), is separable in e1 and e2,
mandating e′1 does not influence the rancher’s choice of e2. As such, provided the
rancher uses the public rangeland he will set e2 equal to the unregulated level enr2




E [π (e′1, e
nr




2 , ε1, ε2)] (3.12)
subject to the regulator’s budget constraint
B ≥ α, (3.13)
and the rancher’s participation constraint
π (e′1, e
nr
2 ) + α ≥ 0, (3.14)
where α is a lump-sum transfer between the rancher and the regulator.20 The reg-
ulator will provide a lump-sum transfer only when the optimal input mandate is so
20Any action by the regulator that benefits the rancher and which is not tied to the rancher’s choice
of inputs (e.g., certain types of range improvements by the regulator) can be thought of as a lump-
sum transfer. In this sense, allowing for lump-sum transfers is quite realistic. There is also a purely
technical reason for introducing lump-sum transfers. By allowing for a lump-sum transfer, which
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large as to make ranching unprofitable. This can occur only if the expected marginal
product of e1 on ecosystem health is positive (E (Ve1) > 0).




E [π (e′1, e
nr




2 , ε1, ε2)] (3.15)
subject to π (e′1, e
nr
2 ) +B ≥ 0.
First, consider the case where the regulator’s optimization problem (3.15) is uncon-
strained. The optimal input mandate in this case is given by
em1 =
θ1 + µ11 − w1
2γ1
= E [e∗1 (ε1)] , (3.16)
where the last expression is the expectation of the first-best level of input e1 from
(3.8). When the constraint binds, the regulator’s optimal choice of e′1 is implicitly
given by the binding constraint: π (e′1, e
nr
2 ) + B = 0. Solving this equation for e
′
1 we
obtain the optimal input mandate under the binding constraint:









By concavity of the objective function in (3.15) and the structure of its constraint,
the regulator’s constraint in (3.15) is binding at the optimum if and only if µ11 > 0 and
em1 ≥ em1 (B). Using the expressions for em1 and em1 (B) , we obtain that em1 ≥ em1 (B)
if and only if




− π (enr1 , enr2 ) . (3.18)
Thus, the optimal input mandate is given by em1 (B) if µ11 > 0 and B ≤ Bm and by
em1 , otherwise.
enters linearly in both the regulator’s budget constraint and the rancher’s participation constraint,
we can immediately reduce the number of constraints by one. This considerably simplifies our
analysis. If we ruled out the lump-sum transfer, the results would not change substantially, but
their presentation would considerably lengthen an already long paper.
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− γ1 {E [e∗1 (ε1)]− em1 (B)}








It follows immediately from this expression that the input mandate strictly improves
upon the expected social welfare in the non-regulated case when the expected marginal
product of the observable input e1 on ecosystem health is non-zero, E (Ve1) 6= 0.
Because the regulator knows how e1 influences both F and E (V ) (though ex post
she cannot directly observe either F or V ), she can set e1 at the expected social
optimum (em1 = E [e
∗
1 (ε1)]) when the budget constraint is not binding. The input
mandate, however, cannot restore the first-best outcome unless the constraint in
(3.15) is non-binding, the effect of e1 on ecosystem health is the same for all ranchers
(V ar (Ve1) = 0), so that the one-size-fits-all input mandate is appropriate, and the
unobservable input, e2, does not influence ecosystem health.
When the budget constraint is binding, the loss in the expected social welfare
relative to the non-binding constraint case is determined, among other factors, by the
difference in the expected socially optimal usage of the observable input, E [e∗1 (ε1)],
and the level dictated by the regulator’s budget constraint, em1 (B). This loss is
decreasing in the regulator’s budget B (since em1 (B) is increasing in B while E [e
∗
1 (ε1)]
is independent of B) and increasing in the expected marginal social value of the
rancher’s effort E (Ve1) = µ11 > 0 (since E [e
∗
1 (ε1)] is increasing in µ11 while e
m
1 (B)
is independent of µ11).
3.5.2 Cost-Sharing/Taxation
We now turn to examining the scenario where the regulator either subsidizes (cost-
sharing) or taxes the rancher’s use of the observable input e1. In both cases, the cost
of input e1 incurred by the rancher is (1−s)w1e1, while the cost borne by the regulator
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is sw1e1. Thus, s > 0 corresponds to cost-sharing, while s < 0 represents taxation. As
discussed above, taxation of forage use through grazing fees is an important element
of FLMA policy on public rangelands. In addition to taxation, we consider cost-
sharing because it has been suggested that for certain degraded conditions, it may
be socially effi cient to subsidize grazing above privately optimal levels as a means of
noxious weed control and wildfire fuel reduction.
The rancher’s choice of e1 under cost-sharing/taxation is given by
ec1 (s) =




As in the preceding section, the rancher’s choice of e2 under cost-sharing is equal to
the unregulated level given by (3.4).
Given the rancher’s choice of ec1 as a function of s, the regulator’s optimization
problem can be written as
max
s,α
E [π (ec1 (s) , e
nr
2 ) + V (e
c
1 (s) , e
nr
2 , ε1, ε2)] (3.21)
subject to the regulator’s budget constraint
B ≥ α + sw1ec1 (s) , (3.22)
and the rancher’s participation constraint
F (ec1 (s) , e
nr
2 )− (1− s)w1ec1 (s)− w2enr2 + α ≥ 0, (3.23)
where α is a lump-sum transfer between the rancher and the regulator.




E [π (ec1 (s) , e
nr
2 ) + V (e
c
1 (s) , e
nr
2 , ε1, ε2)] (3.24)
subject to π (ec1 (s) , e
nr
2 ) +B ≥ 0.
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Since maximization over s in (3.24) is equivalent to maximization over e1, the op-
timization problem (3.24) is equivalent to choosing an optimal input mandate in
(3.15). Hence, the elicited choices of the inputs and the resulting expected social wel-
fare under the optimal cost-sharing/taxation mechanism coincide with those under
the optimal input mandate. Specifically, the optimal cost-sharing variable s and the











ec1 (B) = e
m








, if µ11 > 0 and B ≤ Bm,
and
sc = E (Ve1) /w1 = µ11/w1 and (3.26)
ec1 = e
m
1 = E [e
∗
1 (ε1)] =
θ1 − w1 + µ11
2γ1
, otherwise.
Thus, when the constraint in (3.24) is binding, the optimal cost-sharing is positively
affected by the reciprocal of the price of input e1, the reverse of the rancher’s profits
under the unregulated outcome, and the regulator’s budget B. Under a non-binding
constraint, the regulator sets cost-sharing variable s equal to the ratio of the expected
marginal externality associated with e1 and its market price. The expected social
welfare evaluated at the optimal cost-sharing/taxation arrangement is equal to





− γ1 {E [e∗1 (ε1)]− ec1 (B)}







As a result of this equivalence between the two regulatory instruments, the compara-
tive statics results under the optimal cost-sharing/taxation coincide with those under
the optimal input mandate. As we discuss below, the equivalence between the opti-
mal input mandate and optimal cost-sharing/taxation ceases to hold when the two
regulatory instruments are used in combination with performance regulation.
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3.5.3 Performance Regulation
Suppose that both the rancher and the regulator observe an imperfect measure of
how the rancher’s choices of e1 and e2 influence ecological health:
P (e1, e2, η1, η2) = (φ11 + φ12η1) e1 + (φ21 + φ22η2) e2, (3.28)
where ηi (i = 1, 2) is a random variable distributed over the interval [−η′i, η′i] with
E (ηi) = 0 and V ar (ηi) = σ
2
ηi
. The rancher observes the realizations of random
variables η1 and η2 prior to choosing e1 and e2. In contrast, the regulator does not learn
the realizations of these random variables. It is further assumed that Corr (εi, ηi) > 0
for i = 1, 2. Note that, similarly to the effect of input ei on the social value of the
public good, the variance of P is increasing in e1 and e2. It is assumed that the
performance measure P is verifiable so that it can be a part of a regulatory mechanism.
We consider a linear incentive contract of the form α + βP, where α is a lump-sum
transfer between the regulator and the firm (the base payment) and β is the piece rate
per unit of the performance measure P (the power of the incentive contract).21 We
call this regulatory instrument performance regulation. We focus on the case where
β ≥ 0. Because there are no restrictions on the sign of P (·) and the units of the
performance measure are chosen by the regulator, this assumption does not reduce
the generality of our results.
Before turning to the formal analysis note that performance regulation has a key
advantage over the other two instruments in that it provides the rancher with incen-
tives to respond to private information about η1 and η2.
22 When random variables
η1 and η2 are correlated with random variables ε1 and ε2, respectively, performance
21The use of a linear incentive contract has the following justification. First, for a principal-agent
framework very similar to the one in the present paper, Edmans and Gabaix (2010) demonstrate that
the optimal contract is linear. Second, the use of a linear incentive contract considerably simplifies
the solution, comparative statics results, and their interpretations.
22It is reasonable to expect that in many instances the regulator will be better informed than
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regulation gives the rancher the incentives and flexibility to adjust his choice of inputs
based on his private knowledge of ranch-level ecological conditions and the effect of
the inputs on ecosystem health. As we formally show below, the benefit of giving
the rancher this flexibility is increasing in the accuracy of the performance measure
(as measured by its distortion Corr (εi, ηi) , i = 1, 2) and the value of the rancher’s
private information V ar (Ve1) and V ar (Ve2) and decreasing in the noisiness of the
performance measure V ar (Pei) , (i = 1, 2).
23 Note that performance regulation in-
fluences the rancher’s choices of both the observed input, e1, and the unobserved
input, e2. This way, performance regulation in the model reflects the application of
performance-based approaches on public rangelands, which are as much about how
grazing is conducted (e.g., rotational grazing, keeping cattle out of riparian areas) as
they are about influencing AUM decisions.
The rancher’s optimization problem under performance regulation is given by
max
e1,e2
[π (e1, e2) + α + βP (e1, e2, η1, η2)] . (3.29)
the rancher about certain aspects of the underlying ecological processes on the allotment. While
this may be true, the regulator has no incentive to keep this information from the rancher as both
parties benefit from improved rangeland health. Indeed, information campaigns aimed at improving
rancher understanding of rangeland ecology are an important component of FLMA policies. These
campaigns often focus on invasive grasses, noxious weeds, soil erosion, and best practices in land
management. In contrast, the rancher has no incentive to share his private information with the
regulator.
23In reality, the rancher may also have private information about the opportunity costs of his
unobserved effort. The implicit assumption in our analysis, therefore, is that the variation in the
opportunity costs of unobserved effort is of secondary importance relative to the variation in how
the rancher’s input choices impact ecosystem health. Our justification of this assumption relies on
the observation that the rangeland ecological conditions vary significantly while rancher production
technology is relatively homogeneous across the western United States.
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The rancher’s optimal choice of inputs is given by
epi (β, ηi) =
 0, if θi + β (φi1 + φi2ηi) ≤ wiθi−wi+β(φi1+φi2ηi)
2γi
, otherwise
for i = 1, 2. (3.30)
Given the rancher’s choices ep1 (β, η1) and e
p
2 (β, η2), the regulator’s optimization
problem can be written as
max
α,β
E [π (ep1 (β, η1) , e
p
2 (β, η2)) + V (e
p
1 (β, η1) , e
p
2 (β, η2) , ε1, ε2)] (3.31)
subject to the regulator’s budget constraint
B ≥ α + βE [P (ep1 (β, η1) , e
p
2 (β, η2))] (3.32)
and the rancher’s participation constraint
E [π (ep1 (β, η1) , e
p
2 (β, η2)) + βP (e
p
1 (β, η1) , e
p
2 (β, η2))] + α ≥ 0. (3.33)
Combining these constraints, we can re-write this optimization problem as
max
β
E [π (ep1 (β, η1) , e
p
2 (β, η2)) + V (e
p
1 (β, η1) , e
p
2 (β, η2) , ε1, ε2)] (3.34)
subject to E [π (ep1 (β, η1) , e
p
2 (β, η2))] +B ≥ 0.
In what follows, we focus on the scenarios where the regulator’s optimal choice of β is
such that the rancher uses positive quantities of e1 and e2 for all realizations of η1 and
η2, i.e., e
p
1 (β, η1) > 0 for all η1 ∈ [−η′1, η′1] and e
p
2 (β, η2) > 0 for all η2 ∈ [−η′2, η′2].24
The algorithm for identifying the optimal solution to the optimization problem
(3.34) is similar to that in the two preceding sections. Let βp denote the solution to





































is suffi cient for ePi (β, ηi) > 0 (i = 1, 2)
for all ηi ∈ [−η′i, η′i] .
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By concavity of the objective function in (3.34) and the form of the constraint in
(3.34), the regulator’s constraint is binding at the optimum if and only if βp ≥ βp (B).
Using the expression for βp and βp (B) , we obtain that βp ≥ βp (B) if and only if





2 + V ar (Pei)
4γi
}
(βp)2 − π (enr1 , enr2 ) . (3.37)
The optimal performance bonus and the resulting choice of input ei (i = 1, 2) are
thus given, respectively, by
βp (B) and epi (ηi, B) =
θi − wi + βp (B) (φi1 + φi2ηi)
2γi
, if B ≤ Bp (3.38)
and
βp and epi (ηi) =
θi − wi + βp (φi1 + φi2ηi)
2γi
, otherwise. (3.39)
A number of standard results follow from the expression for βp.25 First, the power
of the incentive scheme is determined by the expected marginal social value of the
rancher’s effort |E (Vei)| (i = 1, 2), irrespective of whether input ei is detrimental
(E (Vei) < 0) or beneficial (E (Vei) > 0) to ecosystem health. Second, note that
Corr (Pei , Vei) = Corr (εi, ηi) captures the level of distortion in the performance
measure. It follows from the expression for βp that the less distorted the performance
measure (the larger Corr (εi, ηi)) the more valuable it is in providing incentives to
the rancher. As a result, the power of the incentive mechanism is increasing in both
Corr (ε1, η1) and Corr (ε2, η2). Third, observe that V ar (Pei) captures the noisiness
25The expression for the optimal performance regulation when the budget constraint is slack, βp,
is analogous to the expression for the optimal power of an incentive contract in Baker (1992).
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of the performance measure. An increase in the noisiness of the performance measure
decreases its value to the regulator for providing incentives to the rancher. As a
result, the regulator will offer a lower-powered incentive scheme under a relatively
noisy performance measure. Finally, the power of the incentive scheme is increasing in
the variances of the expected marginal social values of the rancher’s efforts, V ar (Ve1)
and V ar (Ve2) , which measure the value of the rancher’s private information about
the effect of his inputs on ecosystem health.
When the constraint in (3.34) is binding, the optimal piece rate per unit of the
performance measure, βp (B), is determined by the regulator’s ability to fund regu-
lation, which is a function of her exogenous budget, B, and the rents from ranching
without regulation, F (enr1 , e
nr
2 )− w1enr1 − w2enr2 . When the expected bonus payment
is positive, i.e., E [βp (B)P (ep1 (η1, B) , e
p
2 (η2, B))] > 0, higher rents from ranching
without regulation allow the regulator to fund a larger βp (B) by transferring less
money to the rancher (smaller α > 0) without violating the rancher’s participation
constraint. Similarly, when E [βp (B)P (ep1 (η1, B) , e
p
2 (η2, B))] < 0, higher rents from
ranching without regulation allow the regulator to impose a larger βp (B) without
violating the rancher’s participation constraint.












(βp)2 − [βp − βp (B)]2
}













When the budget constraint is not binding, the extent to which the performance
regulation improves welfare is determined by the same factors that determine the
power of the incentive scheme; the expected social welfare is increasing in the ex-
pected marginal social values of the rancher’s inputs |E (Vei)|, decreasing in the level
of distortions of the performance measure (relatively small values of Corr (εi, ηi)),
decreasing in the noisiness of the performance measure, V ar (Pei), and increasing in
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the variance of the expected marginal social values of the rancher’s inputs, V ar (Vei).
Importantly, the quality of the performance measure is a critical determinant of the
benefits of performance regulation. When the performance measure provides a good
signal of how the rancher’s actions influence ecosystem health (low distortion and
noisiness), the performance regulation can substantially increase the expected social
welfare.
Equation (3.40) reveals that the loss in expected social welfare from the binding
budget constraint is a function of the difference between the second-best optimal piece
rate, βp, and the level dictated by the regulator’s budget constraint, βp (B). This loss
is decreasing in the regulator’s budget, B, and the rents from ranching without reg-
ulation, π (enr1 , e
nr
2 ), which influence the regulator’s ability to fund regulation, and,
hence, βp (B), but do not affect βp. In addition, this ineffi ciency is increasing in the
expected marginal social values of the rancher’s efforts, |Eε (Vei)| = |µi1| (i = 1, 2),
which increase the expected social benefits from performance regulation, and, hence,
the desired level of βp, but do not affect βp (B), which is determined by the regu-
lator’s budget constraint. Note that the loss from the binding budget constraint is
independent of whether input ei (i = 1, 2) is detrimental (E (Vei) < 0) or beneficial
(E (Vei) > 0) to ecosystem health. Finally, the loss arising from the binding budget
constraint is larger when the performance measure provides a less distorted (high
Corr (εi, ηi), i = 1, 2) and less noisy (low V ar (Pei), i = 1, 2) signal of the influence
of the rancher’s input choices on ecosystem health. This follows from the fact that
the expected social benefits from performance regulation, and, conversely, the loss in
the expected social welfare from the binding budget constraint, are greater when the
performance measure provides a better quality signal.
Finally, when the performance measure is a perfect signal of the rancher’s input
choices (V (e1, e2, ε1, ε2) = P (e1, e2, η1, η2) for each e1 and e2) and the regulator’s
budget constraint does not bind (B ≥ Bp), the optimal performance regulation can
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achieve the social optimum given by (3.9). On the other hand, when the regulator’s
budget constraint is binding (B < Bp), the first-best outcome cannot be achieved
even under perfect monitoring.
3.6 Pairwise Comparisons of Regulatory Instru-
ments
We now turn to the analysis of the relative effi ciency of the input-mandate and cost-
sharing/taxation versus performance regulation. Recall that by construction of the
model — the rancher has no private information about how e1 and e2 influence his
private objective —the input mandate and cost-sharing/taxation are equivalent. We
demonstrate in Appendix I that when E (Ve1) > 0, the optimal input mandate (or,
equivalently, the optimal cost-sharing/taxation) dominates the optimal performance













It follows from this inequality that the effi ciency of the performance regulation relative
to the input mandate or cost-sharing/taxation is determined by the same factors
that determine the power of the incentive scheme. In particular, the performance
regulation will dominate the input mandate or cost-sharing/taxation when (i) the
performance measure is less distorted (large Corr (Pei , Vei) = Corr (εi, ηi), i = 1, 2),
(ii) the performance measure is less noisy (small V ar (Pei), i = 1, 2), and (iii) the
rancher’s information regarding the effect of his inputs on ecosystem health is more
valuable (large V ar (Vei), i = 1, 2). This finding also reveals that the regulator’s
budget constraint does not determine her choice between an input mandate or cost-
sharing/taxation and performance regulation when E (Ve1) > 0.
When E (Ve1) < 0, so that the regulator’s budget constraint is not relevant for the
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input mandate or cost-sharing/taxation, and condition (3.41) holds, the optimal input
mandate or cost-sharing/taxation will dominate the optimal performance regulation.
When E (Ve1) < 0 and (3.41) does not hold, however, (3.19) and (3.40) imply that the
optimal input mandate or cost-sharing/taxation dominates the optimal performance














Thus, in this case, the effi ciency of the performance regulation relative to the in-
put mandate or cost-sharing/taxation is determined by the factors that affect both
βp and βp (B), which are the the optimal piece rates under the non-binding and
binding budget constraints, respectively. It follows from (3.42) that the optimal per-
formance regulation is more likely to dominate the optimal input mandate or cost-
sharing/taxation when the regulator has a greater ability to fund regulation, which,
as was explained above, is determined by her exogenous budget, B, and the rents
from ranching without regulation, π (enr1 , e
nr
2 ).
Using the expressions for the expected social welfare under the three regulatory
instruments, we can determine how different parameters of the model affect the rel-
ative effi ciency of different regulatory instruments. Take, for example, the effect of
the expected marginal product of the unobservable input e2 on ecosystem health
E (Ve2) = µ21. Using (3.19) and (3.40), we obtain the effect of µ21 on the effi ciency of
the performance regulation relative to the input-mandate and cost-sharing/taxation:
∂ (Up − Um)
∂µ21
=













where βp and βp (B) are given by (3.35) and (3.36), respectively. It follows from
(3.43) that an increase in the magnitude of the expected marginal product of the
unobserved input on ecosystem health, |E (Ve2)| = |µ21|, will increase the expected
social welfare of the performance regulation relative to both the input mandate and
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cost-sharing/taxation. This follows from the fact that, out of the three regulatory
instruments considered in this article, only the performance regulation influences the
rancher’s choice of e2, and the regulator’s ability to influence the rancher’s choice of
e2 through performance regulation is more valuable when e2 is expected to have a
larger impact (in absolute terms) on ecosystem health.
3.7 Joint Use of Regulatory Instruments
3.7.1 Performance-Regulation and Input Mandate
When the input mandate and performance regulation are used jointly, the regulator
mandates the rancher’s choice of the observable input, denoted by e′1, and institutes
a payment to/from the rancher based on the ex post realization of the verifiable
performance measure, P. As before, this ex post payment is made according to the
linear incentive contract α+βP , where α is a lump-sum transfer between the regulator
and the rancher and β ≥ 0 is the piece rate per unit of P . It is also assumed that the
rancher has to pay a relatively high penalty if his use of e1 differs from e′1 and, as a
result, the rancher never finds it advantageous to violate the mandate.
The rancher’s optimization problem can be written as
max
e2
[π (e′1, e2) + α + βP (e
′
1, e2, η1, η2)] , (3.44)
which yields the rancher’s optimal choice of e2 :
epm2 (β, η2) =









E [π (e′1, e
pm




2 (β, η2) , ε1, ε2)] (3.46)
subject to E [π (e′1, e
pm
2 (β, η2))] +B ≥ 0.
In what follows, we focus on the scenarios where the regulator’s optimal choice of β is
such that the rancher’s choice of e2 is positive for all realizations of η2. Due to space
considerations we only report the results for the non-binding budget constraint case.
The solution to the unconstrained problem (3.46), denoted by epm1 and β
pm, is
given by
epm1 = E [e
∗
1 (ε1)] =























The expected social welfare under the joint use of the input mandate and performance
regulation is given by










It follows directly from (3.19) and (3.49) that using an input mandate and per-
formance regulation in tandem is unambiguously preferred to the use of the in-
put mandate in isolation. Similarly, it follows from (3.40) and (3.49) that the in-
put mandate improves the effi ciency of the performance regulation for large B (for
































where βp is defined by (3.35). This inequality reveals that the input mandate will
improve the effi ciency of the performance regulation when the expected marginal
product of the observable input, e1, on ecosystem health, |µ11| = |E (Ve1)|, is rel-
atively large, and when the performance measure provides a relatively poor signal
of influence of e1 on ecosystem health, i.e., high distortion (low Corr (ε1, η1)) and
noisiness (high V ar (Pe1)). Under these conditions, the input mandate improves wel-
fare by limiting the rancher’s ability to make socially ineffi cient choices of e1, while
performance regulation continues to motivate the rancher to pursue a more socially
desirable choice of e2.
The results in this section provide a rationale for the reliance of FLMAs on in-
put mandates (grazing restrictions) in conjunction with penalties/bonuses based on
observed performance. Our model predicts that this regulatory mix improves wel-
fare relative to the performance regulation alone when monitoring provides a poor
signal for how livestock grazing influences ecological health. Indeed, several studies
have documented the diffi culties associated with monitoring the relationship between
livestock grazing and rangeland health. For example, Holechek (1988) describes the
challenges to setting appropriate grazing restrictions for a public land allotment due
to heterogeneity in vegetation, soil type, slope, and distance to water, all of which
lead to non-uniform forage utilization by livestock across an allotment.
3.7.2 Performance Regulation and Cost-Sharing
When cost-sharing/taxation and performance regulation are used jointly, the regula-
tor subsidizes (cost-shares) or taxes the rancher’s use of the observable input, e1, and
mandates a payment based on the ex post realization of the verifiable performance
measure, P . As before, the cost of input e1 incurred by the rancher is (1 − s)w1e1,
while the cost borne by the regulator is sw1e1. The ex post payment is made accord-
ing to the linear incentive contract α+ βP , where α is a lump-sum transfer between
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the regulator and the firm and β ≥ 0 is the piece rate per unit of P .
The rancher’s optimization problem can be written as
max
e1,e2
[F (e1, e2)− (1− s)w1e1 − w2e2 + α + βP (e1, e2, η1, η2)] (3.51)
The rancher’s optimal choice of inputs is given by
epc1 (s, β, η1) =




epc2 (β, η2) =




Given the rancher’s choices epc1 (s, β, η1) and e
pc
2 (β, η2), the regulator’s optimization
problem can be written as:
max
s,β
E [π (epc1 (s, β, η1) , e
pc
2 (β, η2)) + V (e
pc
1 (s, β, η1) , e
pc
2 (β, η2) , ε1, ε2)] (3.53)
subject to B + E
 F (epc1 (s, β, η1) , epc2 (β, η2))




In what follows, we consider the scenario where the regulator’s optimal choices of
s and β are such that θ1 + β (φ11 + φ12η1) > (1 − c)w1 for all η1 ∈ [−η′1, η′1] and
θ2 + β (φ21 + φ22η2) > w2 for all η2 ∈ [−η′2, η′2]. These assumptions ensure that
epc1 (s, β, η1) > 0 for all η1 ∈ [−η′1, η′1] and e
pc
2 (β, η2) > 0 for all η2 ∈ [−η′2, η′2]. We
also restrict our focus in the remainder of this section to the case where the regulator’s
budget constraint does not bind.





[E (Ve1)− βpcE (Pe1)] =
1
w1




















The expected social welfare under the optimal joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and
performance regulation is given by

















As expected, the optimal joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and performance reg-
ulation unambiguously improves welfare over both cost-sharing/taxation and perfor-
mance regulation in isolation. The improvement in welfare stems from the fact that
cost-sharing/taxation improves welfare by bringing the use of the observable input,
e1, in line with its marginal social costs/marginal social benefits while still giving the
rancher flexibility to use his private knowledge of the ranch-level ecological conditions
when making his input choices. Under performance regulation alone, the regulator
is restricted to offer the same incentive β for both inputs since there is only a single
performance measure. An addition of cost-sharing to performance regulation allows
the regulator to offer differing incentives for the use of the two inputs.
From (3.49) and (3.56), the joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and performance
regulation will dominate the joint use of an input mandate and performance regulation
when the performance measure provides a relatively good signal of the influence of the
observable input, e1, on ecosystem health (i.e., low distortion (high Corr (ε1, η1)) and
noisiness (low V ar (Pei))). The joint use of cost-sharing/taxation and performance
regulation has the advantage of providing the rancher with incentives to use his private
knowledge of ranch-level ecological conditions when choosing e1. This advantage,
however, only improves welfare relative to the joint use of an input mandate and
performance regulation when the performance measure provides a good signal of e1’s
influence on ecosystem health. When the performance measure provides a poor signal,
the joint use of an input mandate and performance regulation dominates by fixing
the rancher’s choice of e1 at the ex ante social optimum, E [e∗1 (ε1)].
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3.8 Discussion
We have developed a theoretical model of optimal regulation by a budget-constrained
regulator under asymmetric information, moral hazard, and imperfect monitoring.
We used the model to evaluate the relative effi ciency of three prominent regulatory
instruments on public rangelands: input mandates, cost-sharing/taxation, and per-
formance regulation. The model extends the received literature by presenting an
informational and institutional environment that closely resembles the actual regu-
lation of ranching on public rangeland and allows for the effi ciency of these three
regulatory instruments to be evaluated and compared.
Our analysis yields a number of results about the relative effi ciency of the three reg-
ulatory instruments. First, we find that both an input mandate and cost-sharing/taxation
improve welfare by bringing the use of observable inputs in line with their marginal
social costs/social benefits. In addition, given the information structure of our model
—the rancher has no private information about how his input choices influence ranch
profits —the input mandate and cost-sharing/taxation are equivalent when they are
not used in combination with performance regulation.
Second, we find that performance regulation improves social welfare when the
performance measure is a suffi ciently accurate signal of how the rancher’s activities
influence ecosystem health. As one would expect, the optimal performance regula-
tion under perfect monitoring achieves the first-best outcome as long as the budget
constraint is non-binding. We find that performance regulation has two main ad-
vantages over an input mandate and cost-sharing/taxation. First, in contrast to an
input mandate or cost-sharing/taxation, performance regulation allows the regulator
to influence the rancher’s unobservable inputs (e.g., grazing management to reduce
the ecological harm of livestock grazing). This advantage of performance regulation
is greater when the unobserved inputs have a larger influence, either positive or neg-
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ative, on rangeland ecological health. Second, also in contrast to an input mandate
or cost-sharing/taxation, performance regulation gives the rancher the incentives and
flexibility to use his private knowledge of ranch-level ecological conditions when mak-
ing his input choices. Given the potential for considerable heterogeneity of range
conditions even within small geographic areas, this is an important benefit for the
regulation of ranching on public land.
Third, we identify two scenarios where an optimal input mandate or cost-sharing/taxation
dominates performance regulation. First, due to the diffi culties of monitoring changes
in rangeland health on each ranch, FLMAs often have to base regulation on a very
distorted or noisy signal of how the rancher’s activities have influenced ecosystem
health. Under these circumstances, we find that performance regulation can be dom-
inated by an optimal input mandate or cost-sharing/taxation. Second, an optimal
input mandate or cost-sharing/taxation can dominate performance regulation when
the regulator faces a relatively strict budget constraint so that she is limited in her
ability to elicit optimal input use through performance regulation.
Finally, we find that when the performance measure is relatively uninformative,
performance regulation in conjunction with an input mandate can dominate either
performance regulation alone or performance regulation in combination with cost-
sharing. This result provides a rationale for the reliance of budget-constrained FLMAs
on input mandates (i.e., grazing restrictions) in conjunction with penalties/bonuses
based on observed performance on public rangelands.
An immediate and important extension of the analysis in this article is a determi-
nation of the optimal regulatory scheme based on the observable input and the per-
formance measure in a framework where non-linear incentive contracts are allowed.
Such a regulatory scheme would undoubtedly improve welfare over the regulatory
instruments used in practice and considered in this article, and would provide in-
sight into how existing regulations on public rangelands could be improved given the
205
informational and institutional constraints on effi cient regulation faced by FLMAs.
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Appendix A
Consumption Spreading Across Household
Members
This appendix demonstrates that given the assumptions on household preferences
in both the model of supply-side NBG presented in Chapter 1.4 and in the model
of demand-side NBG presented in Chapter 1.7.1, household j maximizes utility by
spreading consumption evenly across all of its members.
A.1 Homothetic Preferences
This section of the appendix demonstrates that given the assumptions on household
preferences in the model presented in Chapter 1.4, household j maximizes utility by
spreading consumption evenly across all of its members.
To begin, the utility of household member h at time t is given by










where YhjM(t) and YhjS(t) are household member h’s consumption ofM - and S-sector
output at time t. For given levels of total household consumption ofM - and S-sector
output at time t, ŶjM(t) and ŶjS(t), household j chooses the consumption of M - and
S-sector output for each of its members to maximizes total household utility at time
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t (which is the the summation of the utilities of all members),
∑
h∈Lj(t)
u (YhjM(t), YhjS(t)) ,









YhjM(t) ≥ 0, YhjS(t) ≥ 0 for all h ∈ Lj (t) .
The first two constraint must bind at an optimum because the utility of every member
of household j is strictly increasing in both YhjM(t) and YhjS(t). The second and
























ε + (1− µ)YhjS(t)
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ε + (1− µ)YhjS(t)
ε−1
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Because the objective function is a strictly concave and continuous function mapping
R2×lj(t) (an open convex set) into R and the constraint functions are both concave and
continuos functions mapping Rlj(t) (an open convex set) into R, and Slater’s condition
is satisfied, the first order conditions are both necessary and suffi cient to identify an
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unique optimal solution (Sundaram 1996, p. 187-188).1
The first order conditions imply that each household member consumes the same






for h, h′ ∈ Lj (t) . (A.4)




























for all h′ ∈ Lj (t). That is, (A.3) and (A.4) imply that the ratio of M -sector and
S-sector output that is the same for each household member at time t and equal to
the ratio of M -sector and S-sector output for the entire household at time t.



















 for all h ∈ Lj (t) .
These two equations demonstrated that for given levels of total household consump-
tion ofM - and S-sector output, household j’s maximizes utility at time t by choosing
identical levels of YhjM(t) and YhjS(t) for each of its members. That is, household j
maximizes utility at time t by spreading consumption evenly across all of its members.
1Slater’s condition is satisfied becuase there exists a vector of consumption of M - and S-sector
output for each member for household j in R2×lj(t) such that ŶjM (t) −
∑
i∈Lj(t)




YijS(t) > 0 (Sundaram 1996, p. 188-89). For example, if YijM (t) = 0 and YijS(t) = 0
for all i ∈ Lj (t) the Slater’s condition is satisfied.
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A.2 Non-Homothetic Preferences
This section of the appendix demonstrates that given the assumptions on household
preferences in Chapter 1.7.1, household j maximizes utility by spreading consumption
evenly across all of its members.
To begin, the utility of household member h at time t is given by





where YhjM(t) and YhjS(t) are household member h’s consumption ofM - and S-sector
output at time t. For given levels of total household consumption ofM - and S-sector
output at time t, ŶjM(t) and ŶjS(t), household j chooses the consumption of M - and
S-sector output for each of its members to maximizes total household utility at time
t (which is the the summation of the utilities of all members),
∑
h∈Lj(t)
u (YhjM(t), YhjS(t)) ,









YhjM(t) ≥ 0, YhjS(t) ≥ 0 for all h ∈ Lj (t) .
The first two constraint must bind at an optimum because the utility of every member
of household j is strictly increasing in both YhjM(t) and YhjS(t). The second and





for P = M,S and for all h ∈ Lj (t) (i.e., because the Inada conditions hold for every



































Because the objective function is a strictly concave and continuous function mapping
R2×lj(t) (an open convex set) into R and the constraint functions are both concave and
continuos functions mapping Rlj(t) (an open convex set) into R, and, as above, Slater’s
condition is satisfied, the first order conditions are both necessary and suffi cient to
identify an unique optimal solution (Sundaram 1996, p. 187-188).2




+ γ and YhjS(t) =
1− µ
ξjS(t)
for h ∈ Lj (t) .
That is, the first order conditions imply that given levels of total household consump-
tion ofM - and S-sector output, household j’s maximizes utility at time t by choosing
identical levels of YhjM(t) and YhjS(t) for each of its members. That is, household j
maximizes utility at time t by spreading consumption evenly across all of its members.
2As in the first section of this Appendix, Slater’s condition is satisfied becuase there exists a




YijM (t) > 0 and ŶjS(t)−
∑
i∈Lj(t)
YijS(t) > 0 (Sundaram 1996, p. 188-89).
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Appendix B
Household j’s Utility Maximization
B.1 Household j’s Utility Maximization Problem:
Supply-Side Non-Balanced Growth
This appendix presents household j’s utility maximization problem at time t and
derives (1.4) and (1.5). Household j’s utility maximization problem at time t is
max
YjM (t),YjS(t)
U (YjM(t), YjS(t); lj (t)) (B.1)
s.t. Ej(t)− YjM(t)− p(t)YjS(t) ≥ 0, YjM(t) ≥ 0, and YjS(t) ≥ 0,
where Ej(t) is household j’s expenditure at time t, p (t) is the price of S-sector output
at time t with the price of M -sector output normalized to 1. The first constraint in
(B.1) must bind at an optimum because household j’s utility is strictly increasing in





= ∞ for P = M,S. As such, household


























































} = 0. (B.3)
Because (B.2) is strictly concave in YjM(t) on R++ (a non-empty convex set), the
unique solution to (B.3) is the unique optimal solution to household j’s utility maxi-
mization problem at time t (Sundaram 1996, p. 186).
The first-order condition implies that household j’s utility-maximizing demands


















which correspond to the expressions in (1.5)and that household j’s indirect utility
function at time t is










which is the expression in (1.4).
B.2 Household j’s Utility Maximization Problem:
Non-Homothetic Preferences
This appendix presents household j’s utility maximization problem at time t when
household preferences are non-homothetic, i.e., for the case of demand-side NBG, and
derives (1.79) and (1.78) from Chapter 1.7.1. Given the assumptions that YjM(t) > 0
and YjS(t) > 0 for all t, household j’s utility maximization problem at time t is
max
YjM (t),YjS(t)
U (YjM(t), YjS(t), lj (t)) (B.4)
s.t. Ej(t)− YjM (t)− p(t)YjS (t) ≥ 0.
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As in Chapter 1, the first constraint in Equation B.4 must bind at an optimum because
household j’s utility is strictly increasing in both YjM(t) and YjS(t) on R2+. As such,






























] = 0. (B.6)
Because Equation B.5 is strictly concave in YjM(t) on R++ (a non-empty convex set),
the unique solution to Equation B.6 is the unique optimal solution to household j’s
utility maximization problem at time t (Sundaram 1996, p. 186).
The first-order condition implies that household j’s utility maximizing demands
for M -sector output and S-sector output at time t are,
YjM(t) = µEj(t) + (1− µ)γlj (t) and YjS(t) = (Ej(t)− γlj (t))(1− µ)p(t)−1,
which is (1.79) from Chapter 1.7.1, and that household j’s indirect utility function at
time t is
Vj (t) = lj (t) ln
[
µµ (1− µ)(1−µ) (Ej(t)− γlj (t))p(t)µ−1
]
,
which is (1.78) from Chapter 1.7.1.
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Appendix C
Aggregation of Constant Returns to Scale
Production Functions
This appendix provides a formal proof that when all firms in a sector operate with
identical constant returns to scale production technologies, sectoral production can
be represented by an aggregate production function. This appendix uses results from
Green (1964).
Green (1964, Theorem 10) proves that when the necessary condition for an optimal
distribution of factors among firms that the marginal rate of substitution between any
two inputs must be the same for any two firms is satisfied, a suffi cient condition for
consistent aggregation of individual production functions is that:
1. For each firm, expansion paths are straight lines through their origins.
2. For a given set of marginal rates of substitution, the straight line expansion
paths for all firms are parallel.
It is left to demonstrate that these conditions hold when all firms operate with
identical constant returns to scale production technologies.
For the case where all firms have identical constant return to scale production













for all firms i, j and all inputs s, r, where xis is firm i’s sth input, i = 1, ..,m and s =
1, ..., /n, and f (.) is the common constant returns to scale production function shared
by all firms. Given that f (.) is homogeneous of degree one, ∂f(.)
∂xis
, j = 1, 2, ..., n, is








































From (C.1), when all firms have identical constant return to scale production
technologies, the marginal rate of substitution between inputs depends only on the
ratios between inputs. This implies that the ratio of inputs will be the same for
all levels of firm output; i.e., that each firm’s expansion paths are straight lines.
Moreover, homogeneity of degree one implies that all expansion paths go through the
origin, i.e., f (0, 0, ..., 0) = 0 × f (xi1, xi2, ..., xin) = 0.
In addition, given that the marginal rate of substitution between any two inputs
must be the same for any two firms, these straight line expansion paths for all firms
are parallel. This means that the optimal ratios of inputs will be the same for all
firms and equal to the ratios of the totals in the sector.
Hence, when all firms have identical constant return to scale production technolo-
gies, the expansion paths for all firms are parallel straight lines through their origins,
so that consistent aggregation is possible and sectoral production can be represented
by an aggregate production function.
To see that it is indeed the case that sectoral production can be represented by an
aggregate production function when all firms have identical constant return to scale
production technologies, note that the condition the optimal ratios of inputs will be
the same for all firms and equal to the ratios of the totals in the economy implies
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that firm i’s use of input xis depends only on firm i’s output, yi, and the ratios of the
totals in the sector,x1
xs
, ., 1, ., xn
xs
, where xs =
m∑
i=1
xis is the total use of input s in the
sector; i.e.,
















































This appendix describes how the cost-minimizing input choices for M -sector firms in
region k at time t are derived in two stages.1 In the first stage, M -sector firms in











 1α − Īk ≥ 0 and qi (t) ≥ 0, i ∈M (t) .
The first constraint in (D.1) will bind at an optimum because the cost of purchasing a
given quantity of Ik (t) is strictly increasing in qik(t) for all i = 1, ..., N (t) (i.e., because











= ∞ for all i = 1, ..., N (t). Given










 1α − Īk

1Green (1964, Theorem 4) proves that a necessary and suffi cient condition for (i) the consistency
of the two-stage maximization (minimization) procedure and (ii) for there to be a price index, Pk (t),
such that Pk (t) Ik (t) =
∑
i∈M(t)
pik (t) qik(t), is for each quantity index —i.e., Ik (t) and LkM (t) —to
be homogeneous of degree one, which is the case for M -sector firms in region k at time t.
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where ι (t) is the Lagrangean multiplier. The first-order conditions are










 1α − Īk = 0. (D.3)
Because the objective function,
∑
i∈M(t)
pik (t) qik(t), is a convex and continuous function






Īk , is a concave and continuous function mapping RN(t) (an open convex set) into R,
and Slater’s condition is satisfied, the first-order conditions in (D.2) and (D.3) are
both necessary and suffi cient to identify the optimal solution to (D.1) (Sundaram,
1996, p. 187-188).2 ,3
(D.2) implies that the cost-minimizing demands for intermediate inputs by M -




















pik (t) qik(t) is a continuous function mapping RN(t) (an open convex set) into
R, a suffi cient condition for convexity is for the Hessian of
∑
i∈M(t)
pik (t) qik(t) to be a symmetric
positive semi-definite matrix for every vector of intermediate inputs in RN(t) (Sundaram 1996, p.
184). The Hessian of
∑
i∈M(t)
pik (t) qik(t) is an N (t) × N (t) matrix of zeros for every vector of
intermediate inputs in RN(t), which is symmetric and positive semi-definite. As was mentioned in





 1α −Īk is a concave function
(see Dixit and Stiglitz 1977).
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for all i, i′ ∈M (t) .
Substituting this expression for qik(t) into (D.3) and rearranging terms gives the fol-
lowing expression for the cost-minimizing demand for firm i′’s variety of intermediate
input by M -sector firms in region k:










Substituting this expression into (D.1) implies that the minimum cost of purchasing
Īk for M -sector firms in region k at time t can be expressed as
∑
i′∈M(t)
pi′k (t) qi′k(t) =
∑
i′∈M(t)




























α−1α = ĪkPk (t) .






α−1α is a price index that gives the minimum
cost for M -sector firms in region k of purchasing a unit of Ik (t) at time t.
In the second stage of the cost-minimization problem, M -sector firms in region k
choose Ik (t) and LkM (t) to minimize the cost of producing a given level of output.




Pk (t) Ik (t) + wk (t)LkM (t) (D.6)
s.t. Ik (t)
α LkM (t)
1−α − ȲkM ≥ 0, Ik (t) ≥ 0, and LkM (t) ≥ 0.
The first constraint in (D.1) will bind at an optimum because the cost of purchasing
a given quantity of YkM (t) is strictly increasing in Ik (t) and LkM (t) (that is, because
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Pk (t) > 0 and wk (t) > 0). The second and third constraints will be slack at an
optimum because lim
Ik(t)→0
∂YkM (t) /∂Ik(t) = ∞ and lim
LkM (t)→0
∂YkM (t) /∂LkM (t) = ∞.
As such, the Lagrangean for the second stage of the cost-minimization problem is







where ς (t) is the Lagrangean multiplier. The first-order conditions are
Pk (t)− ς (t)αIk (t)α−1 LkM (t)1−α = 0 (D.7)




1−α − ȲkM = 0. (D.9)
Because the objective function, Pk (t) Ik (t) + wk (t)LkM (t), is a convex and con-
tinuous function mapping R2 (an open convex set) into R, the constraint function,
Ik (t)
α LkM (t)
1−α − ȲkM , is a concave and continuos function mapping R2 (an open
convex set) into R, and Slater’s condition is satisfied, the first-order conditions in
(D.7) to (D.9) are both necessary and suffi cient to identify the optimal solution to
(D.6) (Sundaram, 1996, p. 187-188).4 ,5




1−α − ȲkM > 0 (Sundaram 1996, p. 188-89). For example, if Ik (t) = ȲkM + 1 and
LkM (t) = ȲkM + 1 then Ik (t)
α
LkM (t)
1−α − ȲkM = 1 > 0 .
5Given that Pk (t) Ik (t) + wk (t)LkM (t) is a continuous function mapping R2 (an open convex
set) into R, a suffi cient condition for convexity is for the Hessian of Pk (t) Ik (t) + wk (t)LkM (t)
to be positive semi-definite for every vector of Ik (t) and LkM (t) in R2 (Sundaram 1996, p. 184).
The Hessian of Pk (t) Ik (t) +wk (t)LkM (t) is an 2× 2 matrix of zeros for every vector of Ik (t) and
LkM (t) in R2, which is positive semi-definite.
Similarly, given that Ik (t)
α
LkM (t)
1−α − ȲkM is a continuous function mapping R2 (an open
convex set) into R, a suffi cient condition for concavity is for the Hessian of Ik (t)α LkM (t)1−α− ȲkM
to be negative semi-definite for every vector of Ik (t) and LkM (t) in R2 (Sundaram 1996, p. 184).
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The first-order conditions in (D.7) to (D.9) give the following expressions for the
cost-minimizing input demands:


















and for the cost function for the M -sector in region k at time t:









From (D.4), (D.5), and (D.10), the demands for firm ik’s variety of intermediate input
by M -sector firms in region k and region l at time t are


















wl (t)LlM (t)Pl (t)
−α
a−1 .
(D.10), (D.11), and (D.12) are (1.17), (1.18), and (1.21) in Section 1.4.2.
The Hessian of Ik (t)
α
LkM (t)
1−α−ȲkM is a symmetric 2×2 matrix where the first naturally ordered
principal minors are α (α− 1) Ik (t)α−2 LkM (t)1−α ≤ 0 and α (α− 1) Ik (t)α LkM (t)−α−1 ≤ 0, and
the determinant of the second naturally ordered principal minor equals 0 for every Ik (t) ≥ 0 and
LkM (t) ≥ 0. Hence, the Hessian of Ik (t)α LkM (t)1−α − ȲkM is negative semi-definite.
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Appendix E
Existence of a Walrasian Equilibrium
In this appendix, the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium for the economies in Chap-
ters 1.4 and 1.7.1 is established in two steps. First, it is demonstrated that aWalrasian
quasiequilibrium exists for the economies in Chapters 1.4 and 1.7.1. Second, it is
demonstrated that the "cheaper consumption" condition is satisfied in any Walrasian
quasiequilibrium for the economies in Chapters 1.4 and 1.7.1. When the cheaper
consumption condition is satisfied, a Walrasian quasiequilibrium is also a Walrasian
equilibrium. Hence, demonstrating that a Walrasian quasiequilibrium exists and that
the cheaper consumption condition is satisfied establishes that a Walrasian equilib-
rium exists for the economies in Chapters 1.4 and 1.7.1. This method for establishing
the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium follows Propositions 17.BB.1 and 17.BB.2
from Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995).
E.1 Definitions
Before getting started, it is necessary to define the consumption and production sets
for the economies in Chapters 1.4 and 1.7.1 and give a formal definition for aWalrasian
equilibrium. The consumption and production sets are identical for the economies in
both chapters. The proof of the existence of an equilibrium offered in this appendix
therefore holds for both chapters.
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The consumption set for household j at time t is
Xj (t) = R2+ =
{
(YjM (t) , YjS (t)) ∈ R2
∣∣YjM (t) ≥ 0 and YjS (t) ≥ 0} .
The production sets for the economy in Chapters 1.4 and 1.7.1 are as follows. When
defining production sets, the convention that positive numbers denote outputs and
negative numbers denote inputs is used. The production set for theM -sector in region










LkM (t)1−α − YkM (t) ≥ 0,
LkM (t) ≥ 0, and qi (t) ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., N (t)
 .
The production set for the S-sector in region k at time t for Fk > 0 is
YkS (t) =
{
(YkS (t) ,−LkS (t))|LkS (t)β Fk1−β − YkS (t) ≥ 0 and LkS (t) ≥ 0
}
.
The production set for I-sector firm ik ∈Mk (t) at time t is
Yik(t) = {(Yik(t),−YikM(t))|YikM(t)− Yik(t) ≥ 0 and YikM(t) ≥ 0} ,
where, for the purposes of defining the production set, Yik(t) is the quantity of in-
termediate input produced by firm ik at time t, and YikM(t) ≥ 0 is the quantity of
M -sector output used in production by firm ik at time t. Finally, the production set
for I-sector innovation in region k at time t is
YkI(t) =
{(
Ṅk (t) ,−LkI (t)
)∣∣∣Ωk (t)LkI (t)− Ṅk (t) ≥ 0 and LkI (t) ≥ 0} .
Given these definitions of the consumption and production sets, an allocation for
the economy at time t is a specification of a consumption vector for each household
j = 1, ..., H, (YjM(t), YjS(t)) ∈ Xj (t), and a production vector for each firm/sector,(
YkM (t) ,−LkM , [−qik (t)]N(t)i=1
)
∈ YkM (t), (YkS (t) ,−LkS) ∈ YkS (t), (Yik(t),−YikM(t)) ∈
Yik(t), ik = 1, ..., Nk (t), and
(
Ṅk (t) ,−LkI (t)
)
∈ YkI(t) for k = a, b. An allocation
224
for the economy at time t is feasible if the market-clearing conditions for labor, YM (t),
YS (t), and qi(t), i = 1, ..., N (t), k = a, b, given in Chapter 1.4.2 hold.
An allocation and a price vector,
(
p (t) , r (t) , wb (t) , wa (t) , w
F
a (t) , w
F
b (t) , [pa(i, t)]
N(t)





is a Walrasian equilibrium if:
1. The production vectors maximize profits for each firm/sector.
2. Each household’s consumption vector maximizes their utility (i.e., is maximal
given for their preferences, j) on their budget set
{(YjM (t) , YjS (t)) ∈ Xj (t)|E (j, t)− YjM (t)− p (t)YjS (t) ≥ 0} .
3. The market-clearing conditions given in Chapter 1.4.2 hold.
It is clear from this definition that together, the static equilibrium conditions at
time t given in Chapter 1.5 defines a Walrasian equilibrium. That is, when the static
equilibrium conditions hold at time t, the allocation and price vector for the economy
ensure that firms maximize profits given their technologies, households maximize
utility given their budget constraints, and all good and factor markets clear.
E.2 Existence of a Walrasian Quasiequilibrium
This appendix will use the suffi cient conditions for a Walrasian quasiequilibrium to
exist for an economy given by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) in Proposition
17.BB.2. That is, it will be shown that a Walrasian quasiequilibrium exists for the
economies in Chapters 1.4 and 1.7.1 because the following conditions hold:
1. For every household j in the economy for all t:
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(a) its consumption set, Xj (t), is closed and convex. (The consumption set
for household j is Xj (t) = R2+ for all t, which is a convex and closed set.)
(b) its preference relation, j, is rational, continuous, locally non-satiated,
and convex preference relation defined on Xj (t) .
(c) Each household’s initial endowment of YjM(t) and YjS(t) is greater than or
equal to some element in its consumption set. (This condition is satisfied
for all households in Chapters 1.4 and 1.7.1 because each households initial
endowment of both YjM(t) and YjS(t) at time t is zero and (0, 0) ∈ Xj (t)
for all j = 1, ..., H. Recall that YjM(t) and YjS(t) are perishable.)
2. Every production set in the economy is closed, convex, includes the origin, and
satisfies the free-disposal property for all t.
3. The set of feasible allocations for the economy is compact for all t.
E.2.1 Preferences
In this section, it will be shown that household j’s preference relation is rational (com-
plete and transitive), continuous, locally non-satiated, and convex. That is, it will
be shown that household j’s preference relation satisfies 1.b. The existence of house-
hold j’s utility function at time t, U (YjM(t), YjS(t), lj (t)), implies that household j’s
preferences relation satisfies
x j y ⇔ U (x1, x2, lj (t)) ≥ U (y1, y2, lj (t)) ,
where x = (x1, x2) and y = (y1, y2) are bundles in household j’s consumption set, i.e.,
x, y ∈ Xj (t).
To begin, it will be established that household j’s preferences are complete and
transitive. First, that household j’s preferences are complete follows from the fact that
U (YjM(t), YjS(t), lj (t)) is continuous onXj (t), so that U (x1, x2, lj (t)) ≥ U (y1, y2, lj (t))
226
or U (y1, y2, lj (t)) ≥ U (x1, x2, lj (t)) (or both) for all x, y ∈ Xj (t). This implies that
x j y or y j x (or both) for all x, y ∈ Xj (t), i.e., that household j’s preferences
are complete. Second, household j’s preferences are transitive for all x, y, z ∈ Xj (t)
if x j y and y j z implies that x j z. For household j, x j y and y j z implies
that U (x1, x2, lj (t)) ≥ U (y1, y2, lj (t)) ≥ U (z1, z2, lj (t)), which in turn implies that
x j z. This establishes that household j’s preferences are transitive.
To establish that household j’s preference are continuous, it is suffi cient to demon-
strate that for all x ∈ Xj (t), the upper contour set {y ∈ Xj (t)| y  x} and the lower
contour set {y ∈ Xj (t)|x  y} are closed sets, i.e., include their boundaries. The up-
per contour set can be re-expressed as {y ∈ Xj (t)|U (y1, y2, lj (t)) ≥ U (x1, x2, lj (t))} ,
and the lower contour set can be re-expressed as {y ∈ Xj (t)|U (x1, x2, lj (t)) ≥ U (y1, y2, lj (t))}.
That the upper and lower contour sets are closed for all x ∈ Xj (t) follows from the
continuity of U (YjM(t), YjS(t), lj (t)) and from the fact that the upper and lower con-
tour sets are defined by weak inequalities.
In order to establish that household j’s preferences are locally non-satiated, it is
suffi cient to prove the stronger property that household j’s preferences are strongly
monotone. That household j’s preferences are strongly monotone follows from the
fact that U (YjM(t), YjS(t), lj (t)) is continuous and strictly increasing in both YjM (t)
and YjS (t) overXj (t). These properties of U (YjM(t), YjS(t), lj (t)) imply that if x ≥ y
and x 6= y (i.e., x1 > y1 or x2 > y2 or both), U (x1, x2, lj (t)) > U (y1, y2, lj (t)) and
x j y. This establishes that household j’s preferences are strongly monotone and,
hence, locally non-satiated.
Finally, household j’s preference are convex if for every x ∈ Xj (t) the upper con-
tour set {y ∈ Xj (t)| y  x} is convex. This upper contour set can be re-expressed as
{y ∈ Xj (t)|U (y1, y2, lj (t)) ≥ U (x1, x2, lj (t))}, which is a convex set by the concavity
of U (YjM(t), YjS(t), lj (t)).
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E.2.2 Production Sets
Now it must be shown that every production set in the economies in Chapters 1.4
and 1.7.1 is closed, convex, includes the origin, and satisfies the free-disposal prop-
erty. To begin, the production sets are closed because they are defined by weak
inequalities. The production sets are convex because they represent the intersec-
tion of upper contour sets of quasi-concave functions, which are convex. It is also
clear that the production sets include the origin (for example, (0, 0, 0) ∈ YkM (t))
and satisfy the free-disposal property (for example, if y = (y1, y2, y3) ∈ YkM (t) and




3) ≤ y, then y′ ∈ YkM (t)).
In addition, these production sets satisfy the no-free-lunch property (for example,
if y = (y1, y2, y3) ∈ YkM (t) and y ≥ 0, then y = (0, 0, 0)) and the irreversibility prop-
erty (for example, if y = (y1, y2, y3) ∈ YkM (t) and y 6= (0, 0, 0), then −y /∈ YkM (t)).
The no-free-lunch and irreversibility properties are important for the demonstration
that the set of feasible allocations is compact.
E.2.3 Set of Feasible Allocations is Compact
It is left to demonstrate that the set of feasible allocations is compact. To establish
this result, this appendix will use the suffi cient condition for the set of feasible alloca-
tions to be compact given by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) in Proposition
16.AA.1. That is, the set of feasible allocations is compact if the following hold:
1. Every Xj (t) for all t
(a) is closed (established above).
(b) is bounded below, i.e., no consumer can supply the market with an ar-
bitrary large amount of any good. (This condition holds in Chapters 1.4
and 1.7.1 because the initial endowments of YjM (t) and YjS (t) are zero for
every household and for all t.)
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(a) is convex. (The aggregate production set is convex as it is the sum of
convex sets.)
(b) admits the possibility of inaction. (This property holds for the aggregate
production set because it holds for each production set in the economy.)
(c) satisfies the no-free-lunch property. (This property also holds for the ag-
gregate production set because it holds for each production set in the
economy.)
(d) is irreversible. (Again, this property holds for the aggregate production
set because it holds for each production set in the economy.)
E.3 Cheaper Consumption
The previous section established the existence of a Walrasian quasiequilibrium for
the economies in Chapters 1.4 and 1.7.1. To establish that Walrasian quasiequilib-
ria are also Walrasian equilibria it is necessary to demonstrate that the "cheaper
consumption" condition is satisfied in any Walrasian quasiequilibrium. The cheaper
consumption condition for household j at time t is satisfied if there is x ∈ Xj (t) such
that x1 + p (t)x2 < E (j, t), where E (j, t) is household j’s expenditure at time t. The
cheaper consumption condition must hold for all households in the economy in any




= ∞ for P = M,S
implies that YjM (t) > 0 and YjS (t) > 0, and hence E (j, t) > 0, for all t. That
households can finance E (j, t) > 0 for all t follows from the fact that households have
positive labor income, w (t) lj (t), for all t.
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Appendix F
Proofs of Proposition 1 and Theorems 1 and 2
F.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. To being, (1.35) from Proposition 1 (i.e., that pikk(t) = pkk (t) = 1/α and
pikl(t) = pkl (t) = Γ/α for all ik ∈ Mk (t) and for all t) is a direct implication of
the conditions for profit-maximization for I-sector firms presented in Chapter 1.4.2.
Substituting these expressions for pkk (t) and pkl (t) into the expression for Pk (t) yields

















α−1α = α−1 (Nk (t) + Γ αa−1Nl (t))α−1α .
Furthermore, substituting this expression for Pk (t) into the expression for wk (t)
from (1.20) implies that when theM -sector is in production in region k at time t, the
equilibrium wage in region k is (1.37) from Proposition 1













The owners of the fixed factor in region k will set the rental rate for the fixed factor
at time t, wFk (t), so that S-sector firms have just enough incentive to remain in
operation, i.e., so that there are zero profits in the S-sector. If there were positive
profits in the S-sector, the owners of the fixed factor in region k could costlessly
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increase their income by increasing wFk (t). Substituting the expression for LkS (t)
from (1.26) into expression for S-sector profits in region k at time t from (1.24), and















Fk − wFk (t)Fk = 0. (F.1)
Rearranging (F.1) gives the expression for the rental rate for the fixed factor in region
k at time t in (1.38) from Proposition 1:







As each qik(t) enters M -sector production symmetrically and the price of each
qik(t) is fixed, M -sector firms in region k demand equal quantities of each interme-
diate input produced in region k and demand equal, but different, quantities of each
intermediate input produced in region l. This means that all I-sector firms in region
k face the same demand for their output, i.e., qikk(t) = qkk (t) and qikl(t) = qkl (t) for
all ik ∈Mk (t). Using (1.21), (1.36), and (1.37),
qkk(t) = α
−2




α−1LlM (t) for all ik ∈Mk (t) . (F.2)
These expressions for qkk (t) and qkl (t) imply that at time t, all I-sector firms in
region k produce








for all ik ∈Mk (t) ,
(F.3)
and, make profits equal to














for all ik ∈Mk (t) .
(F.4)
(F.3) and (F.4) are (1.41) and (1.42) from Proposition 1.
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In order to obtain an expression for the relative price of S-sector output, p (t),













Substituting this expression for the total demand for S-sector output and the ex-
pressions for S-sector employment in regions a and b from (1.26) into the S-sector

























This expression defines the relative price of S-sector output, p (t), implicitly in terms
of E (t), wa (t), and wb (t) when the economy is in static equilibrium.
The expression for the value of an I-sector firm in region k at time t (provide
I-sector innovation takes place in region k at time t) in (1.40) from Proposition 1
follows directly from the zero-profit condition in the I-sector, (1.30), and uses the
expressions for Ωk (t) from (1.27) and for wk (t) from (1.37).
Substituting the expressions for qkk (t) and qkl (t) from (F.2) into the expression




















The expression forM -sector employment in (1.43) from Proposition 1 can be obtained
from the M -sector market-clearing condition, (1.32), by using the expression for M -
sector production in region k at time t from (F.5) and the fact that, from (1.5), the
total demand for M -sector output at time t is
H∑
j=1











and, from the expressions for the quantity of intermediate inputs produced in regions












































= (1 + α) [wa (t)LaM (t) + wb (t)LbM (t)]













Rearranging (F.8) provides the expression for M -sector employment in (1.43) from
Proposition 1. The expression for S-sector employment when the economy is in
static equilibrium in (1.44) from Proposition 1 follows directly from the expression
for LkS (t), k = a, b, from (1.26). Similarly, the expression for total employment in I-
sector innovation when the economy is in static equilibrium in (1.45) from Proposition
1 follows directly from the market-clearing condition in the labor market, (1.31).
Substituting the expression for the expression for S-sector employment in region
k at time t from (1.26) into the expression for S-sector production in region k at
time t from (1.23) yields the expression for total production of S-sector when the
economy is in static equilibrium in (1.47) from Proposition 1. Finally, the expression
for output in I-sector innovation when the economy is in static equilibrium in (1.48)
from Proposition 1 is simply the restatement of (1.29) from Chapter 1.4.2.
F.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Theorem 1 is proven in three parts. First, it is shown that {λ∗M (t) , N∗a (t) /N (t)} =
{1, 1} is a stable spatial equilibrium and that all {λM (t) , Na (t) /N (t)} ∈ {(0.5, 1) , (0.5, 1)}
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are not spatial equilibria. This result is demonstrated in two steps. First, using (1.42),




λM (t) + Γ
α









a−1λM (t) + (1− λM (t))
]




The first step establishes that I-sector firms are more profitable in region a than
region b when region a has a larger concentration of M -sector labor. These higher
































N (t) = wb (t)⇒ λM (t) = 1.
The second step establishes that the wage paid to M -sector labor is higher region a
than region b when region a has a larger concentration of I-sector firms. This higher
wage will lead M -sector labor to concentrate itself in the region a.
These two steps establish that {λ∗M (t) , N∗a (t) /N (t)} = {1, 1} is a spatial equi-
librium in that no I-sector firm increase its profits and no M -sector worker can
increase their wage by moving between regions when {λ∗M (t) , N∗a (t) /N (t)} = {1, 1}.
{λ∗M (t) , N∗a (t) /N (t)} = {1, 1} is a stable spatial equilibrium because there exists a
bounded, convex set containing {1, 1}, given by {(1− 0.5, 1 + 0.5) , (1− 0.5, 1 + 0.5)}∩
{[0, 1] , [0, 1]} = {(0.5, 1], (0.5, 1]}, such that from any point {λM (t) , Na (t) /N (t)} ∈
{(0.5, 1], (0.5, 1]} , M -sector workers can increase their wage and I-sector firms can
increase their profits by moving to region a until {λ∗M (t) , N∗a (t) /N (t)} = {1, 1} is
restored as the spatial distributions of M -sector labor and I-sector firms. An imme-
diate corollary of this result is that no {λM (t) , Na (t) /N (t)} ∈ {(0.5, 1) , (0.5, 1)} is
a spatial equilibrium.
Second, identical arguments establish that {λ∗M (t) , N∗a (t) /N (t)} = {0, 0} is
a stable spatial equilibrium; that there exists a bounded, convex set containing
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{0, 0}, given by {[0, 0.5), [0, 0.5)}, such that from any point {λM (t) , Na (t) /N (t)} ∈
{[0, 0.5), [0, 0.5)}, M -sector workers can increase their wage and I-sector firms can
increase their profits by moving to region b until {λ∗M (t) , N∗a (t) /N (t)} = {0, 0} is
restored as the spatial distributions of M -sector labor and I-sector firms; and that
all {λM (t) , Na (t) /N (t)} ∈ {(0, 0.5) , (0, 0.5)} are not spatial equilibria.
Third, it is shown that {λ∗M (t) , N∗a (t) /N (t)} = {0.5, 0.5} is a spatial equilibrium.
This results is demonstrated in two steps. First,











which means that when λM (t) = 0.5, no I-sector firm can increase its profits by
moving between regions because the demand for its variety of intermediate input by
M -sector firms, which determines its profits, is the same in both regions. Second,
Na (t)
N (t)











which means that when Na (t) /N (t) = 0.5, no M -sector worker can increase their
wage by moving between regions. Taken together, these two steps imply that {λ∗M (t) , N∗a (t) /N (t)}
= {0.5, 0.5} is a spatial equilibrium. The first two parts of this proof establish that
{λ∗M (t) , N∗a (t) /N (t)} = {0.5, 0.5} is not a stable spatial equilibrium. This is because
any bounded, convex set containing {0.5, 0.5} defined by {(0.5− ρ, 0.5 + ρ) , (0.5− ρ, 0.5 + ρ)}∩
{[0, 1] , [0, 1]}, ρ > 0, will contain elements of the sets {[0, 0.5), [0, 0.5)} and {(0.5, 1], (0.5, 1]}.
As such, there does not exist a bounded, convex set containing {0.5, 0.5} defined
by {(0.5− ρ, 0.5 + ρ) , (0.5− ρ, 0.5 + ρ)} ∩ {[0, 1] , [0, 1]}, ρ > 0, such that from any
point in the set, M -sector workers and I-sector firms will change regions to restore
{λ∗M (t) , N∗a (t) /N (t)} = {0.5, 0.5} as the spatial distribution of M -sector labor and
I-sector firms.
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F.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Theorem 2 is proven in three steps. First, recall that the free-entry con-
dition in I-sector innovation means that entrepreneurs will develop new varieties of
intermediate inputs until the value of an I-sector firm, V (t), is equal to the cost of
developing a new variety at time t in the region with the lowest cost of development.
From (1.40), when the M -sector labor and I-sector firms are in spatial equilibrium
so that w (t) = wa (t) = wb (t),









where Ωa (t) = N (t) [λI (t) + η(1− λI (t))] and Ωb (t) = N (t) [ηλI (t) + (1− λI (t))]
are the marginal products of labor in I-sector innovation in regions a and b. That
λ∗I (t) = 1 is a stable spatial equilibrium and that all λI (t) ∈ (0.5, 1) are not spatial
equilibria follows from






⇒ λI (t) = 1.
λ∗I (t) = 1 is a spatial equilibrium because no firm in I-sector innovation can increase
their profits by moving between regions when λI (t) = 1. λ
∗
I (t) = 1 is a stable spatial
equilibrium because there exists a bounded, convex set containing λ∗I (t) = 1, given
by (1− 0.5, 1 + 0.5) ∩ [0, 1] = (0.5, 1], such that from any point in λI (t) ∈ (0.5, 1],
firms in I-sector innovation can increase their profits by moving into region a until
λ∗I (t) = 1 is restored as the spatial distribution of labor in I-sector innovation.
Second, identical arguments establish that λ∗I (t) = 0 is a stable spatial equilib-
rium; that there exists a bounded, convex set containing λ∗I (t) = 0, given by [0, 0.5),
such that from any point λI (t) ∈ [0, 0.5), firms in I-sector innovation can increase
their profits by moving into region b until λ∗I (t) = 0 is restored as the spatial dis-
tribution of labor in I-sector innovation; and that all λI (t) ∈ (0, 0.5) are not spatial
equilibrium.
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Third, that λ∗I (t) = 0.5 is a spatial equilibrium follows from the fact that







which implies that no firm in I-sector innovation can increase its profits by moving
between regions when λI (t) = 0.5. The first two parts of this proof establish that
λ∗I (t) = 0.5 is not stable spatial equilibrium. This is because any bounded, convex
set containing λ∗I (t) = 0.5 defined by (0.5− ρ, 0.5 + ρ) ∩ [0, 1], ρ > 0, will contain
elements of the sets [0, 0.5) and (0.5, 1]. As such, there does not exist a bounded,
convex set containing λ∗I (t) = 0.5 defined by (0.5− ρ, 0.5 + ρ) ∩ [0, 1], ρ > 0, such
that from any point in the set, I-sector firms will move between regions so that




G.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. To begin, the price of S-sector output, p (t), is defined implicitly in terms
of E (t) and N (t) by the S-sector market-clearing condition, (1.39). To derive an




























SC = FA, FD. Applying the implicit function theorem to (G.1) and using (1.39)
yields part 1 of Proposition 2:





































































Next, the expression for the elasticity of pSC (t) with respect to E (t) in part 2 of
Proposition 2 is derived by applying the implicit function theorem to (G.1) and using
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(1.39):










































Finally, from (1.39), when the economy is in static equilibrium, pSC (t) is deter-
mined by N (t) and E (t) and not L (t). As such, part 3 of Proposition 2 must hold
for all t.
G.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Using the expression for M -sector employment when the economy is in a
static equilibrium from (1.43), the elasticity of M -sector employment with respect to

































SC = FA, FD. Substituting the expression for d ln p(t)
d lnN(t)
from (G.2) into (G.4) yields






































 < 0. (G.5)
Using the expression for S-sector employment when the economy is in a static equi-
librium from (1.44), the elasticity of S-sector employment, LSCS (t), with respect to
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k = a, b. Substituting the the expression for d ln p(t)
d lnN(t)
from (G.2) into (G.6) yields the

































































The third expression in part 1 of Proposition 3 follows from (G.5) and (G.7) and the
market-clearing condition in the labor market, (1.31).
Using (1.43), the elasticity of M -sector employment with respect to societal ex-















(1− ε) d ln p
SC(t)
d lnE (t)











Substituting the expression for d ln p
SC(t)
d lnE(t)
from (G.3) into (G.8) yields the first expres-
sion in part 2 of Proposition 3:
d lnLSCM (t)
d lnE (t)




















= 1− (1− ε)













































Using the result that d ln p
SC(t)
d lnE(t)
> 0 from Proposition 2, it follows that (G.10) is greater
than zero, which establishes the second expression in part 2 of Proposition 3. The
third expression in part 1 of Proposition 3 follows from (G.9), (G.10), and the market-
clearing condition in the labor market, (1.31).
Finally, from (1.43) and (1.44), when the economy is in static equilibrium, LSCM (t)
and LSCS (t) are determined by N (t) and E (t) and not L (t). As such, part 5 of
Proposition 3 must hold for all t.
G.3 Proof of Proposition 4
























































 d ln pSC(t)d lnN (t) ,
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SC = FA, FD. Substituting the expression for d ln p
SC(t)
d lnN(t)
from (G.2) into (G.11), and
the fact that d ln p
SC(t)
d lnN(t)































































































































 d ln pSC(t)d lnN (t)
= (ε− 1) d ln p
SC(t)
d lnN (t)
> 0⇔ ε > 1.


































d ln pSC (t)
d lnE (t)
= 1−


















 d ln pSC (t)d lnE (t) .
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Substituting the expression for d ln p
SC(t)
d lnE(t)
from (G.3) into (G.13), and the fact that
d ln pSC(t)
d lnE(t)
> 0 from Proposition 2, yield part 2 of Proposition 2:
d ln
(





















































































































(1− β) + (1− ε)








(1− β) + (1− ε)
d ln pSC (t)
d lnE (t)
]










G.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Under full agglomeration, region a’s total employment is given by
LFAa (t) = L
FA
M (t) + L
FA




Using the market-clearing condition for labor, (1.31), LFAa (t) can be re-expressed as
LFAa (t) = L
FA




L (t)− LFAM (t)− LFAaS (t)− LFAbS (t)
)
= L (t)− LFAbS (t)
(G.15)




















from (G.7) into (G.16) yields the first term





L (t)− LFAbS (t)












 > 0. (G.17)





















< 0 from Proposition 3 (G.18) establishes the






L (t)− LFAbS (t)
1
1− β
d ln pFA (t)
d lnE (t)
< 0. (G.19)
The third term from part 1 of Proposition 5 follows directly from (G.15).










Using the market-clearing condition for labor, (1.31), and the expression for LFDkS (t),


































Using this expression for LFDa (t) and the fact that
d lnLFDS (t)
d lnN(t)
< 0 from Proposition 3,














> 0⇐⇒ Fa − Fb < 0. (G.21)
(G.21) establishes the first term in part 2 of Proposition 5.














> 0⇐⇒ Fa − Fb > 0. (G.22)




> 0 from Proposition 3. (G.22) establishes the
second term in part 2 of Proposition 5. The third term from part 2 of Proposition 5




H.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. In Section 1.4.1, the optimal expenditure path for household j is characterized
by the Euler equation, (1.13), the budget-flow constraint, (1.6), the initial conditions
lj (0), aj(0), fja, and fjb, and the transversality condition, (1.12). These first-order
conditions are shown to be both necessary and suffi cient to identify a unique max-
imum for household j’s intertemporal program. This proof for Proposition 6 will
demonstrate that having these first-order conditions hold for each household in the
economy is a suffi cient condition for (1.59) - (1.61) to hold. In doing so, this proof
establishes that (1.59) - (1.61) are necessary conditions for the first-order conditions
for household j’s intertemporal program to hold for every household in the economy.
The first differential equation in Proposition 6, (1.58), governs the growth of
technology. To understand how (1.58) is a necessary condition for the first-order
conditions from household j’s intertemporal program to hold for every household in
the economy, first note that when the economy is in static equilibrium, the equation
governing how household j’s assets evolve over time, (1.6), can be expressed as
ȧj(t) = w
SC(t)lj (t) + w
F,SC(t) (fja + fjb) + r
SC (t) aj (t)− Ej(t), (H.1)
SC = FA, FD. (H.1) uses the fact when the economy is in static equilibrium
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wj(t) = w
SC (t) for all j = 1, ..., H, where wSC (t) is defined in (1.37), and wF,SCa (t) =
wF,SCb (t) = w
F,SC(t), where wF,SCj (t), j = a, b, is defined in (1.38). That (H.1) holds









wSC(t)lj (t) + w
F,SC(t) (fja + fjb) + r

















= wSC(t)L (t) + wF,SC(t) (Fa + Fb) + r
SC (t) aSC (t)− E (t) ,
where aSC (t) is the total value of assets in the economy at time t.
(H.2) is an economy-wide resource constraint. To understand why this is the case,
first note that because households invest in I-sector firms and the economy is closed,
aSC (t) is equal to the total value of I-sector firms at time t, i.e., aSC (t) = V SCN(t)
(recall from (1.40) that value of an I-sector firm is constant). This implies that
ȧSC (t) = V SCṄSC (t), so that the growth in the total value of household assets is
a linear function of the growth in the number of I-sector firms (i.e., of the growth
in the number of varieties of intermediate inputs). Second, aggregate income in
the economy has three parts: labor income, wSC(t)L (t), rents to the fixed factor,
wF,SCa (t) (Fa + Fb), and total profits of I-sector firms, π
SC
I (t)N (t), which, using
(1.42) and (1.57), equal rSC (t) aSC (t). As such, the first three terms on the right-
hand side of (H.2) are aggregate income in the economy at time t. Given these facts,
(H.2) states that, at every point in time, aggregate income in the economy must be
allocated either to expenditure, E (t), which is directed towards household consump-
tion of M - and S-sector output, or to investment in the creation of new varieties of
intermediate inputs.
Next, it will be demonstrated that (H.2) is equivalent to (1.58) when the expres-
sions for ȧSC (t), aSC (t), wSC(t), wF,SC(t), and rSC (t) when the economy is in static
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equilibrium are inserted into (H.2). Using the expression for wF,SC(t) from (1.38) and
the expression for LSCS (t) from (1.44), we obtain






(Fa + Fb) (H.3)










= (1− β) β−1wSC (t)LSCS (t) .
Next, using the expressions rFA (t) = αLFAM (t) and r
FD (t) = α 1
2
(1 + η)LFDM (t)
from (1.57), the expressions V FA = (1− α)α
2α









from (1.40), and the fact that aSC (t) = V SCN (t), yields
rSC (t) aSC (t) = αwSC (t)LSCM . (H.4)
Substituting (H.3) and (H.4) into (H.2), and using the fact that ȧSC (t) = V SCṄSC (t),
V SCṄSC (t) = wSC(t)L (t) + (1− β) β−1wSC (t)LSCS (t) + αwSC (t)LSCM − E (t)
= wSC(t)
(





β−1wSC (t)LSCS (t) + (1 + α)w




L (t)− LSCM (t)− LSCS (t)
)
.
Substituting the expressions for LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t) from (1.43) and (1.44) into (H.5)
yields (1.58). This establishes that (H.2) is equivalent to (1.58), and that having (1.6)
hold for each household in the economy is a suffi cient condition for (1.58) to hold. In
addition, this proof demonstrates that expressions for N̂FA (t) and N̂FD (t) in (1.58)
are consistent with the aggregate resource constraint for the economy holding for all
t.1
1In addition, notice that (1.58) is the expression for the production function in the I-sector
innovation, (1.29), using the market-clearing condition for labor (1.31), and substituting in the
expressions for LSCM (t) and L
SC
S (t) from (1.43) and (1.44). This equivalence is reassuring, and
also not surprising given that the production function for I-sector innovation is embedded in the
economy-wide resource constraint implied by (H.2).
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Notice that (H.5) holds because
β−1wSC (t)LSCS (t) + (1 + α)w
SC (t)LSCM − E (t) = 0 (H.6)
for all values of E (t), N (t), and L (t). To establish this result, the first term
in (H.6) can be re-expressed as, using the expression for LSCS (t) from (1.44),
























(Fa + Fb) .
Further, using the S-sector market-clearing condition from (1.39), (H.7) becomes



















Similarly, using the M -sector market-clearing condition from (1.32), the second term
in (H.6) can be expressed as,




















E(t)−E(t) = E(t)−E(t) = 0.
Thus, (H.6) holds for all values of E (t), N (t), and L (t).2







1 + a+ 1 + a−1
(1 + a−1) (1 + a)
=
1 + a−1 + 1 + a
1 + a−1 + 1 + a
= 1.
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The second differential equation in Proposition 6, (1.59), governs the evolution
of total societal expenditure, E (t). As the Euler equation from household j’s pro-
gram, (1.13), must hold for every household in the economy, the following ordinary



















= rSC(t)− (δ − n) (H.10)
SC = FA, FD. Using the expression for rFA(t) = αLFAM (t) and r
FD(t) = 1
2
[1 + η]αLFDM (t)
from (1.57) and the expression for LSCM (t) from (1.43) yields (1.59). This implies that
a suffi cient condition for (1.59) is for the Euler equation, (1.13), to hold for every
household in the economy.
The third differential equation in Proposition 6, (1.60), governs the population
growth. As (1.1), which governs growth in household size, must hold for every house-
hold in the economy, population growth in the economy is L̂ (t) = n.
Finally, it is left to demonstrate that having each household’s transversality con-
dition, (1.15), hold is a suffi cient condition for (1.61) to hold. To begin, that the





























As is explained above, aSC (t) = V SCN(t) at all time t, which implies â (t) = N̂SC (t).
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Integrating â (t) = N̂SC (t) with respect to time,































− a (0) = 0.
(H.12) can be re-expressed as





Substituting (H.13) into (H.11) yields (1.61). This establishes that having (1.15) hold
for every household in the economy is a suffi cient condition for (1.61) to hold. This
establishes that (1.61) is a necessary condition for each household’s transversality
condition to hold.
H.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. The EGP is defined as a dynamic equilibrium for the economy that features
a constant real interest rate and constant growth in expenditure. To begin, from
(1.57), a constant real interest rate, r̄SC , implies that M -sector employment is also
constant along the EGP. Using the expression for r̄SC , SC = FA, FD, from (1.57)
and the expressions for ÊSC (t) from (1.59),
gFAE = αL̄
SC
M − (δ − n) and gFDE =
1
2
[1 + η]αL̄FDM − (δ − n) . (H.14)
251
Next, the asymptotic growth rates for technology, N (t), and the relative price
of S-sector output, p (t), along the EGP are established using the S-sector market
clearing condition, (1.39), and the fact that M -sector employment is constant along
the EGP. To begin, the expression for LSCM (t) from (1.43) and the fact that M -sector
employment is constant along the EGP imply that







] p̂SC(t) = 0 (H.15)
must hold along the EGP. Similarly, totally differentiating the S-sector market-
clearing condition (1.39) implies that






















 p̂SC(t) = 0
(1− β) ÊSC(t) + βN̂ (t)−












 p̂SC(t) = 0
must hold along the EGP. Substituting (H.15) into this expression yields
(1− β) ÊSC(t) + β
[

















This implies that the following relationship between ÊSC(t) and p̂SC(t) must hold
along the EGP:
ÊSC(t) =



































Similarly, substituting (H.16) into (H.15) implies that the following relationship be-
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tween ÊSC(t) and N̂SC (t) must hold along the EGP:


















































The fact that ÊSC(t) = gSCE along the EGP and L’Hôpital’s rule are used to get
expressions for p̂SC(t) and N̂SC (t) along the EGP. For example, applying L’Hôpital’s


































= [(1− β) ε+ β]−1 gSCE .
Similarly, applying L’Hôpital’s Rule and using (H.17),
gSCN = lim
t→∞



































Using the expression for M -sector production from (1.46),
Ŷ SCM (t) = L̂
SC
M (t) + N̂
SC (t) . (H.20)
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Ŷ SCM (t) = lim
t→∞
N̂SC (t) = gSCN = g
SC
E . (H.21)
Similarly, using the expression for S-sector production from (1.47) and the ex-
pression for S-sector employment from (1.44),







k = a, b. (H.22) implies









Using the fact that (H.18) and (H.17) imply that N̂ (t) = [(1− β) ε+ β] p̂SC(t), (H.23)
becomes



















Ŷ SCS (t) =
(
(1− ε) β





(1− ε) β + ε
)
gSCE . (H.25)
(H.25) implies that S-sector output is growing along the EGP (gSCS > 0) if and only
if ε < 1. In addition, (H.25) implies that S-sector output grows at a lower rate (gSCS )
than M -sector output (gSCM = g
SC
E ) along the EGP.
Next, the asymptotic growth rates for S-sector employment, LSCS (t), is derived
by using the condition that marginal revenue product of labor in the S-sector must
equal the wage for all t, which, using (1.47), is given by
βpSC (t)LSCS (t)
β−1 F 1−βk = w
SC (t) (H.26)
k = a, b, SC = FA, FD, where, from (1.37), wFA (t) = (1− α)α
2α
1−αN (t) and









N (t), and pSC(t) is defined implicitly by the
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S-sector market-clearing condition (1.39). (H.26) implies that






Using (H.16) and (H.17), (H.27) becomes






















































































(1− ε) β + ε
]
gSCE .
(H.29) is greater than zero if and only if ε < 1.
Next, from (1.29), N̂FA (t) = LFAI (t) and N̂
FD (t) = 1
2
(1 + η)LFDI (t). These
expression imply, using (H.19), that I-sector employment is constant along the EGP,
L̄FAI ≡ lim
t→∞
LFAI (t) = lim
t→∞


















That both M - and I-sector employment are constant along the EGP implies that
for the EGP to be consistent with a growing population (i.e., n > 0), S-sector em-
ployment must be growing along the EGP. (H.29) establishes that nSCS > 0 if and
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only if ε < 1. Hence, an EGP with a constant real interest rate and constant growth
in expenditure is only consistent with the conditions for a dynamic equilibrium for
the economy if ε < 1. This is the basis for the claim in Theorem 3 that there does
not exist an EGP when ε ≥ 1.
That both M - and I-sector employment are constant along the EGP implies that
the asymptotic rate of growth in S-sector employment equals the rate of population
growth. (i.e., nSCS = n). From (H.29), this result implies that
nSCS = n =
(
(1− ε)
(1− ε) β + ε
)
gSCE → gSCE =
(




(1.62)-(1.66) in Theorem 3 follow directly from (H.32). In particular, (H.32) along




M establishes (1.62). Next, substituting the
expression for gSCE from (H.32) into the expression for S-sector production along the
EGP, (H.25), establishes the second term in (1.63).
Concerning prices, substituting the expression for gSCE from (H.32) into the ex-
pression for the growth of pSC (t) from (H.18) yields the first term in (1.64). The
second term in (1.64) follows from (1.37).The third term in (1.64) follows from
(1.38), the expression for gSCp , and the fact that, from (H.18) and (H.17), N̂ (t) =
[(1− β) ε+ β] p̂SC(t). The fourth and final term in (1.64) follows from (H.32) and
(1.36).
Substituting the expression for gSCE from (H.32) into (H.14) and rearranging terms
establishes the expression for the constant level of M -sector employment along the
EGP in (1.65). Similarly, substituting the expression for gSCE from (H.32) into (H.30)
and (H.31) establishes the expressions for the constant level of I-sector employment
along the EGP in (1.66).
Concerning regional population growth and regional population shares along the
EGP, the populations of regions a and b are, under full agglomeration,
LFAa (t) = L
FA
M (t) + L
FA
I (t) + L
FA
aS (t) and L
FA
b (t) = L
FA
bS (t) , (H.33)
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It follows from (H.33) and (H.34) that
nFAa = lim
t→∞






L̂FAaS (t) = lim
t→∞
L̂FAS (t) = n. (H.35)
(H.35) uses the facts that L̂FAkS (t) = L̂
FA
S (t), k = a, b, which follows from the expres-
sion for LFAkS (t) from (1.26), and that bothM - and I-sector employment are constant







= 1. Identical arguments


















































(LFDM (t) + L
FD







(LFDM (t) + L
FD











These result establish (1.68).
To demonstrate that this EGP allocation is consistent with the necessary con-
ditions for a dynamic equilibrium from Proposition 6, it is left to establish that it
satisfies the transversality condition given in (1.61) (note that this proof has already
used (1.58), (1.59), and (1.60) from Proposition 6). A suffi cient condition for the
transversality condition in (1.61) to hold is for the rate of growth of technology,
N̂ (t), to be less than the real interest rate, r (t), as t → ∞. This condition holds
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along the EGP: r̄SC = αL̄SCM = gE + (δ − n) > gE = gN , SC = FA, FD. Hence, the
transversality condition in (1.61) from Proposition 6 holds along the EGP.
The EGP is unique by construction in that it is the only dynamic path for the
economy with a constant real interest rate and constant growth rate of expenditure
that satisfies the necessary conditions for a dynamic equilibrium from Proposition 6.
H.3 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. To establish Proposition 7, it is suffi cient to demonstrate that LSCM (t) tends
to a constant as t → ∞ when (i) the economy is on the dynamic trajectory defined
by ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t) and (ii) L̂FAS (t) approaches n from above as t → ∞. Recall
that the EGP is defined as a dynamic equilibrium for the economy that features a
constant real interest rate (as well as constant expenditure growth). From (1.57), a
constant LSCM (t) implies a constant r
SC (t).
To obtain an expression for LSCM (t) when the economy is on a dynamic trajectory
defined by ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t), using the expression for N̂SC (t) from (1.58) and the
expression for ÊSC (t) from (1.58),












(1 + η)αLFDM (t)−(δ − n) = ÊFD (t) .
These two expressions imply that when ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t),
LFAM (t) = (1 + α)
−1 [L (t)− LFAS (t) + (δ − n)] (H.36)
and
LFDM (t) = (1 + α)
−1
[







From (H.36) and (H.37), LFAM (t) and L
FD
M (t) will tend to a constant as t → ∞ if(
L (t)− LSCS (t)
)
tends to constant as t → ∞. When L̂FAS (t) approaches n from
above as t → ∞ then lim
t→∞
(














LSCS (t) /L (t) = 1 (i.e., because the S-sector dominates the asymptotic distrib-
ution of employment. Hence, that L̂FAS (t) approaches n from above as t → ∞ is a
suffi cient condition for (H.36) and (H.37) to tend to constants as t→∞, and for the
dynamic trajectory defined by ÊSC (t) = N̂SC (t) to approach the EGP.
H.4 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. To begin, totally differentiating the expression forM -sector employment from
(1.43) with respect to time yields
L̂SCM (t) = Ê








SC = FA, FD. The expression for p̂SC(t) is obtained by totally differentiating the























When N̂SC(t) = ÊSC(t), (H.38) and (H.39) yield part 1 of Proposition 8:
L̂SCM (t) =
(ε− 1)






N̂SC(t) > 0⇔ ε > 1. (H.40)
Next, using the expression for S-sector employment from (1.44) and the S-sector













Totally differentiating (H.41) with respect to time yields
L̂SCS (t) = Ê








When N̂SC(t) = ÊSC(t), substituting the expression for p̂ (t)SC from (H.39) into
(H.42) yields part 2 of Proposition 8:
L̂SCS (t) =
(1− ε)






N̂SC(t) > 0⇔ ε < 1. (H.43)
Part 3 of Proposition 8 can be derived using the expression for M -sector produc-
tion from (1.46), and using the expression for L̂SCM (t) when Ê
SC(t) = N̂SC(t) from
(H.40)
Ŷ SCM (t) = L̂
SC

























 N̂SC(t) > 0.
Part 4 of Proposition 8 can be derived using the expression for S-sector produc-
tion from (1.47), the expression for S-sector employment from (1.44), the fact that
Ŷ SCkS (t) = Ŷ
SC
S (t), k = a, b , and the expression for p̂
SC(t) when ÊSC(t) = N̂SC(t)
from (H.39),






































 N̂SC (t) > 0⇔ ε < 1.
Finally, part 5 of Proposition 8 follows from totally differentiating the market












and from the the fact that Ŷ SCI (t) = L̂
SC
I (t).
H.5 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. To being, under full agglomeration, employment in regions a and b are
LFAa (t) = L
FA
M (t) + L
FA
I (t) + L
FA






LFAb (t) = L
FA








Totally differentiating these expressions for LFAa (t) and L
FA
a (t) with respect to time
and rearranging terms yields part 1 of Proposition 9:








> 0⇔ n > L̂FAS (t) .








































Totally differentiating these expressions for LFDa (t) and L
FD





























Rearranging terms yields part 2 of Proposition 9:















S (t) (Fa − Fb)LFDb (t)
−nL (t) (Fa + Fb)LFDa (t)
+L̂FDS (t)L
FD











 nL (t) (Fa + Fb) (LFDb (t)− LFDa (t))
+L̂FDS (t)L
FD











 −nL (t)LFDS (t) (Fa − Fb)
+L̂FDS (t)L
FD


































Appendix for Chapter 3
We prove that
Um > Up for some B if and only if Um > Up for all B. (I.1)












which we demonstrate in three steps. First, it follows directly from the expressions
for Um and Up that Um > Up for all B ≥ max {Bm, Bp} if and only if (I.2) holds.
Second, from (3.27), when B < min {Bm, Bp},













It follows from (3.40) that when B < min {Bm, Bp},
Up = Unr + [π (enr1 , e
nr















Using (I.3) and (I.4), we obtain that Um > Up for all B < min {Bm, Bp} if and
only if (I.2) holds. Third, it is left to demonstrate that Um > Up for all B ∈
[min {Bm, Bp} ,max {Bm, Bp}) if and only if (I.2) holds. It follows from the expres-
sions for Bm and Bp that Bm > Bp if and only if (I.2) holds. By continuity of Um
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and Up as functions of B and equivalence between (I.2) and Bm > Bp, we have that
Um > Up for all B ∈ [min {Bm, Bp} ,max {Bm, Bp}) if and only if Bm > Bp. Hence,
Um > Up for all B ∈ [min {Bm, Bp} ,max {Bm, Bp}) if and only if (I.2) holds.
Combining the results proved in the above three steps, we obtain that Um > Up
for all B if and only if (I.2) holds. The inequality (I.2) is independent of B. Hence,
Um > Up for some B if and only if Um > Up for all B.
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